Reforming Indonesia's civil-military relations

Reforming Indonesia's civil-military relations

The following is an excerpt from a paper submitted to the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) by political science
lecturers at the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada
University, including F. Iriani Sophiaan Yudoyoko, Budiarto
Shambazy, Mahrus Irsyam and Rizal Panggabean. The paper
was based on a recent workshop held in Jakarta.

JAKARTA (JP): In the past, particularly during the New Order
era, the military's role went beyond security and defense. On the
other hand, during both the New and Old Order eras, Indonesian
politicians had the tendency to use the military for political
purposes. The democratization process is therefore expected to
improve the relationship between civilians and the military from
both sides. In other words, civil supremacy must be established,
but civilians must also be willing to avoid using the military to
further their political interests.

One of the nondefense roles played by the military is its
sociopolitical role, including military officers' assignment to
civilian bureaucratic and political posts. Military officers have
also been allocated legislative seats in the House of
Representatives (DPR) as well as regional legislatures, a
practice that disregards the democratic norm that all legislative
seats must be won through elections. Moreover, the military also
plays an important role in the economy, through the control of
state-owned companies and cooperatives. Political, youth and
cultural organizations are also open to the military.

All of the above practices are justified through the
exploitation of historical, ideological and constitutional
interpretations. Historically, it is claimed that the dominant
role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) is in line with the fact
that TNI is a "military of the people, from the people and for
the people". Ideologically, the military formulated and
socialized the idea of its "dual function" as the basis for
justifying its control of political, social and economic posts.
Constitutionally, under a liberal interpretation of Article 2 of
the 1945 Constitution, the military is considered to be an
"interest group" that is entitled to legislative seats.

The dominant role of the military under the New Order has
resulted in numerous negative consequences, from the perspective
of the development of a democratic political order. Not only did
it foster the military's domination of the civil bureaucracy, but
also the militarization of civil society, such as the
establishment of student regiments and paramilitary institutions
as part of mass organizations. In consequence, elements of civil
society demonstrate militaristic culture and behavior.

Furthermore, TNI's political domination has pushed the nation
toward disintegration. Although this is a problem throughout the
country, it is most obvious in East Timor, Aceh and Ambon.
Ironically, TNI has always thought of itself as the sole unifying
force in Indonesia. When the military's monopoly of the use of
force breaks down, such as in civil war or armed rebellion, the
military faces various problems, such as demoralization, internal
dissension and a breakdown in the chain of command. Therefore,
reformulating the position and role of TNI is for TNI's benefit
as well.

These phenomena have often been questioned in the past, but
the rigid authoritarian system did not allow any fundamental
changes to occur. In the reform era, people's voices have grown
stronger and they demand reform in civil-military relations. TNI
has responded to such demands with its "New Paradigm". On the one
hand, the implementation of this paradigm has brought about some
positive changes, such as the military's neutrality in the June
elections. On the other hand, at its core the New Paradigm still
maintains TNI's social and political roles, albeit at a lessened
intensity. In addition, the implementation of the paradigm seems
to be aimed more at improving TNI's image than resolving the real
problems.

In sum, the creation of the Civil Supremacy Paradigm is
necessary to expand public discourse on the restructuring of
civil-military relations in Indonesia, particularly in relation
to the 1999 MPR General Session. Thus, it is highly hoped that
the recommendations contained in this blueprint can be included
in the MPR decrees as the basis for government policy for the
next five years.
* The new Indonesia recognizes civil supremacy

1. The 1945 Constitution adheres to the principle of civil
supremacy.

2. Healthy civil-military relations is part of a larger
political system with the following characteristics: (1) a
government based on the separation of powers and the principle of
checks and balances; (2) a politically neutral civilian and
military bureaucracy; (3) an independent and autonomous civil
society; (4) strong political parties and party system; and (5)
wide-ranging regional autonomy.

3. TNI is an instrument of the state that abides by civil
supremacy and the rule of law, in accordance with the 1945
Constitution.

4. One of TNI's characteristics in abiding by the rule of law
is that the jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited only to
battlefield crimes, whereas the involvement of TNI members in
civilian crimes is processed through the civilian court system in
accordance with civilian law.
5. A free press supports the life of a democracy.
* Matters of national defense and security in the new Indonesia

1. TNI is an instrument of the state that specializes in
national defense, especially in dealing with external threats,
whereas the police maintain domestic security and order.

2. Political forces do not attempt to utilize the military and
the police as instruments to help compete for and maintain power.
* The new Indonesia is demilitarized

1. TNI no longer considers itself the most important or
superior body, or the body that holds the final word in the
decision-making process.

2. Civil society no longer behaves in a militaristic manner.
Therefore, military-style uniforms for civilians, civil
ceremonies conducted in a militaristic manner, military training
for civil servants and regional government officials, and
paramilitary organizations must be eliminated.

3. The resolution of national and local crises uses not just a
security approach, but also social, cultural, economic and
political approaches.
* Short-term (1999 to 2000) steps to realize this vision
I. 1999 MPR General Session

1. Amendment of the 1945 Constitution

- Article 2 (elimination of interest group representatives)

- Article 10 (addition of "and the use of TNI must be approved
by the DPR".)

- Article 30 (explanation of the obligation of citizens to
defend the state)

2. The president and vice president should be elected from
among the civilian political leaders who competed, through their
political parties, in the June 7 general elections.
II. Forming the new government

1. The name of the Ministry of Defense and Security should be
changed to the Ministry of Defense.

2. The post of minister of defense should not be held by an
active or retired military officer.

3. The post of TNI commander should be eliminated and replaced
by the post of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would
be held in rotation by the Army chief of staff, the Navy chief of
staff and the Air Force chief of staff. The appointment of any of
these chiefs of staff is to be done by the president, with the
approval of the DPR.
III. Abolition of the dual function

1. Civilian posts currently filled by active or retired
military officers should be returned to civilian bureaucrats
within six months.

2. The Coordinating Agency for National Stability and its
regional counterparts should be eliminated.

3. The Ministry of Home Affairs' Directorate General of Social
and Political Affairs and its branches in the provinces and
districts should be eliminated.

IV. Reorientation of national defense policy

1. Revision of various laws pertaining to civil-military
relations, such as Law No. 20/1982 on Principles of National
Security and Defense.

2. Reformulation by the government and the DPR of TNI and
National Police doctrines based on community input.

3. National Police should be moved from the Ministry of
Defense to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

4. Gradual abolition of the territorial system in all parts of
Indonesia should begin in Aceh with the withdrawal of all troops
to three military bases for the purpose of external defense, to
be located in Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe and Meulaboh. This
withdrawal is one effort to maintain Aceh as a part of Indonesia
and as an example of the national process of abolishing the
territorial system in the medium and long term.

5. Improvement of the welfare of enlisted soldiers and
noncommissioned officers in TNI and the National Police.

6. Reform of both civilian and military intelligence-gathering
institutions, so that civilian intelligence institutions are led
by civilians and the activities and budgets of both types of
intelligence institutions are made accountable to the government
and the DPR.

7. Promotions of high-ranking officers (beginning with one-
star generals) must be proposed by the Council on High Positions
and Ranks, decided by the president and approved by the DPR.
V. Reform of the military judicial system

1. Return the military police to their proper role of handling
violations committed by members of the military while on duty.

2. Criminal offenders within the military are brought to
justice in accordance with the type of violation committed.
Military courts are only to try offenders who commit violations
while on duty, so that members of the military can no longer hide
behind the military judicial system.

3. Establishment of an independent institution with the task
of formulating and implementing a strategy for handling past
human rights violations, like the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in South Africa. This institution should be
responsible to the DPR.

4. Corruption cases involving both TNI personnel and civil
servants must be fully investigated and prosecuted.
* Medium term (2000 to 2004)

I. Reform of civilian and military institutions

1. Abolish TNI/National Police seats in the DPR and regency
legislatures through the passage of a new law on legislatures.

2. Empower the National Police to handle domestic security by
increasing its personnel and supplying them with proper and
sufficient equipment, improving the welfare of its members and
reforming the police education system toward community policing.

3. Form two commands -- the West Command and East Command --
which are led by four-star generals, called commanders.

4. Abolish the institution of Mahkejapol (a tripartite forum
of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's Office and the
National Police) as a means of establishing respect for and the
independence of the Supreme Court as the highest court of the
state.

II. Implementation of regional autonomy

1. Regional military commanders are to report not only to
their superiors within the military hierarchy, but also to the
head of the relevant regional government (governor, mayor or
regent).

2. Phased elimination of the territorial system on a national
scale begins with the withdrawal of all troops from villages and
subdistricts to District Military Commands.

3. All TNI operations in a region must be approved by the
respective regency legislature.
III. Other

1. Reform the military's educational system and curriculum to
bring it in line with TNI's role and doctrine in external
defense.

2. Improve the welfare of enlisted soldiers and
noncommissioned officers in TNI and the National Police.
* Long term (2004 to 2009)

1. Gradual elimination of the territorial system on a national
scale is completed by disbanding all Regional Military Commands
and assigning the soldiers to military bases strategically
located for the purpose of external defense within the West and
East Commands.

2. Transfer control of all military businesses in accordance
with relevant laws, so that all revenue and expenditures
associated with defense and security matters are recorded in the
TNI and National Police sections of the national budget.

3. Improve the welfare of enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned
officers and commissioned officers in TNI and the National Police
to compensate for their loss of off-budget income (from military
businesses).

Window: When the military's monopoly of the use of force breaks down,
such as in civil war or armed rebellion, the military faces
various problems, such as demoralization, internal dissension and
a breakdown in the chain of command.