Reforming Indonesia's civil-military relations

The following is an excerpt from a paper submitted to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) by political science lecturers at the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University, including F. Iriani Sophiaan Yudoyoko, Budiarto Shambazy, Mahrus Irsyam and Rizal Panggabean. The paper was based on a recent workshop held in Jakarta.

JAKARTA (JP): In the past, particularly during the New Order era, the military's role went beyond security and defense. On the other hand, during both the New and Old Order eras, Indonesian politicians had the tendency to use the military for political purposes. The democratization process is therefore expected to improve the relationship between civilians and the military from both sides. In other words, civil supremacy must be established, but civilians must also be willing to avoid using the military to further their political interests.

One of the nondefense roles played by the military is its sociopolitical role, including military officers' assignment to civilian bureaucratic and political posts. Military officers have also been allocated legislative seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) as well as regional legislatures, a practice that disregards the democratic norm that all legislative seats must be won through elections. Moreover, the military also plays an important role in the economy, through the control of state-owned companies and cooperatives. Political, youth and cultural organizations are also open to the military.

All of the above practices are justified through the exploitation of historical, ideological and constitutional interpretations. Historically, it is claimed that the dominant role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) is in line with the fact that TNI is a "military of the people, from the people and for the people". Ideologically, the military formulated and socialized the idea of its "dual function" as the basis for justifying its control of political, social and economic posts. Constitutionally, under a liberal interpretation of Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution, the military is considered to be an "interest group" that is entitled to legislative seats.

The dominant role of the military under the New Order has resulted in numerous negative consequences, from the perspective of the development of a democratic political order. Not only did it foster the military's domination of the civil bureaucracy, but also the militarization of civil society, such as the establishment of student regiments and paramilitary institutions as part of mass organizations. In consequence, elements of civil society demonstrate militaristic culture and behavior.

Furthermore, TNI's political domination has pushed the nation toward disintegration. Although this is a problem throughout the country, it is most obvious in East Timor, Aceh and Ambon. Ironically, TNI has always thought of itself as the sole unifying force in Indonesia. When the military's monopoly of the use of force breaks down, such as in civil war or armed rebellion, the military faces various problems, such as demoralization, internal dissension and a breakdown in the chain of command. Therefore, reformulating the position and role of TNI is for TNI's benefit as well.

These phenomena have often been questioned in the past, but the rigid authoritarian system did not allow any fundamental changes to occur. In the reform era, people's voices have grown stronger and they demand reform in civil-military relations. TNI has responded to such demands with its "New Paradigm". On the one hand, the implementation of this paradigm has brought about some positive changes, such as the military's neutrality in the June elections. On the other hand, at its core the New Paradigm still maintains TNI's social and political roles, albeit at a lessened intensity. In addition, the implementation of the paradigm seems to be aimed more at improving TNI's image than resolving the real problems.

In sum, the creation of the Civil Supremacy Paradigm is necessary to expand public discourse on the restructuring of civil-military relations in Indonesia, particularly in relation to the 1999 MPR General Session. Thus, it is highly hoped that the recommendations contained in this blueprint can be included in the MPR decrees as the basis for government policy for the next five years. * The new Indonesia recognizes civil supremacy

1. The 1945 Constitution adheres to the principle of civil supremacy.

2. Healthy civil-military relations is part of a larger political system with the following characteristics: (1) a government based on the separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances; (2) a politically neutral civilian and military bureaucracy; (3) an independent and autonomous civil society; (4) strong political parties and party system; and (5) wide-ranging regional autonomy.

3. TNI is an instrument of the state that abides by civil supremacy and the rule of law, in accordance with the 1945 Constitution.

4. One of TNI's characteristics in abiding by the rule of law is that the jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited only to battlefield crimes, whereas the involvement of TNI members in civilian crimes is processed through the civilian court system in accordance with civilian law. 5. A free press supports the life of a democracy. * Matters of national defense and security in the new Indonesia

1. TNI is an instrument of the state that specializes in national defense, especially in dealing with external threats, whereas the police maintain domestic security and order.

2. Political forces do not attempt to utilize the military and the police as instruments to help compete for and maintain power. * The new Indonesia is demilitarized

1. TNI no longer considers itself the most important or superior body, or the body that holds the final word in the decision-making process.

2. Civil society no longer behaves in a militaristic manner. Therefore, military-style uniforms for civilians, civil ceremonies conducted in a militaristic manner, military training for civil servants and regional government officials, and paramilitary organizations must be eliminated.

3. The resolution of national and local crises uses not just a security approach, but also social, cultural, economic and political approaches. * Short-term (1999 to 2000) steps to realize this vision I. 1999 MPR General Session

1. Amendment of the 1945 Constitution

- Article 2 (elimination of interest group representatives)

- Article 10 (addition of "and the use of TNI must be approved by the DPR".)

- Article 30 (explanation of the obligation of citizens to defend the state)

2. The president and vice president should be elected from among the civilian political leaders who competed, through their political parties, in the June 7 general elections. II. Forming the new government

1. The name of the Ministry of Defense and Security should be changed to the Ministry of Defense.

2. The post of minister of defense should not be held by an active or retired military officer.

3. The post of TNI commander should be eliminated and replaced by the post of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would be held in rotation by the Army chief of staff, the Navy chief of staff and the Air Force chief of staff. The appointment of any of these chiefs of staff is to be done by the president, with the approval of the DPR. III. Abolition of the dual function

1. Civilian posts currently filled by active or retired military officers should be returned to civilian bureaucrats within six months.

2. The Coordinating Agency for National Stability and its regional counterparts should be eliminated.

3. The Ministry of Home Affairs' Directorate General of Social and Political Affairs and its branches in the provinces and districts should be eliminated.

IV. Reorientation of national defense policy

1. Revision of various laws pertaining to civil-military relations, such as Law No. 20/1982 on Principles of National Security and Defense.

2. Reformulation by the government and the DPR of TNI and National Police doctrines based on community input.

3. National Police should be moved from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

4. Gradual abolition of the territorial system in all parts of Indonesia should begin in Aceh with the withdrawal of all troops to three military bases for the purpose of external defense, to be located in Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe and Meulaboh. This withdrawal is one effort to maintain Aceh as a part of Indonesia and as an example of the national process of abolishing the territorial system in the medium and long term.

5. Improvement of the welfare of enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers in TNI and the National Police.

6. Reform of both civilian and military intelligence-gathering institutions, so that civilian intelligence institutions are led by civilians and the activities and budgets of both types of intelligence institutions are made accountable to the government and the DPR.

7. Promotions of high-ranking officers (beginning with one- star generals) must be proposed by the Council on High Positions and Ranks, decided by the president and approved by the DPR. V. Reform of the military judicial system

1. Return the military police to their proper role of handling violations committed by members of the military while on duty.

2. Criminal offenders within the military are brought to justice in accordance with the type of violation committed. Military courts are only to try offenders who commit violations while on duty, so that members of the military can no longer hide behind the military judicial system.

3. Establishment of an independent institution with the task of formulating and implementing a strategy for handling past human rights violations, like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. This institution should be responsible to the DPR.

4. Corruption cases involving both TNI personnel and civil servants must be fully investigated and prosecuted. * Medium term (2000 to 2004)

I. Reform of civilian and military institutions

1. Abolish TNI/National Police seats in the DPR and regency legislatures through the passage of a new law on legislatures.

2. Empower the National Police to handle domestic security by increasing its personnel and supplying them with proper and sufficient equipment, improving the welfare of its members and reforming the police education system toward community policing.

3. Form two commands -- the West Command and East Command -- which are led by four-star generals, called commanders.

4. Abolish the institution of Mahkejapol (a tripartite forum of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's Office and the National Police) as a means of establishing respect for and the independence of the Supreme Court as the highest court of the state.

II. Implementation of regional autonomy

1. Regional military commanders are to report not only to their superiors within the military hierarchy, but also to the head of the relevant regional government (governor, mayor or regent).

2. Phased elimination of the territorial system on a national scale begins with the withdrawal of all troops from villages and subdistricts to District Military Commands.

3. All TNI operations in a region must be approved by the respective regency legislature. III. Other

1. Reform the military's educational system and curriculum to bring it in line with TNI's role and doctrine in external defense.

2. Improve the welfare of enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers in TNI and the National Police. * Long term (2004 to 2009)

1. Gradual elimination of the territorial system on a national scale is completed by disbanding all Regional Military Commands and assigning the soldiers to military bases strategically located for the purpose of external defense within the West and East Commands.

2. Transfer control of all military businesses in accordance with relevant laws, so that all revenue and expenditures associated with defense and security matters are recorded in the TNI and National Police sections of the national budget.

3. Improve the welfare of enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers in TNI and the National Police to compensate for their loss of off-budget income (from military businesses).

Window: When the military's monopoly of the use of force breaks down, such as in civil war or armed rebellion, the military faces various problems, such as demoralization, internal dissension and a breakdown in the chain of command.