Reform security, disband paramilitary groups

M. Riefqi Muna, Defense Analyst, The RIDEP Institute,riefqi@gmx.net, Jakarta

On Feb. 5, 2002, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto reiterated his call for all extremist and militia groups, including those affiliated to political parties and religious organizations, to disband. The call received positive support from society given that such groups have incited fear due to their violent acts.

However, some who defend the existence of the groups say that they help security as pamswakarsa (voluntary security force). But, the term pamswakarsa is highly politicized and is related to the interests of the political elite and private security business.

Pamswakarsa are very much like a hired group, thugs that could be deployed based on the interests of the group or person that pays them. Unfortunately, the growth of such militia groups is also in line with the biggest political parties. These parties have betrayed basic democratic ideals by having semi-military task forces (satgas), saying they must have their own semi- military groups given the weakness of the state security apparatus.

In a democracy, it is generally agreed that the state is the only entity that has the right to develop and use force, hence the state has its soldiers, police and other security apparatus. Still, the security forces must be accountable to the public according to the principle of civilian control of the armed forces. This means that macro strategic policies relating to defense must take the form of democratic political decisions.

The state's monopoly of force is a basic principle of a democratic state, and with it comes the obligation to provide security for the people, encompassing also territorial integrity. Consequently the armed forces have to be prepared professionally with a specific structure and organization, and no other civilian organization has the right to duplicate it.

On the civilian side, the police force is set up to provide law enforcement and public order, or internal security. Other security apparatus such as the secret services, immigration as well as customs support broader security aspects.

Private civilians have no right to develop their own model of a paramilitary force or models that resemble the military system in their behavior, regardless of whether or not their uniforms differ from the military.

Violence is innate to the security apparatus. In this regard, the state has the monopoly over the right to use violence, but it still has to be accountable to its people.

And while some in the political elite will defend the need for the satgas, people know that like those called the laskar, these groups are models of militarism. In many cases across the country the satgas have not merely provided internal security for political parties, but have functioned more as a deterrent vis-a- vis the community or perceived opponents.

Among the causes of growing militarism is the culture of violence. Consequently, people accept such violence-prone groups. Meanwhile the leaders of political, ideological or even regular criminal groups have often used militaristic groups to maximize their political gain or power, taking advantage of potential recruits amid high unemployment.

The previous concept of a "total peoples' defense" (hankamrata) which assumes that anyone can voluntarily join in national defense, is a problematic concept, especially regarding the distinction between "combatant" and "non-combatant" in international humanitarian law.

In international humanitarian law during war, only combatants are allowed to shoot; meaning that the deployment of civilians is not permitted. This also applies to the police since the decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of 2000 rightly separated the police from the armed forces.

However, the concept of "total peoples' defense" has been revised to "total defense" or sistem pertahanan semesta as stated in Law No. 3/2002 on national defense, thus correcting the above mistake of failing to differentiate combatants and non- combatants; and adopting the total defense system adopted in most countries.

In times of war, combat would remain the main duty of the military; while civilians would only be able to be deployed for war through mobilization -- this would mean legally integrating them into the military structure, with or without military training. Hence during deployment they are combatants and no longer categorized as civilians until demobilization.

Integration of civilians into direct military operation must be based on a specific legal umbrella such as a law on mobilization and demobilization, which we do not have. Civilian involvement in war is only allowed after being mobilized by the law and demobilized afterward.

In this regard, the understanding, even on the part of some military officers that laskar, satgas, or whatever the paramilitary group, should be sustained as a type of reserve force for national defense, is misleading.

No matter what the circumstances, only the military (TNI) and National Police (POLRI) have the right to use a symbol and the use of force. Military training can only be conducted under mobilization. Only the state has the right to give the mandate to the TNI to give military training for civilians after they are mobilized or recruited based on the above law.

Therefore the state must decide to disband paramilitary organizations or groups. Despite the lack of the above mentioned law, the state decision to disband the respective groups could take the form of an executive order that would help reduce the proliferation of violence in society.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri's courage to disband the groups would thus contribute to peace, and would help the future Indonesia against falling into a warlord model of a community or growing mercenary forces. It is a democratic commitment to control paramilitary groups.

The disbanding of task forces of satgas of political parties is also necessary because their existence contradicts the democratic values of a political party as a vehicle for peaceful political channels.

Consequently, the state must have a plan to develop the capacity and professionalism of the security apparatus. This would reflect the government's commitment to reform the security sector in a broader sense.

The writer is also affiliated to the Center for Political Research, National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.