Reform security, disband paramilitary groups

Reform security, disband paramilitary groups

M. Riefqi Muna, Defense Analyst, The RIDEP Institute,riefqi@gmx.net,
Jakarta

On Feb. 5, 2002, Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen.
Endriartono Sutarto reiterated his call for all extremist and
militia groups, including those affiliated to political parties
and religious organizations, to disband. The call received
positive support from society given that such groups have incited
fear due to their violent acts.

However, some who defend the existence of the groups say that
they help security as pamswakarsa (voluntary security force).
But, the term pamswakarsa is highly politicized and is related to
the interests of the political elite and private security
business.

Pamswakarsa are very much like a hired group, thugs that could
be deployed based on the interests of the group or person that
pays them. Unfortunately, the growth of such militia groups is
also in line with the biggest political parties. These parties
have betrayed basic democratic ideals by having semi-military
task forces (satgas), saying they must have their own semi-
military groups given the weakness of the state security
apparatus.

In a democracy, it is generally agreed that the state is the
only entity that has the right to develop and use force, hence
the state has its soldiers, police and other security apparatus.
Still, the security forces must be accountable to the public
according to the principle of civilian control of the armed
forces. This means that macro strategic policies relating to
defense must take the form of democratic political decisions.

The state's monopoly of force is a basic principle of a
democratic state, and with it comes the obligation to provide
security for the people, encompassing also territorial integrity.
Consequently the armed forces have to be prepared professionally
with a specific structure and organization, and no other civilian
organization has the right to duplicate it.

On the civilian side, the police force is set up to provide
law enforcement and public order, or internal security. Other
security apparatus such as the secret services, immigration as
well as customs support broader security aspects.

Private civilians have no right to develop their own model of
a paramilitary force or models that resemble the military system
in their behavior, regardless of whether or not their uniforms
differ from the military.

Violence is innate to the security apparatus. In this regard,
the state has the monopoly over the right to use violence, but it
still has to be accountable to its people.

And while some in the political elite will defend the need for
the satgas, people know that like those called the laskar, these
groups are models of militarism. In many cases across the country
the satgas have not merely provided internal security for
political parties, but have functioned more as a deterrent vis-a-
vis the community or perceived opponents.

Among the causes of growing militarism is the culture of
violence. Consequently, people accept such violence-prone groups.
Meanwhile the leaders of political, ideological or even regular
criminal groups have often used militaristic groups to maximize
their political gain or power, taking advantage of potential
recruits amid high unemployment.

The previous concept of a "total peoples' defense"
(hankamrata) which assumes that anyone can voluntarily join in
national defense, is a problematic concept, especially regarding
the distinction between "combatant" and "non-combatant" in
international humanitarian law.

In international humanitarian law during war, only combatants
are allowed to shoot; meaning that the deployment of civilians is
not permitted. This also applies to the police since the decree
of the People's Consultative Assembly of 2000 rightly separated
the police from the armed forces.

However, the concept of "total peoples' defense" has been
revised to "total defense" or sistem pertahanan semesta as stated
in Law No. 3/2002 on national defense, thus correcting the above
mistake of failing to differentiate combatants and non-
combatants; and adopting the total defense system adopted in most
countries.

In times of war, combat would remain the main duty of the
military; while civilians would only be able to be deployed for
war through mobilization -- this would mean legally integrating
them into the military structure, with or without military
training. Hence during deployment they are combatants and no
longer categorized as civilians until demobilization.

Integration of civilians into direct military operation must
be based on a specific legal umbrella such as a law on
mobilization and demobilization, which we do not have. Civilian
involvement in war is only allowed after being mobilized by the
law and demobilized afterward.

In this regard, the understanding, even on the part of some
military officers that laskar, satgas, or whatever the
paramilitary group, should be sustained as a type of reserve
force for national defense, is misleading.

No matter what the circumstances, only the military (TNI) and
National Police (POLRI) have the right to use a symbol and the
use of force. Military training can only be conducted under
mobilization. Only the state has the right to give the mandate to
the TNI to give military training for civilians after they are
mobilized or recruited based on the above law.

Therefore the state must decide to disband paramilitary
organizations or groups. Despite the lack of the above mentioned
law, the state decision to disband the respective groups could
take the form of an executive order that would help reduce the
proliferation of violence in society.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri's courage to disband the
groups would thus contribute to peace, and would help the future
Indonesia against falling into a warlord model of a community or
growing mercenary forces. It is a democratic commitment to
control paramilitary groups.

The disbanding of task forces of satgas of political parties
is also necessary because their existence contradicts the
democratic values of a political party as a vehicle for peaceful
political channels.

Consequently, the state must have a plan to develop the
capacity and professionalism of the security apparatus. This
would reflect the government's commitment to reform the security
sector in a broader sense.

The writer is also affiliated to the Center for Political
Research, National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.