Reenergizing security sector reform in a democratic society

Andi Widjajanto , Member, Indonesia's Working Group on Security Sector Reform, Jakarta

Indonesia's political and social instability must be seen as the result of our incapability to project power and authority within our own borders, leaving most of our territories devoid of government. Thus, we share the characteristics of "weak states": A loss of institutional control over borders; declining levels of gross domestic product per capita; environmental degradation; a rise in criminal and political violence; and rising ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural conflicts.

One classic solution that can be implemented to eradicate internal political and social instability is development. Initiated in the 1950s and carried through until the 1980s, the post-World War II development paradigms -- reconstruction in the 1950s, development planning in the 1960s, meeting basic human needs in the 1970s, and finally, structural adjustment in the 1980s -- were mainly concerned with reducing poverty through the promotion of economic growth based on investment and science and technology. However, experience has demonstrated that economic development does not always lead to peace and security.

To close the gap between development and security, we should designate security as an explicit objective of development. Lack of security, for the state and/or for its citizens, is a major obstacle to development in Indonesia.

If Indonesia is to create those conditions under which they can escape from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, criminalization and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing, the socio-economic, governance and security dimensions must be tackled simultaneously.

The term "security sector reform" (SSR) is widely used to encapsulate this concept. As a development objective, in 1998 Nicole Ball recommended that SSR should be conducted to integrate issues pertaining to internal security such as policing, administration of justice and rule of law, with issues relating to the armed forces, the intelligence services, paramilitary forces and those civilian institutions responsible for managing and monitoring them.

In a 2000 report for Saferworld and the Conflict Prevention Network, Malcolm Chalmers defined the security sector as all those organizations that have the authority to use or order the use of -- or the threat of -- force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight.

Chalmers' definition includes: (a) military and paramilitary forces; (b) intelligence services; (c) police forces, border guards and customs services; (d) judicial and penal systems; (e) civil structures responsible for the management and oversight of the above.

Thus, to strengthen our security sector reform, it is imperative to reenergize the political vision of military transformation, i.e., to create a capable and professional defense force within a democratic society.

This vision basically means that the Indonesian Military (TNI) has to reconstruct its core competence. To achieve this objective, we need to initiate packages of political regulations for military transformation. These regulations will remove TNI's undemocratic character and serve as the foundation to begin a cultural transformation within the TNI.

The first political regulation is a new state defense bill. This regulation has already been established under Law No. 3/2002 on national defense. This law dictates that the TNI will only play a defensive role in dealing with any potential or actual external threats and leave most of the non-military, domestic security matters in the hands of the National Police.

The second political regulation should focus on defining TNI's new role within the scope of its new corporate culture. This step should begin with the drafting of a new armed forces bill and revisions of military doctrines. These will end TNI's political role and its political association with political parties, while defining its new role.

Ending TNI's political role will not only require the total annulment of its legislative representation, but also the termination of its residual influence in the executive branch of government.

Another dimension to defining TNI's new corporate culture is the government's development of a new structure and function for the Ministry of Defense, which will be the institutional representative of the democratic principle of civilian control for the armed forces.

This representation needs to be developed, since many of the problems encountered in TNI's reform attempts are a result of its isolation from society and its lack of accountability for its activities and for the resources it consumes.

A key aim of transformation, therefore, is to ensure that good governance is extended to the military sector.