Reenergizing security sector reform in a democratic society

Reenergizing security sector reform in a democratic society

Andi Widjajanto , Member, Indonesia's Working Group
on Security Sector Reform, Jakarta

Indonesia's political and social instability must be seen as
the result of our incapability to project power and authority
within our own borders, leaving most of our territories devoid of
government. Thus, we share the characteristics of "weak states":
A loss of institutional control over borders; declining levels of
gross domestic product per capita; environmental degradation; a
rise in criminal and political violence; and rising ethnic,
religious, linguistic and cultural conflicts.

One classic solution that can be implemented to eradicate
internal political and social instability is development.
Initiated in the 1950s and carried through until the 1980s, the
post-World War II development paradigms -- reconstruction in the
1950s, development planning in the 1960s, meeting basic human
needs in the 1970s, and finally, structural adjustment in the
1980s -- were mainly concerned with reducing poverty through the
promotion of economic growth based on investment and science and
technology. However, experience has demonstrated that economic
development does not always lead to peace and security.

To close the gap between development and security, we should
designate security as an explicit objective of development. Lack
of security, for the state and/or for its citizens, is a major
obstacle to development in Indonesia.

If Indonesia is to create those conditions under which they
can escape from a downward spiral wherein insecurity,
criminalization and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing,
the socio-economic, governance and security dimensions must be
tackled simultaneously.

The term "security sector reform" (SSR) is widely used to
encapsulate this concept. As a development objective, in 1998
Nicole Ball recommended that SSR should be conducted to integrate
issues pertaining to internal security such as policing,
administration of justice and rule of law, with issues relating
to the armed forces, the intelligence services, paramilitary
forces and those civilian institutions responsible for managing
and monitoring them.

In a 2000 report for Saferworld and the Conflict Prevention
Network, Malcolm Chalmers defined the security sector as all
those organizations that have the authority to use or order the
use of -- or the threat of -- force, to protect the state and its
citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible
for their management and oversight.

Chalmers' definition includes: (a) military and paramilitary
forces; (b) intelligence services; (c) police forces, border
guards and customs services; (d) judicial and penal systems; (e)
civil structures responsible for the management and oversight of
the above.

Thus, to strengthen our security sector reform, it is
imperative to reenergize the political vision of military
transformation, i.e., to create a capable and professional
defense force within a democratic society.

This vision basically means that the Indonesian Military (TNI)
has to reconstruct its core competence. To achieve this
objective, we need to initiate packages of political regulations
for military transformation. These regulations will remove TNI's
undemocratic character and serve as the foundation to begin a
cultural transformation within the TNI.

The first political regulation is a new state defense bill.
This regulation has already been established under Law No. 3/2002
on national defense. This law dictates that the TNI will only
play a defensive role in dealing with any potential or actual
external threats and leave most of the non-military, domestic
security matters in the hands of the National Police.

The second political regulation should focus on defining TNI's
new role within the scope of its new corporate culture. This step
should begin with the drafting of a new armed forces bill and
revisions of military doctrines. These will end TNI's political
role and its political association with political parties, while
defining its new role.

Ending TNI's political role will not only require the total
annulment of its legislative representation, but also the
termination of its residual influence in the executive branch of
government.

Another dimension to defining TNI's new corporate culture is
the government's development of a new structure and function for
the Ministry of Defense, which will be the institutional
representative of the democratic principle of civilian control
for the armed forces.

This representation needs to be developed, since many of the
problems encountered in TNI's reform attempts are a result of its
isolation from society and its lack of accountability for its
activities and for the resources it consumes.

A key aim of transformation, therefore, is to ensure that good
governance is extended to the military sector.