Recycling militants: Darul Islam and terrorism

Recycling militants: Darul Islam and terrorism

International Crisis Group (ICG), Singapore

No understanding of jihadism in Indonesia is possible without
understanding the Darul Islam movement (DI) and its efforts to
establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia
(NII)). Over the last 55 years, that movement has produced
splinters and offshoots that range from Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) to
non-violent religious groups.

Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing
into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired
by DI's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to
give the movement a new lease on life. If the pattern outlined in
this report holds, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate JI or
its jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the
central command but, with more attention to a few key measures,
it ought to be able to contain them.

The DI movement, that began as separate rebellions in West
Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh in the 1950s, is now one very
loose but enduring web of personal contacts that extends to most
of the major islands in Indonesia. The September 2004 bombing in
front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta shows how some of
those contacts can be brought into play.

Within days of the explosion, Indonesian police determined
that two known Malaysian JI members, Azhari Husin and Noordin
Mohammed Top, were involved. But it became apparent that they
were working in partnership with an offshoot of DI called the
Banten Ring, operating in old DI strongholds in western Java.
Three of the young men recruited as suicide bombers from the
Banten Ring, including one who died in the September bombing, had
fathers in DI.

Examining DI's history may give us clues to understanding JI:

The way Darul Islam survived and adapted after its defeat by
the Indonesian army in the 1960s and the arrest of virtually its
entire leadership in 1977-1982 suggests JI may also be able to
survive the arrests and imprisonment of many of its top leaders.

Imprisonment often enhances the credentials of DI members and
rarely serves to weaken their commitment to the cause; they often
emerge even from long imprisonment as energized as when they went
in and recruitable for new operations.

Rifts and power struggles at the top often have little impact
on cooperation at lower levels.

The odds against a particular operation succeeding are little
deterrent to those committed to planning attacks. With "Victory
or martyrdom" as the operative slogan, waging jihad against
insuperable odds has its own attraction.

Failure of older leaders to respond to particular political
events may lead to the emergence of new, militant movements led
by younger members angered by the inaction of their elders.

New bonds are forged and lasting friendships made during
military training programs.

All this is worrisome but there is also good news. The
recycling of old DI members into JI or into partnerships with JI
suggests that the recruiting base for jihadists may not be
expanding significantly, and that it is difficult for them to
move very far beyond old DI or existing JI constituencies. Even
in the DI stronghold where the foot soldiers for the Australian
embassy bombing were recruited, it was difficult to find youths
willing to sign up for the combination of very strict religious
practice and extreme interpretation of jihad. There is no reason
to think that the war in Iraq, for example, will produce a sudden
spurt of new JI members, even though the unpopularity of that war
and the anti-American sentiment it has fueled will continue to
complicate domestic counter-terror initiatives.

The most important variables that will determine whether
jihadism is contained include whether: communal tensions inside
Indonesia are properly managed; law enforcement capacity is
improved; the Indonesian government gives more serious thought to
the impact of prison on the jihadists in custody and what happens
to them on release; and, better control is exerted over the sale
and transfer of arms, ammunition and explosives.

All these are within the control of the Indonesian government.
A fourth variable is whether a new major center of international
jihadist training, such as Afghanistan once was, emerges. That
depends, of course, not only, or even primarily upon the
Indonesian government's actions but upon policies of the wider
international community.