Reconciling quixotic reforms

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): What is now the legitimate and justified reform question under the leadership of President Megawati Soekarnoputri? No sensible person would be capable of giving a satisfactory answer. Three years ago, in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of Soeharto, many could have answered the question with much greater certainty. However, developments and events during the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid have had a dazzling effect on us regarding our view of our ongoing struggle for democracy.

Abdurrahman, or Gus Dur, is a great man, for sure. He remains the doyen of democracy, justice, and humanity, with his strong commitment toward pluralism, tolerance, peaceful resolution of conflict and respect of human rights. More than any other president of Indonesia, he desacralized some of the state's symbols, including the State Palace and government bureaucracy. However, he was incapable of managing an effective government. His style of leadership was too erratic, setting the tone to his own orchestra, making it difficult for others to follow his rhythm.

Megawati has now taken up the presidency. The way she selected her Cabinet appears to have negated earlier accusations that she was unable to decide things on her own. Many would consider her as more capable than she appears, uncertain though her capability may be to rein in her coalition partners. For sure, the success of Megawati's government will depend on dynamics in the legislature and the support of the state bureaucracy, both of which were pretty well dominated by reluctant reformers, if not conservatives.

To purist democracy and human rights activists, Megawati's ascendancy will lead to the return of Soeharto-era forces into political life, which could end Indonesia's road to democracy. Her fervent nationalist patina may jeopardize regional autonomy. The creation of a state minister for communications and information and the presence of a lieutenant-general at the helm of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy have revived fears of a return to an authoritarian past.

These are all indeed legitimate worries. Soeharto's rule has become a serious cause of distress and infringement of human rights. A victim of the 1965 massacre is not able to turn a new page before the previous page has even been read. The relatives of students who were shot dead in the Trisakti and Semanggi incidents in 1998 are hearing the new, before they have heard the truth of history. Victims of incidents in Lampung, Aceh, and East Timor will not expect that the hurt in their hearts can be forgotten before it is healed.

Undoubtedly, the urgent need to restore peace and stability, national as well as regional, is the prerequisite for an economic recovery that will stimulate foreign as well as domestic investment. This urgency may bring a more statist approach of governance back to the fore.

Megawati will be more determined to resort to military solutions than Abdurrahman; she will also be more cautious in implementing regional autonomy. She is a constitutionalist with a marked streak of legalism. Her close relations with the military may hinder trials of human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh and elsewhere.

To a certain extent, this could create serious problems between the Megawati government and civil society. Human rights activists may well be disappointed by the world discussing the new, before talking about resolving old problems. Their fears have been expressed in recent statements by rights activists in New York and Canberra and environmentalists in London; their voicing of opposition against closer military relations with Indonesia's military has indicated such worries.

Indeed, one cannot expect too much from transitional regimes. As the scholar Samuel Huntington suggests, the building of democracy requires a balance between excessive participation and political institutionalization. Nick Kirtz presupposed the persistence of transitional justice, in which laws could well be insufficient instruments to seek justice.

Mohammed Ayoob has even suggested that "adequate stateness" (of democracies) allows the use of coercive forces, including the national police and the military, so long as such decisions are reached through democratic processes by institutions in authority.

The tranquility of transition, especially a transition that failed to completely break with the past, would have to accommodate the more pervasive aspects of the old regime.

The psyche of transition pragmatically assumes obectives that are more practical than idealistic. Democratic mechanisms such as transparency and accountability could well be more important than purist democratic norms, values, and virtues. Megawati's government is hardly an exception. It may be nothing wrong, at least until 2004, to use extra-constitutional measures so long as they are morally legitimate and politically justifiable.

After all, the struggle for reform, democracy and human rights will not stand still because Megawati tells it to. Those who want to be part of the future must keep pace with changes in the course of history. We must not be woven so intricately into the past that we are unable calmly to turn our attention to the new. Perhaps, the present struggle is for us to be more confident and realistic.

There is simply no place now for a "Don Quixote", a man who absurdly tilted at windmills that he thought were monstrous giants.

Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer in Strategic Studies at the postgraduate studies program at the University of Indonesia.