Reconciliation first among the contending forces

Reconciliation first among the contending forces

By Omar Halim

JAKARTA (JP): In mid-1998, Abdurrahman Wahid, then chairman of
Nahdlatul Ulama, asked this writer to assist him in setting up a
commission for national reconciliation.

Gus Dur, as he is known, felt strongly that the downfall of
Soeharto after committing years of serious abuses of people's
rights would activate strong centrifugal forces that could break
the nation and country apart.

Given the poor political legitimacy of the succeeding
administration of President B.J. Habibie, it would not have been
possible for it to assume the task of healing the nation. This
was especially true when Habibie later took the much-criticized
steps that eventually led to the secession of East Timor from
Indonesia.

The campaigns for national reconciliation had therefore to be
led by an Indonesian, outside the government, who was held in
high esteem and was also acceptable to all conflicting parties.
Under the circumstances then, Abdurrahman was no doubt one such
person.

The national reconciliation commission was to have members
representing the conflicting parties and others who were of high
social standing to act as mediators. The latter group could
comprise highly respected leaders of religious and social groups,
students, NGOs, and regional and ethnic groups who were not
involved in the conflict.

To represent the conflicting parties, names considered to
belong to those of Soeharto's circle, the military and police,
and troubled regions such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, East Timor and
Maluku, were agreed upon.

Habibie refused to endorse or be represented in the
commission. This stance forced Abdurrahman Wahid to defer the
campaigns until after the August 1999 presidential elections.

But then of course he became the next president, in an
election that was widely recognized as democratic and therefore
had legitimacy.

He was in the perfect position to initiate the reconciliation
commission. He could have easily obtained the support of Vice
President Megawati Soekarnoputri, People's Consultative Speaker
(MPR) Speaker Amien Rais and House Speaker Akbar Tandjung.

This planned national commission could have been a display of
reform leaders' determination to prevent the country from
disintegrating. This is why it should be pursued now.

Although the commission would be established by the President,
based on a law approved by the House of Representatives (DPR),
its independence and impartiality in performing its tasks has to
be strictly upheld.

First of all, its credibility, in the eyes of Indonesians,
will depend greatly upon whether the chairman and the members of
the commission are trusted by the people. They should be highly
respected leaders of the society and have unquestionable
integrity.

Nominations should thus be solicited from the general public.
The acceptability of its recommended solutions, regarding
specific conflicts, and the measures to be implemented by the
various parties to foster long-term reconciliation would depend
on whether it could uphold its independence and impartiality.
Otherwise, it will soon lose its credibility and effectiveness.

Membership of the commission would be in two separate but
inter-related groups: (1) at the national level: members who
would deal with national or inter-regional conflicts and (2) at
the regional/local level.

Since many conflicts at the regional level are influenced by
factors outside the region, the relevant "national" members would
have to support the effort of the particular "regional" members.

Membership at the "national" level will necessarily have to be
more limited, perhaps up to a maximum of 50 members. But
membership at the "regional" level would depend upon the extent
of conflict in that particular region and the "mediators" are
those highly respected regional and local leaders, buttressed by
the appropriate "national" mediators.

The size of the regional membership would therefore depend
upon the region, and in the case of some regions this could be in
the hundreds.

The membership list of the commission, at the time of its
inauguration, should not be a closed one. The commission should
be able to incorporate other, especially new, leaders in the
future, as required.

The first function of the commission is to identify the
conflicts, at the national as well as at the regional levels,
that have, since our Independence in 1945, fractured Indonesian
national unity.

This would include all major events that are politically
sensitive, yet have to be dealt with and looked into, in order
for the Indonesian people to go through the catharsis that any
reconciliation process entails.

The second task is to identify factors that have contributed
to the conflicts and, as a reconciliation body, launch the
process of reconciling the interests of the various conflicting
parties and resolve these conflicts.

If, in the attempt to resolve a conflict, the truth of the
conflict needs to be established, then the process of gathering
and verifying the facts should be launched by the commission.

But mindful of the fact that Indonesia has not, as yet, gone
through a reconciliation process, such as South Africa when it
launched its Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996, our
commission should only deal with the victims of wrongdoings of
the past. Victims and their sufferings have to be identified,
recognized and compensated.

The identification and adjudication of the perpetrators should
be done by special courts (Pengadilan Koneksitas and Pengadilan
HAM) that have been established by DPR for this purpose.

The third function of the commission is to formulate, based on
the analysis of the factors contributing to our past conflicts,
long-term measures that should be taken by the various groups
within society, the government and the Indonesian Military
(TNI)/Indonesian Police (Polri) in order to prevent actions that
could fracture the national unity of Indonesia in the future.

These measures are fundamental toward changing our ability to
perceive each other differently, in which we should not emphasize
differences, as much as stress similarities, among ourselves, and
foster common long-term goals for our nation.

These would also include measures that stress the fundamental
equal rights of every Indonesian, particularly the under-
privileged, to enjoy the protection of the law and the benefits
of development. The commission and the special courts should work
in tandem with each other.

In the process of obtaining, verifying and establishing the
names of the victims, the commission would inevitably obtain the
names of the alleged perpetrators.

The commission should not, however, publish these names since
their guilt needs to be proven in the special courts. The names
of the alleged perpetrators would automatically be transmitted to
the special prosecutor's office, which will then determine
whether there is sufficient grounds to indict these people.

In this regard, the DPR, in formulating the legal basis of
these special courts, could make allowances for the amnesty of
individuals, by the courts, who had committed crimes "below" a
certain level, provided that they have openly confessed,
expressed their deepest regret and asked for the forgiveness of
the victims and their families, and swore that they would never
commit such crimes again.

The possibility of obtaining amnesty would be a strong
inducement for the perpetrators to come forward with their
confessions, and thus settle the majority of cases. The process
of adjudication, depending upon the cases, could be done singly
but preferably by group.

As a principle, the court cases of "smaller" and "medium"
level crimes -- which should involve the large majority of cases
-- should be adjudicated first.

The adjudication of these cases would bring a feeling to the
people that the law is finally being upheld and that justice is
being done. The cathartic effect on the Indonesians would be
enormous.

The serious, larger cases would be brought to trial later,
perhaps after one to two years. These cases have to be tried and
adjudicated by the special courts, without exceptions. The hope
is that, by then, the Indonesian people will be less vindictive
in dealing with these perpetrators, especially in the context of
national reconciliation.

The proceedings of the commission should be completely open
and transparent. The more the people are involved in the national
and regional reconciliation efforts, the stronger would be their
support for the process, and this would ensure the full
implementation of its long-term recommendations.

In the process, local communities could also resolve their own
smaller-scale conflicts. This will make the national
reconciliation process more broad-based. To obtain the required
involvement of the people, a strong public communications program
should be implemented.

Three months before the official announcement of the
commission, communities in the various regions should be induced
to debate the causes of their local conflicts, aiming at ways to
resolve them.

Local groups, such as students, youth, NGOs, businesses and
the local press, would take the initiative in starting the debate
with the aim of involving the people in the process.

When the commission is launched in Jakarta, the sense of
involvement of the people in the region could be enormous. All
means of communications need to be used to involve the public in
the progress and developments of the reconciliation process.

Regional and local seminars and discussion groups, sinetron,
ketoprak, wayang, films, pamphlets, cassettes, bumper stickers,
buttons, T-shirts and others would complement the usual print,
audio and visual media materials. These should be done with
imagination.

Innovative approaches could also be used to disseminate the
long-term recommendations of the commission to the various
population groups, in order to generate widespread interest and
thus ensure that these would be followed and implemented.

There have been a lot of discussions in public about the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a model for
Indonesia.

In my opinion, the South African reconciliation process
started when President William de Klerk released Nelson Mandela
from Ruben Island in February 1990 and when they commenced their
reconciliation talks.

William de Klerk was representing the National Party
Government (the party of Afrikaans-speaking whites who formed the
bastion of Apartheid) and Nelson Mandela was representing the
African National Congress (the main organization of the
disenfranchised South African blacks fighting apartheid).

This reconciliation process led to free and fair elections in
April 1994 to form the Constituent Assembly; a national unity
Government in 1995 headed by President Nelson Mandela and Vice
President William de Klerk and, finally, the formation of the TRC
in 1996.

The work of TRC therefore should be seen as an important, and
perhaps last phase of the reconciliation process between the
whites and blacks in South Africa.

The present situation in Indonesia is quite different.

First, interests of the Old Order, New Order and the
reformists have never been reconciled.

Second, those who have benefited from 32 years of the New
Order are numerous and permeate various segments of the society,
and they have the means to attain their goals. They would be very
wary of having their interests challenged.

The reformists, on the other hand, are hopelessly divided and
are fending for their own political future. Every time the
reformists are pushed by the masses, to take action against their
antagonists, they are resisted. Differences in religion,
ethnicity and regionalism have been used as points of conflict.

It is imperative therefore that a clear understanding be
established among these groups of opposing interests, in order
not to aggravate the disintegrative forces. Bringing to justice
the still very powerful forces for their past wrongdoings at this
point of time will only bring disintegration.

Therefore, in present-day Indonesia the first priority is to
have reconciliation first among the contending forces. This
writer is therefore proposing that the scope and name of the
commission proposed above be the Komisi Independen untuk
Rekonsiliasi Nasional.

Can the Independent Commission for National Reconciliation be
implemented in Indonesia now? Only if the present reformist
political leaders are able to work out a common position to deal
with the New Order interests.

Within the context of the process of political, economic and
judicial reforms, they should delineate what the conditions for
the New Order interests are to be re-accepted into the society.

These conditions, and their quid pro quo, should not over-rule
or negate the absolute requirement that past wrongs have to be
righted.

Once they are able to do this, then they could negotiate these
within the context of national reconciliation. The KOMREKNAS
framework would be suitable for this purpose.

The reconciliation of the reformist political leaders could be
attempted by respected figures, such as Sri Sultan Hamengku
Buwono X together with a few other prominent non-political
figures, to bring the reformist leaders together not just to sign
a joint declaration but a cooperative work program, which needs
to be followed up.

First, there needs to be serious appraisal of the reform work
done in the political, economic and judicial fields. This
appraisal should result in the identification of reform work that
still needs to be done.

Second, the leaders need to plot the course of their future
actions. Basic to this is their readiness, subject to the wishes
of the electorate, to share power over the next, say, ten years.
During this period, the reform process should be completed.

Third, once this is achieved, a common position needs to be
established on how to deal with the re-acceptance of interests
from the past. The process of reaching such an agreement, if
indeed there is goodwill and cooperation from all sides, should
not exceed three months. The national reconciliation process
could then start.

If the reformist political leaders are not able to reconcile
among themselves, then since there is no one strong enough
politically to push through the reform process, the reform
process will founder and the New Order interests will, de facto,
prevail, although they would not be able to return because of
potentially violent popular opposition.

The political and security situation will continue to be
unstable, with one political figure replacing the other over
time, and the economy will be in shambles. Regional grievances
will be dealt with by force and/or band-aids, and the rich
regions will one-by-one try to secede. Our vision of Patih Gajah
Mada's Nusantara will remain only a dream.

The writer is a former senior Indonesian staff member of the
United Nations, dealing with conflict resolution in Africa and
Central Europe. He now resides in Jakarta.