Reconciliation first among the contending forces

By Omar Halim

JAKARTA (JP): In mid-1998, Abdurrahman Wahid, then chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, asked this writer to assist him in setting up a commission for national reconciliation.

Gus Dur, as he is known, felt strongly that the downfall of Soeharto after committing years of serious abuses of people's rights would activate strong centrifugal forces that could break the nation and country apart.

Given the poor political legitimacy of the succeeding administration of President B.J. Habibie, it would not have been possible for it to assume the task of healing the nation. This was especially true when Habibie later took the much-criticized steps that eventually led to the secession of East Timor from Indonesia.

The campaigns for national reconciliation had therefore to be led by an Indonesian, outside the government, who was held in high esteem and was also acceptable to all conflicting parties. Under the circumstances then, Abdurrahman was no doubt one such person.

The national reconciliation commission was to have members representing the conflicting parties and others who were of high social standing to act as mediators. The latter group could comprise highly respected leaders of religious and social groups, students, NGOs, and regional and ethnic groups who were not involved in the conflict.

To represent the conflicting parties, names considered to belong to those of Soeharto's circle, the military and police, and troubled regions such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, East Timor and Maluku, were agreed upon.

Habibie refused to endorse or be represented in the commission. This stance forced Abdurrahman Wahid to defer the campaigns until after the August 1999 presidential elections.

But then of course he became the next president, in an election that was widely recognized as democratic and therefore had legitimacy.

He was in the perfect position to initiate the reconciliation commission. He could have easily obtained the support of Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri, People's Consultative Speaker (MPR) Speaker Amien Rais and House Speaker Akbar Tandjung.

This planned national commission could have been a display of reform leaders' determination to prevent the country from disintegrating. This is why it should be pursued now.

Although the commission would be established by the President, based on a law approved by the House of Representatives (DPR), its independence and impartiality in performing its tasks has to be strictly upheld.

First of all, its credibility, in the eyes of Indonesians, will depend greatly upon whether the chairman and the members of the commission are trusted by the people. They should be highly respected leaders of the society and have unquestionable integrity.

Nominations should thus be solicited from the general public. The acceptability of its recommended solutions, regarding specific conflicts, and the measures to be implemented by the various parties to foster long-term reconciliation would depend on whether it could uphold its independence and impartiality. Otherwise, it will soon lose its credibility and effectiveness.

Membership of the commission would be in two separate but inter-related groups: (1) at the national level: members who would deal with national or inter-regional conflicts and (2) at the regional/local level.

Since many conflicts at the regional level are influenced by factors outside the region, the relevant "national" members would have to support the effort of the particular "regional" members.

Membership at the "national" level will necessarily have to be more limited, perhaps up to a maximum of 50 members. But membership at the "regional" level would depend upon the extent of conflict in that particular region and the "mediators" are those highly respected regional and local leaders, buttressed by the appropriate "national" mediators.

The size of the regional membership would therefore depend upon the region, and in the case of some regions this could be in the hundreds.

The membership list of the commission, at the time of its inauguration, should not be a closed one. The commission should be able to incorporate other, especially new, leaders in the future, as required.

The first function of the commission is to identify the conflicts, at the national as well as at the regional levels, that have, since our Independence in 1945, fractured Indonesian national unity.

This would include all major events that are politically sensitive, yet have to be dealt with and looked into, in order for the Indonesian people to go through the catharsis that any reconciliation process entails.

The second task is to identify factors that have contributed to the conflicts and, as a reconciliation body, launch the process of reconciling the interests of the various conflicting parties and resolve these conflicts.

If, in the attempt to resolve a conflict, the truth of the conflict needs to be established, then the process of gathering and verifying the facts should be launched by the commission.

But mindful of the fact that Indonesia has not, as yet, gone through a reconciliation process, such as South Africa when it launched its Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996, our commission should only deal with the victims of wrongdoings of the past. Victims and their sufferings have to be identified, recognized and compensated.

The identification and adjudication of the perpetrators should be done by special courts (Pengadilan Koneksitas and Pengadilan HAM) that have been established by DPR for this purpose.

The third function of the commission is to formulate, based on the analysis of the factors contributing to our past conflicts, long-term measures that should be taken by the various groups within society, the government and the Indonesian Military (TNI)/Indonesian Police (Polri) in order to prevent actions that could fracture the national unity of Indonesia in the future.

These measures are fundamental toward changing our ability to perceive each other differently, in which we should not emphasize differences, as much as stress similarities, among ourselves, and foster common long-term goals for our nation.

These would also include measures that stress the fundamental equal rights of every Indonesian, particularly the under- privileged, to enjoy the protection of the law and the benefits of development. The commission and the special courts should work in tandem with each other.

In the process of obtaining, verifying and establishing the names of the victims, the commission would inevitably obtain the names of the alleged perpetrators.

The commission should not, however, publish these names since their guilt needs to be proven in the special courts. The names of the alleged perpetrators would automatically be transmitted to the special prosecutor's office, which will then determine whether there is sufficient grounds to indict these people.

In this regard, the DPR, in formulating the legal basis of these special courts, could make allowances for the amnesty of individuals, by the courts, who had committed crimes "below" a certain level, provided that they have openly confessed, expressed their deepest regret and asked for the forgiveness of the victims and their families, and swore that they would never commit such crimes again.

The possibility of obtaining amnesty would be a strong inducement for the perpetrators to come forward with their confessions, and thus settle the majority of cases. The process of adjudication, depending upon the cases, could be done singly but preferably by group.

As a principle, the court cases of "smaller" and "medium" level crimes -- which should involve the large majority of cases -- should be adjudicated first.

The adjudication of these cases would bring a feeling to the people that the law is finally being upheld and that justice is being done. The cathartic effect on the Indonesians would be enormous.

The serious, larger cases would be brought to trial later, perhaps after one to two years. These cases have to be tried and adjudicated by the special courts, without exceptions. The hope is that, by then, the Indonesian people will be less vindictive in dealing with these perpetrators, especially in the context of national reconciliation.

The proceedings of the commission should be completely open and transparent. The more the people are involved in the national and regional reconciliation efforts, the stronger would be their support for the process, and this would ensure the full implementation of its long-term recommendations.

In the process, local communities could also resolve their own smaller-scale conflicts. This will make the national reconciliation process more broad-based. To obtain the required involvement of the people, a strong public communications program should be implemented.

Three months before the official announcement of the commission, communities in the various regions should be induced to debate the causes of their local conflicts, aiming at ways to resolve them.

Local groups, such as students, youth, NGOs, businesses and the local press, would take the initiative in starting the debate with the aim of involving the people in the process.

When the commission is launched in Jakarta, the sense of involvement of the people in the region could be enormous. All means of communications need to be used to involve the public in the progress and developments of the reconciliation process.

Regional and local seminars and discussion groups, sinetron, ketoprak, wayang, films, pamphlets, cassettes, bumper stickers, buttons, T-shirts and others would complement the usual print, audio and visual media materials. These should be done with imagination.

Innovative approaches could also be used to disseminate the long-term recommendations of the commission to the various population groups, in order to generate widespread interest and thus ensure that these would be followed and implemented.

There have been a lot of discussions in public about the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a model for Indonesia.

In my opinion, the South African reconciliation process started when President William de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from Ruben Island in February 1990 and when they commenced their reconciliation talks.

William de Klerk was representing the National Party Government (the party of Afrikaans-speaking whites who formed the bastion of Apartheid) and Nelson Mandela was representing the African National Congress (the main organization of the disenfranchised South African blacks fighting apartheid).

This reconciliation process led to free and fair elections in April 1994 to form the Constituent Assembly; a national unity Government in 1995 headed by President Nelson Mandela and Vice President William de Klerk and, finally, the formation of the TRC in 1996.

The work of TRC therefore should be seen as an important, and perhaps last phase of the reconciliation process between the whites and blacks in South Africa.

The present situation in Indonesia is quite different.

First, interests of the Old Order, New Order and the reformists have never been reconciled.

Second, those who have benefited from 32 years of the New Order are numerous and permeate various segments of the society, and they have the means to attain their goals. They would be very wary of having their interests challenged.

The reformists, on the other hand, are hopelessly divided and are fending for their own political future. Every time the reformists are pushed by the masses, to take action against their antagonists, they are resisted. Differences in religion, ethnicity and regionalism have been used as points of conflict.

It is imperative therefore that a clear understanding be established among these groups of opposing interests, in order not to aggravate the disintegrative forces. Bringing to justice the still very powerful forces for their past wrongdoings at this point of time will only bring disintegration.

Therefore, in present-day Indonesia the first priority is to have reconciliation first among the contending forces. This writer is therefore proposing that the scope and name of the commission proposed above be the Komisi Independen untuk Rekonsiliasi Nasional.

Can the Independent Commission for National Reconciliation be implemented in Indonesia now? Only if the present reformist political leaders are able to work out a common position to deal with the New Order interests.

Within the context of the process of political, economic and judicial reforms, they should delineate what the conditions for the New Order interests are to be re-accepted into the society.

These conditions, and their quid pro quo, should not over-rule or negate the absolute requirement that past wrongs have to be righted.

Once they are able to do this, then they could negotiate these within the context of national reconciliation. The KOMREKNAS framework would be suitable for this purpose.

The reconciliation of the reformist political leaders could be attempted by respected figures, such as Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono X together with a few other prominent non-political figures, to bring the reformist leaders together not just to sign a joint declaration but a cooperative work program, which needs to be followed up.

First, there needs to be serious appraisal of the reform work done in the political, economic and judicial fields. This appraisal should result in the identification of reform work that still needs to be done.

Second, the leaders need to plot the course of their future actions. Basic to this is their readiness, subject to the wishes of the electorate, to share power over the next, say, ten years. During this period, the reform process should be completed.

Third, once this is achieved, a common position needs to be established on how to deal with the re-acceptance of interests from the past. The process of reaching such an agreement, if indeed there is goodwill and cooperation from all sides, should not exceed three months. The national reconciliation process could then start.

If the reformist political leaders are not able to reconcile among themselves, then since there is no one strong enough politically to push through the reform process, the reform process will founder and the New Order interests will, de facto, prevail, although they would not be able to return because of potentially violent popular opposition.

The political and security situation will continue to be unstable, with one political figure replacing the other over time, and the economy will be in shambles. Regional grievances will be dealt with by force and/or band-aids, and the rich regions will one-by-one try to secede. Our vision of Patih Gajah Mada's Nusantara will remain only a dream.

The writer is a former senior Indonesian staff member of the United Nations, dealing with conflict resolution in Africa and Central Europe. He now resides in Jakarta.