Recommended U.S. policy for Indonesia and Maluku crisis

The following is the second part of an excerpt from a report prepared for the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom which held a hearing on the Maluku Islands on Feb. 13 in Washington D.C. The report is by R. William Liddle, an expert on Indonesia of The Ohio State University in the United States.

WASHINGTON D.C.: What are the implications for the United States policy of Abdurrahman Wahid's present and Megawati Soekarnoputri's prospective presidencies? How should the U.S. respond to the continuing crisis in Maluku?

The U.S. should more actively engage the present democratic regime than we did Soeharto's authoritarian New Order, when our policy was influenced largely by Cold War considerations and our appreciation for Soeharto's record of economic success.

Indonesia is an important country regionally (and potentially globally) whose new leaders are committed to achieving national unity, democracy, and shared prosperity, key characteristics of modern societies.

The obstacles to their success are enormous, and the opportunities for outsiders to make a difference are also greater than ever before.

With regard to separatist movements and other regional demands, we should support peaceful efforts by the Indonesian government to negotiate differences in regions such as Aceh and Irian Jaya.

We should also provide technical assistance to help the government create viable provincial and district/municipality governments. We should oppose military or police action -- currently being contemplated by the Abdurrahman, or Gus Dur, government and strongly supported within the Megawati camp -- which is almost certain to be counterproductive, increasing the hostility of the people of Aceh and Irian Jaya to Jakarta and to Indonesia.

We should work toward restoration of programs of assistance to the Indonesian armed forces to help them become a professional force whose basic mission is national defense.

While the police must eventually take over the responsibility for maintaining public order, the military will for many years still be called upon in emergency situations -- such as the current Maluku crisis -- and must be able to intervene as a neutral, unbiased force to restore order.

Our assistance should be predicated on a clear understanding that the armed forces have given up their pretension to being an autonomous political actor.

Accordingly, the territorial system should be dismantled.

Implementation of this recommendation may be more difficult to achieve under a Megawati government, which may be less sensitive to the requirements of civilian supremacy than is Gus Dur.

We should support a massive program to rebuild the justice system, including assistance in training and developing police, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to a high performance standard.

The new Indonesian democracy cannot succeed in meeting the basic needs of its citizens, and will probably not even be stable, if it is not undergirded with a modern system of justice.

Because the roots of the Indonesian legal system are in continental Europe, this should be a multi-national program. This recommendation may also be harder to implement under a Megawati government more protective of the privileges of the state over society.

We should support the development of a modern party system, responsive and accountable to citizen demands and as free as possible of corruption, which delegitimizes democracy.

The core institutions of modern democracy, parties are especially weak in Indonesia because of the legacy of four decades of anti-party authoritarian rule.

International non government organizations, like the U.S.- based National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute and the German party foundations are probably best equipped to help in this area.

We should continue to press the Indonesian government to adhere to its agreements with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international creditors and donors and in general to keep the economy open domestically and internationally.

Market-oriented economic growth, with appropriate government intervention, produces prosperity, as has been amply proved by the East Asian, including Indonesian, experience of the last half-century.

It also creates the social and cultural basis for a stable and effective modern democracy. Unfortunately, Megawati and Gus Dur are probably equally reluctant supporters of free markets.

Strict enforcement of the rule of law by a neutral police and an impartial judiciary is the ideal resolution of the Maluku crisis, according to most outside observers. Unfortunately, this approach does not work in much of Indonesia, for reasons already discussed, and has been particularly problematic in Maluku since the initial outbreak of violence in January 1999.

Nonetheless, it needs to be stated at the outset, and in conjunction with the general recommendations above, that it is the goal toward which the Indonesian government and interested outside parties should be working.

In the short run, two approaches seem most promising. One is to keep U.S. and international pressure on the Indonesian government to find and prosecute the militia leaders most responsible for the violence.

International human rights groups can help by identifying those leaders and documenting their actions. Sanctions against the Indonesian government for failing to take action can include continued embargoes on arms sales and isolation of the Indonesian military, accompanied by reminders that the long term goal is restoration of military-to-military assistance under the terms laid out in the general recommendations.

The second approach is to maximize the international presence in Maluku, as a means of keeping a spotlight on the militias and providing a continuing flow of information about their activities to the outside world.

This can be accomplished by programs such as those currently being carried out by the UNDP and USAID, most of which provide humanitarian assistance or sponsor Christian-Muslim mediation activities.

When the need is for justice, mediation is not likely to be effective, but at least the participants are continuously made aware of the presence of foreigners. These programs also help to encourage the "moderate middle" leadership strata to take control of local society back from the militia.

Finally, while it is true that the Indonesian police and military have proved themselves completely incapable of restoring order in Maluku, an international peacekeeping force does not seem to be a feasible alternative.

There is too little backing outside Indonesia and too much hostility in the country to the idea. The domestic hostility has two sources: the extreme sensitivity concerning Christian-Muslim conflict at the center and in many regions of the country; and the 1999 traumatic experience with foreign troops in East Timor.

To quote the careful and balanced report of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, published in December 2000, "Foreign military intervention in Maluku would be counter-productive, could easily lead to further destabilization in Indonesia, and should not be sought."

The report also suggests offering foreign observers, however, and recommends maintaining and increasing sanctions on the Indonesian military and police.