Recommended U.S. policy for Indonesia and Maluku crisis

Recommended U.S. policy for Indonesia and Maluku crisis

The following is the second part of an excerpt from a report
prepared for the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom which held a hearing on the Maluku Islands on
Feb. 13 in Washington D.C. The report is by R. William Liddle, an
expert on Indonesia of The Ohio State University in the United
States.

WASHINGTON D.C.: What are the implications for the United
States policy of Abdurrahman Wahid's present and Megawati
Soekarnoputri's prospective presidencies? How should the U.S.
respond to the continuing crisis in Maluku?

The U.S. should more actively engage the present democratic
regime than we did Soeharto's authoritarian New Order, when our
policy was influenced largely by Cold War considerations and our
appreciation for Soeharto's record of economic success.

Indonesia is an important country regionally (and potentially
globally) whose new leaders are committed to achieving national
unity, democracy, and shared prosperity, key characteristics of
modern societies.

The obstacles to their success are enormous, and the
opportunities for outsiders to make a difference are also greater
than ever before.

With regard to separatist movements and other regional
demands, we should support peaceful efforts by the Indonesian
government to negotiate differences in regions such as Aceh and
Irian Jaya.

We should also provide technical assistance to help the
government create viable provincial and district/municipality
governments. We should oppose military or police action --
currently being contemplated by the Abdurrahman, or Gus Dur,
government and strongly supported within the Megawati camp --
which is almost certain to be counterproductive, increasing the
hostility of the people of Aceh and Irian Jaya to Jakarta and to
Indonesia.

We should work toward restoration of programs of assistance to
the Indonesian armed forces to help them become a professional
force whose basic mission is national defense.

While the police must eventually take over the responsibility
for maintaining public order, the military will for many years
still be called upon in emergency situations -- such as the
current Maluku crisis -- and must be able to intervene as a
neutral, unbiased force to restore order.

Our assistance should be predicated on a clear understanding
that the armed forces have given up their pretension to being an
autonomous political actor.

Accordingly, the territorial system should be dismantled.

Implementation of this recommendation may be more difficult to
achieve under a Megawati government, which may be less sensitive
to the requirements of civilian supremacy than is Gus Dur.

We should support a massive program to rebuild the justice
system, including assistance in training and developing police,
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to a high performance standard.

The new Indonesian democracy cannot succeed in meeting the
basic needs of its citizens, and will probably not even be
stable, if it is not undergirded with a modern system of justice.

Because the roots of the Indonesian legal system are in
continental Europe, this should be a multi-national program.
This recommendation may also be harder to implement under a
Megawati government more protective of the privileges of the
state over society.

We should support the development of a modern party system,
responsive and accountable to citizen demands and as free as
possible of corruption, which delegitimizes democracy.

The core institutions of modern democracy, parties are
especially weak in Indonesia because of the legacy of four
decades of anti-party authoritarian rule.

International non government organizations, like the U.S.-
based National Democratic Institute and International Republican
Institute and the German party foundations are probably best
equipped to help in this area.

We should continue to press the Indonesian government to
adhere to its agreements with the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and other international creditors and donors and
in general to keep the economy open domestically and
internationally.

Market-oriented economic growth, with appropriate government
intervention, produces prosperity, as has been amply proved by
the East Asian, including Indonesian, experience of the last
half-century.

It also creates the social and cultural basis for a stable and
effective modern democracy. Unfortunately, Megawati and Gus Dur
are probably equally reluctant supporters of free markets.

Strict enforcement of the rule of law by a neutral police and
an impartial judiciary is the ideal resolution of the Maluku
crisis, according to most outside observers. Unfortunately, this
approach does not work in much of Indonesia, for reasons already
discussed, and has been particularly problematic in Maluku since
the initial outbreak of violence in January 1999.

Nonetheless, it needs to be stated at the outset, and in
conjunction with the general recommendations above, that it is
the goal toward which the Indonesian government and interested
outside parties should be working.

In the short run, two approaches seem most promising. One is
to keep U.S. and international pressure on the Indonesian
government to find and prosecute the militia leaders most
responsible for the violence.

International human rights groups can help by identifying
those leaders and documenting their actions. Sanctions against
the Indonesian government for failing to take action can include
continued embargoes on arms sales and isolation of the Indonesian
military, accompanied by reminders that the long term goal is
restoration of military-to-military assistance under the terms
laid out in the general recommendations.

The second approach is to maximize the international presence
in Maluku, as a means of keeping a spotlight on the militias and
providing a continuing flow of information about their activities
to the outside world.

This can be accomplished by programs such as those currently
being carried out by the UNDP and USAID, most of which provide
humanitarian assistance or sponsor Christian-Muslim mediation
activities.

When the need is for justice, mediation is not likely to be
effective, but at least the participants are continuously made
aware of the presence of foreigners. These programs also help to
encourage the "moderate middle" leadership strata to take control
of local society back from the militia.

Finally, while it is true that the Indonesian police and
military have proved themselves completely incapable of restoring
order in Maluku, an international peacekeeping force does not
seem to be a feasible alternative.

There is too little backing outside Indonesia and too much
hostility in the country to the idea. The domestic hostility has
two sources: the extreme sensitivity concerning Christian-Muslim
conflict at the center and in many regions of the country; and
the 1999 traumatic experience with foreign troops in East Timor.

To quote the careful and balanced report of the Brussels-based
International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and
Chaos in Maluku, published in December 2000, "Foreign military
intervention in Maluku would be counter-productive, could easily
lead to further destabilization in Indonesia, and should not be
sought."

The report also suggests offering foreign observers, however,
and recommends maintaining and increasing sanctions on the
Indonesian military and police.