Reciprocal efforts needed to revive peace in Aceh

P. Ramasamy, National University of Malaysia, Selangor, Malaysia

For durable peace to take shape in Aceh, there is need for the both the parties, the Indonesian government and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) to practice some kind of give and take. However, recent events indicate that the positions of the both the sides are becoming very polarized, paving the way for renewed armed conflict in the province.

There are sections within the government that are putting new and difficult demands for the GAM to fulfill. For example, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Gen. (ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono along with those in the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the National Police are now telling GAM to accept the provision of special autonomy and the framework of a united Indonesia before any further talks could be planned.

Strange enough, following the acceptance of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) on Dec. 9, these conditions were not there. It was assumed by both the parties that peace negotiations would proceed by the way of building mutual trust and confidence. In the COHA, the surrender of the weapons by GAM was very much tied with the Indonesian armed forces retreating and slowly reducing its military presence in the province.

However, without these two simultaneous processes in motion, it would be difficult for Indonesian authorities to merely accept GAM to surrender its weapons. GAM would not surrender its weapons unless there is simultaneous reciprocation on the party of the authorities reduce the overwhelming presence of the TNI, the police and other units that have posed major security problems for the people.

Close reading of the spirit of the COHA would indicate that the whole process of building confidence leading to a durable peace requires commitment and honesty on both parts.

Further, the authorities or GAM cannot expect miracles from the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC); the agency is a mere facilitator of the peace process on the basis of the jointly signed COHA.

The HDC would not really be able to do much if the Indonesian government starts taking unilateral actions that might potentially undermine the peace process. Demanding GAM to surrender its weapons and asking it to accept the concept of special autonomy within the larger political framework of Indonesia, is potentially dangerous. Such demands might please the hardliners in the government especially the armed forces, but are not going to anything for the peace process.

GAM doesn't really seem to have projected the quest for independence in a bold and unilateral manner. Its representative in the JSC, Ibrahim Sofyan Tiba, has said that whatever the decision taken by the committee would be agreeable to GAM. Yet if the Indonesian authorities do not rescind the above demands, there is great likelihood that GAM might indeed come out with its bold proposals of outright independence through armed struggle or through a general referendum.

COHA document is not a blue-print for peace; it is a document that provides general guidelines as to how peace could be obtained on the basis of building trust, confidence and understanding. It is going to be more than four months since the signing of the COHA, and during this period, the people of Aceh have benefited from the general absence of civil war.

The good thing about an uninterrupted peace process is that it allows the return of normalcy and people affected by more than two decades of war will start developing a stake in the system. These developments will have the tendency to influence the peace process and ultimately determine the nature of peace settlement in the province.

Thus, for peace to proceed, both the parties must go back to the contents and spirit of the COHA. Most importantly, the peace process should not re-start without the imposition of difficult conditions by either the government or GAM.

Both parties need to adopt a functional perspective; put aside difficult political questions aside for some time and try to focus on issues that might elicit cooperation from both sides.

Once cooperation and understanding is developed, then the process itself would have its own logic to tackle more difficult political and ideological questions.

As it is, asking GAM to surrender its weapons and making a commitment to special autonomy would not advance the cause of peace in Aceh. These demands might beget other forms of radical political demands from GAM.

It is not that the entire peace process is lost. The HDC is trying its best to organize another JC meeting soon. GAM has agreed and chances are the government would also agree to this meeting. The proposed meeting will be essential to revive the fledging peace process in Aceh and give importance to COHA.

COHA is not a perfect document; there will be always tendencies for the both parties to misinterpret and misjudge its contents, but under the watchful eyes of HDC, it has the potential to bring about durable peace in Aceh, a province that only knew conflict and suffering for more than two decades.

Perhaps it is about time that the parties to conflict also examine the peace process in Sri Lanka, currently mediated by the Norwegian government. The Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in February 2001.

The peace process is nevertheless holding fast in the country and normalcy is slowly returning to affected parts of the country, especially in the north and east. Although the LTTE withdrew from the peace negotiations as a protest, the ceasefire agreement is very much in force. There seem to be good chances that the LTTE will get back to the negotiating table very soon.

The case of Sri Lanka illustrates that temporary withdrawals from peace negotiations need not undermine ceasefire agreements. Temporary withdrawals and suspensions might actually rejuvenate the peace process without undermining initial agreement.

The LTTE, by temporarily disengaging from negotiations, has reportedly succeeded in forcing the Sri Lanka government to withdraw some of its troop from occupying civilian areas in the district of Jaffna, in northern Sri Lanka.

P. Ramasamy is a professor of political science at the Centre for History, Political Science and Strategic Studies of the above university.