Reciprocal efforts needed to revive peace in Aceh

Reciprocal efforts needed to revive peace in Aceh

P. Ramasamy, National University of Malaysia, Selangor, Malaysia

For durable peace to take shape in Aceh, there is need for
the both the parties, the Indonesian government and the Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (GAM) to practice some kind of give and take.
However, recent events indicate that the positions of the both
the sides are becoming very polarized, paving the way for renewed
armed conflict in the province.

There are sections within the government that are putting new
and difficult demands for the GAM to fulfill. For example,
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Gen.
(ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono along with those in the
Indonesian Military (TNI) and the National Police are now telling
GAM to accept the provision of special autonomy and the framework
of a united Indonesia before any further talks could be planned.

Strange enough, following the acceptance of the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement (COHA) on Dec. 9, these conditions were not
there. It was assumed by both the parties that peace negotiations
would proceed by the way of building mutual trust and confidence.
In the COHA, the surrender of the weapons by GAM was very much
tied with the Indonesian armed forces retreating and slowly
reducing its military presence in the province.

However, without these two simultaneous processes in motion,
it would be difficult for Indonesian authorities to merely accept
GAM to surrender its weapons. GAM would not surrender its weapons
unless there is simultaneous reciprocation on the party of the
authorities reduce the overwhelming presence of the TNI, the
police and other units that have posed major security problems
for the people.

Close reading of the spirit of the COHA would indicate that
the whole process of building confidence leading to a durable
peace requires commitment and honesty on both parts.

Further, the authorities or GAM cannot expect miracles from
the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC); the agency is a mere facilitator
of the peace process on the basis of the jointly signed COHA.

The HDC would not really be able to do much if the Indonesian
government starts taking unilateral actions that might
potentially undermine the peace process. Demanding GAM to
surrender its weapons and asking it to accept the concept of
special autonomy within the larger political framework of
Indonesia, is potentially dangerous. Such demands might please
the hardliners in the government especially the armed forces, but
are not going to anything for the peace process.

GAM doesn't really seem to have projected the quest for
independence in a bold and unilateral manner. Its representative
in the JSC, Ibrahim Sofyan Tiba, has said that whatever the
decision taken by the committee would be agreeable to GAM. Yet if
the Indonesian authorities do not rescind the above demands,
there is great likelihood that GAM might indeed come out with its
bold proposals of outright independence through armed struggle or
through a general referendum.

COHA document is not a blue-print for peace; it is a document
that provides general guidelines as to how peace could be
obtained on the basis of building trust, confidence and
understanding. It is going to be more than four months since the
signing of the COHA, and during this period, the people of Aceh
have benefited from the general absence of civil war.

The good thing about an uninterrupted peace process is that it
allows the return of normalcy and people affected by more than
two decades of war will start developing a stake in the system.
These developments will have the tendency to influence the peace
process and ultimately determine the nature of peace settlement
in the province.

Thus, for peace to proceed, both the parties must go back to
the contents and spirit of the COHA. Most importantly, the peace
process should not re-start without the imposition of difficult
conditions by either the government or GAM.

Both parties need to adopt a functional perspective; put aside
difficult political questions aside for some time and try to
focus on issues that might elicit cooperation from both sides.

Once cooperation and understanding is developed, then the
process itself would have its own logic to tackle more difficult
political and ideological questions.

As it is, asking GAM to surrender its weapons and making a
commitment to special autonomy would not advance the cause of
peace in Aceh. These demands might beget other forms of radical
political demands from GAM.

It is not that the entire peace process is lost. The HDC is
trying its best to organize another JC meeting soon. GAM has
agreed and chances are the government would also agree to this
meeting. The proposed meeting will be essential to revive the
fledging peace process in Aceh and give importance to COHA.

COHA is not a perfect document; there will be always
tendencies for the both parties to misinterpret and misjudge its
contents, but under the watchful eyes of HDC, it has the
potential to bring about durable peace in Aceh, a province that
only knew conflict and suffering for more than two decades.

Perhaps it is about time that the parties to conflict also
examine the peace process in Sri Lanka, currently mediated by the
Norwegian government. The Sri Lankan Government and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement in February 2001.

The peace process is nevertheless holding fast in the country
and normalcy is slowly returning to affected parts of the
country, especially in the north and east. Although the LTTE
withdrew from the peace negotiations as a protest, the ceasefire
agreement is very much in force. There seem to be good chances
that the LTTE will get back to the negotiating table very soon.

The case of Sri Lanka illustrates that temporary withdrawals
from peace negotiations need not undermine ceasefire agreements.
Temporary withdrawals and suspensions might actually rejuvenate
the peace process without undermining initial agreement.

The LTTE, by temporarily disengaging from negotiations, has
reportedly succeeded in forcing the Sri Lanka government to
withdraw some of its troop from occupying civilian areas in the
district of Jaffna, in northern Sri Lanka.

P. Ramasamy is a professor of political science at the Centre
for History, Political Science and Strategic Studies of the above
university.