Rebuilding trust vital to a lasting peace in Aceh

Rebuilding trust vital to a lasting peace in Aceh

Damien Kingsbury, Melbourne

Since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono assumed the presidency, there
has been growing talk about the possibility of moving towards a
resolution of the conflict in Aceh. Susilo said it was a goal of
his presidency to find peace in Aceh, even if his initial
proposal of the Free Aceh Movement effectively surrendering was
not a meaningful contribution.

But there is a glimmer of hope for peace. To be realized, it
will take real negotiations and real compromise on both sides.
And both the Tentara Nasional Aceh (TNA), or GAM army, the
Indonesian military (TNI), will have be brought fully under the
control of their respective civilian leadership.

While there is talk about the need to find peace, there has
been no contact between the two sides since the declaration of
martial law in May 2003. What there has been, however, is
attempts by the Indonesian government to stifle the capacity of
the GAM leadership and its advisers.

Apart from the continued jailing of the GAM negotiating team,
this tactic has effectively failed, with the Swedish courts
saying there was insufficient evidence to convict the GAM
leadership living in Sweden of criminal behavior.

The listing of advisers, too, with Interpol, on charges on
alleged gun-running, has made little impact. Some travel has been
restricted, but global communications are such that these
limitations are effectively meaningless. As for the gun-running
charges, they are serious, but in this case being unconnected to
reality, make the Indonesian government look desperate, rather
than in control.

What the Indonesian government also seems not to realize is
that opposition to Jakarta's authority in Aceh is not just from a
handful of men in Stockholm and misguided idealists in Aceh. It
is keenly felt by an overwhelming majority of Acehnese.

This explains why, although GAM has suffered some losses over
the past 18 months, it has been able to draw on a large reservoir
of volunteers waiting to step up and fight. Martial law might
have been intended to crush GAM, but as many predicted, it has
not significantly diminished GAM's military capacity, and has
only hardened the resolve of Aceh's population against the TNI
and the government it represents.

So, too, with the leadership in Stockholm. When they were
arrested earlier this year, the military leadership of GAM simply
regarded this as a further possible loss in a wider battle. As
with losses in the field, there was - and remains - a plan in
place to elect a new political leadership. On this, the
Indonesian government is probably better off negotiating with the
political leadership it knows, rather than finding itself facing
a new, unknown and potentially more hostile leadership.

Now, trapped by the TNI-backed demands that GAM fighters
surrender and accept special autonomy as a precursor to peace,
the Indonesian government has imposed preconditions that make
peace talks impossible. GAM similarly had an extensive list of
preconditions, many of which the Indonesian government would
have found difficult to accept.

However, GAM has now dropped its preconditions, recognizing
that its claims will have to be negotiated. This is, after all,
what talks are meant to be about. It is time for the Indonesian
government to also drop its preconditions, and to enter a
genuinely open dialogue in good faith.

Given the recent distance between the two sides, there will
probably need to be unofficial, second track diplomacy to arrange
mutually acceptable circumstances for renewing talks. That is,
first contact will probably have to be between parties
representing either side but in an unofficial capacity. It should
be noted here that the breakaway Majelis Pemerintah-GAM or
government selected NGOs would not qualify in this capacity.

The next step is to find an external mediator. The Japanese
government would seem to be best placed for this, although others
such as the Norwegian or Canadian governments would also be
suitably neutral.

If it is possible to construct an open, unconditional forum
for talks, the first item to be considered will have to be a
truce, leading to conditions that will allow a more regularized
ceasefire. In this, there will have to be considerable good will,
and recognition of where both sides previously erred, which
caused the previous Cessation of Hostilities Agreement to be
undermined.

If a ceasefire can be established, this will then have to
become regularized, so that conditions of trust can be firmly
established to allow talks about moving towards more concrete
steps towards peace.

TNI demands that GAM surrender its weapons, as opposed to
place them in cantonment, are unlikely to produce results.
Similarly, completely removing the TNI from Aceh is also not
likely, at least in the short to medium term. However, a 'return
to barracks' for both sides could provide space for genuine
dialogue about a political solution.

Realistically, even if it started now, the time-frame for such
a process will be years, not months. And even beginning to talk
about final solutions at this stage will do nothing but undermine
the first, tentative steps. One must learn to walk before on can
run.

In this process, even if all that is achieved is a ceasefire
that can be held in place over the longer term, that alone must
be seen as a positive outcome. And if it can allow the rebuilding
of trust, which is now in such short supply, then it may be that
a solution to the Aceh problem is eventually possible.

The writer is senior lecturer in international development at
Deakin University, Melbourne.