Rebels, too, have no fixed address to be obliterated

Kanis Dursin The Jakarta Post Jakarta

Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Wirayuda unleashed the first-ever scathing criticism by any Indonesian official on the invasion and occupation of Iraq in early December, almost nine months after allied forces, led by the world's lone superpower, the United States, dropped their first bombs at selected targets across Iraq in March.

"Terrorists have no fixed addresses that can be obliterated once and for all with a surgical military strike," the Cabinet minister told the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) conference here on Dec. 8.

He continued, "if those weapons (of mass destruction) have not been found because they do not exist, then an entire country has been leveled to the ground for no good reason."

Isn't the government doing just that in Aceh against its own people and in its own territory? Didn't the Cabinet minister realize that Indonesia too, the world's largest Muslim country, has been engaged in a lopsided war against an outnumbered, poorly trained, ill-equipped separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM)?

In a desperate attempt to crack down on the secessionist movement, President Megawati Soekarnoputri placed the country's westernmost province of Aceh under a state of emergency with the declaration of martial law on May 19, paving the way for a power- hungry military to take the reins in the resource-rich province.

Massive military offensive ensued, with the government mobilizing some 35,000 combat troops and 14,000 police personnel, mostly from the much-feared paramilitary Mobile Brigade (Brimob). Tanks and warplanes were also moved overnight to support the country's largest-ever military deployment. Since then, Aceh has become a real-life battleground, with the military pounding and raiding suspected GAM strongholds and hideouts, day in, day out.

But seven months into the operation, GAM rebels are still very much around and their leaders are still in full command of the secessionist movement. Indeed, government troops have regained territories previously controlled by GAM but the insurgency still poses a great security threat to both civilians and the military. Its mission not accomplished, the government extended martial law in mid-November for another six months.

In the meantime, over 300 innocent civilians have lost their lives in a war they never waged. And to borrow the words of Minister Hassan, these people have died "for no good reason." It is for no good reason because their deaths do not and will not change for the better the situation in Aceh and certainly will not make Acehnese rebels give up their struggle for independence.

On the contrary, the war has dashed any hopes of a peaceful settlement to the Aceh question. As government troops intensify military operations and GAM rebels harden their demands for independence, more casualties, including innocent civilians, are likely to be sustained. That means the Acehnese will have to suffer even more. Already, at the onset of operations, tens of thousands of students in Aceh had to face the full brunt of the so-called integrated operation as government troops failed to anticipate the rebels' scorched-earth tactics in torching hundreds of schools in the province.

If the ultimate goal of the current military offensive in Aceh was to wipe out the decades-long secessionist movement by arresting or killing all GAM rebels and their commanders, then the government has little to brag about. Government troops and police personnel have so far managed to kill just over 1,000 rebels and arrest almost 2,000 others. None of those arrested or killed were senior members or leaders of the separatist movement.

Jakarta has indeed restored some local administrations by installing former and active military personnel as regents and district heads, but these newly restored local administrations cannot function effectively without the support of the military and police. Peace and order in those areas also remain volatile, with local residents living in perpetual fear of being caught in cross fire between government troops and rebels. Needless to say, tens of thousands of Acehnese have opted to stay in makeshift refugee camps and have to put up with miserable conditions in those squalid camps just to spare themselves from stray bullets.

The Aceh war came after the failure of a last-ditch attempt to save a peace agreement signed in December 2002. Under the agreement, known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), both the government and GAM rebels vowed to end all hostilities across the province. The government pledged, among other things, to move its troops from offensive to defensive positions and confine the function of Brimob police to maintaining peace and order. The rebels, for their part, agreed to store their weapons and abandon independence aspirations by accepting the special autonomy status introduced in 2001. To lend more credibility to the landmark deal, both parties agreed to invite observers from two neighboring countries, the Philippines and Thailand, to monitor its implementation. The peace agreement was then hailed as the dawn of peace in Aceh.

Peace proved to be short-lived as the government and rebels soon realized that they were strange bedfellows rather than soulmates. They began to recant their respective vows and slowly drifted apart, only to confront each other at deadly armed encounters.

Government troops were never withdrawn to defensive positions and Brimob never changed into territorial police in charge of peace and order, while GAM members refused to collect their weapons and continued to campaign for independence. Moreover, neither the government nor the rebels admitted that they were violating the peace agreement, which was sponsored by the Switzerland-based Henry Dunant Centre. Instead of apologizing for breaching the agreement, both sides busily pointed fingers at each other.

In a move that could be seen more as an attempt to justify its impending military operation than a sincere search for peace, the government invited GAM rebels to a last-minute meeting, but with a string attached: The rebels had to accept unconditionally the territorial integrity of the country, which included Aceh. It was easy to guess that GAM members would turn down the invitation. Thus the military operation went ahead.

The operation, which saw the deployment of some of the country's sophisticated weaponry, including warplanes and tanks, has so far failed to bring Acehnese rebels to their knees. The secessionist movement remains intact and rebel leaders move around the province undisturbed, with some readily accessible for press interviews. Defiant as ever, virtually all GAM leaders have eluded massive searches and have been spared from relentless air bombardment.

If the Aceh war has produced any lessons to be learned, it should be these: First, rebels too, just like terrorists, have no fixed address for government troops to blow up; thus, marching dozens of thousands of troops and police personnel against ill- equipped, poorly trained Acehnese rebels is extremely disproportionate. Second, ideology, including independence ideology, cannot be defeated by military might. This holds true in Northern Ireland, Mindanao in the Southern Philippines and even now in Iraq. This should also be true for Aceh and Papua, where the government has been engaging a low-level, poorly organized rebel group, the Free Papua Movement (OPM).

It does not mean, however, that an ideology cannot be defeated. Of course it can -- but only by another ideology.

The secessionist movement in Aceh started only in 1976, almost two decades after Acehnese leaders had voluntarily pooled their personal money to buy a commercial airplane. Money earned by operating the plane was used to finance struggles for recognition of the country's independence. This clearly suggests that Acehnese have from the very birth of the country shared the ideology of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.

So, what went wrong? Looking back, Jakarta has failed Aceh and has largely ignored the aspirations of Acehnese people. The central government promised to grant Aceh special status in terms of religion, culture, and education, but as of now has not yet honored its words. Instead, Jakarta plundered Aceh's resources, returning only a tiny fraction of the abundant wealth to the Acehnese. Even demands by Acehnese people to prosecute those responsible for gross human rights violations in Aceh, including military officers, have fallen on deaf ears. What do we expect from people whom we have failed, plundered, and whose rights we have violated? Loyalty is certainly not one of them.

It is worth noting that the ongoing operation has failed to draw Acehnese people to the government side. While Acehnese have not displayed their support for GAM rebels publicly, they have shown little interest in divulging information about the whereabouts of GAM members and their leaders, making it difficult for troops to track them down. This "indifference," however, should not be taken to mean that they support the secessionist movement. It simply demonstrates that for the Acehnese a military operation is simply not the way to resolve the Aceh question once and for all.

The government took the right path when it introduced in 2001 special autonomy status for Aceh, under which the province would largely manage its own government and retain almost 70 percent of its revenues. The province would also be free to implement sharia (Islamic law) and establish a sharia court. The government, however, has yet to implement the law.

Since Jakarta has long failed Aceh and violated the rights of its people, don't expect the Acehnese, especially GAM rebels, to patch up their differences with the government quickly and abandon their independence aspirations. The government has to go the extra mile, proving to and convincing the Acehnese and the rebels that it is now serious about addressing their grievances. It is the government, not GAM rebels, that has to prove that it is sincere in its peaceful undertaking.

Acehnese rebels are likely to bend on engaging the government in endless bloody conflict in order to advance their independence aspiration and would torpedo any peace initiative in the future. In this case, the government, especially its troops on the ground, has to exercise patience and self-restraint.

Jakarta needs Aceh more than Aceh needs Jakarta. Aceh can do without Jakarta, but Jakarta cannot do without Aceh. An independent Aceh would likely spark more rebellions in other parts of the world's largest archipelagic country.

"The war against terrorism is a struggle for the hearts and minds of populations. That struggle calls for wise policies, not smart bombs," said Minister Hassan. Indeed, the same principle applies to rebellions like GAM in Aceh and OPM in Papua. (END/12/03/KD)