Racing against time: Avoiding a state of emergency

Racing against time: Avoiding a state of emergency

In the little time he has left the President may still be able
to gain a much needed boost of credibility and avoid declaring a
state of emergency, writes analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono.

JAKARTA (JP): Speech is civilization itself, writes Thomas
Mann in The Magic Mountain. "The word, even the most
contradictory word, preserves contact -- it is silence which
isolates."

Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri is clearly aware of her
increasing importance. She is now a key to the solution of the
political stalemate; small wonder that she plays hard to get. Yet
it is doubtful if she is playing her cards right from the
perspective of the interest of the nation.

Megawati certainly played a decisive role in President
Abdurrahman Wahid's failure to initiate a meeting with political
party leaders. Her refusal to attend that meeting was clearly the
main reason the leaders of the major political parties,
particularly Hamzah Haz of the United Development Party (PPP) and
Akbar Tandjung of Golkar, stayed away from the meeting, too, with
the rest following suit.

The failure of the meeting may be interpreted in different
ways. It has been suggested that there is no more trust in the
President on the part of the party leaders, or that he has lost
all confidence.

Whatever the case may be, it was an indication that no matter
how erratic and enigmatic the President may have been, he was
still willing to offer a last, probably belated effort, whatever
the guile behind it, to break the deadlock.

By contrast, the unwillingness of Megawati as chairwoman of
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and the
leaders of the rest of the parties to attend the meeting clearly
indicated that they were not willing to come to a compromise. It
proved Gus Dur's (Abdurrahman) accusation right that they had
blocked the road to a compromise. They wanted a special session
of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) at all costs.

The reasons Megawati refused to attend the meeting were beyond
comprehension. First, the argument that the agenda of the meeting
was unclear was not appropriate for a politician of her position.
Did she expect the agenda on a possible political compromise to
be made public first, which could have been counterproductive?

Second, to claim that she had a tight schedule for the day was
a display of disrespect for the office of the President. Both
reasons only show how immature she appears as a high-ranking
politician with a (formal) potential to be president.

Indeed, after the meeting failed to materialize, Gus Dur
reiterated his threats: if there was no progress toward a
compromise by July 20, and if the MPR should insist on his
accountability report, he would issue a decree on a state of
emergency and dissolve the legislature and the MPR. After all,
the legal and constitutional basis of a demand for accountability
is highly debatable.

It is important to remember that the "impeachment" of first
president Sukarno was done against the backdrop of a real tragedy
in consequence of the Sept. 30, 1965 Gestapu affair, resulting in
the murder of half a dozen Army generals and the loss of the
lives of hundreds of thousands of people in retaliation, most of
whom were probably innocent.

President Abdurrahman said that the absence of military
support would only apply to high-ranking officers, not to the
rank and file. He added that the people would have their own way
of dealing with the consequences. This did sound frightening and
he did sound callous about possible violent communal conflicts
and their possible dire consequences.

He may be either callous or smart, and hence his repeated
threats and bluffing. A "civil war" would pose a serious
challenge to the military as well as the police. In a chaotic
condition that might put the survival and integrity of the state
at stake, it would be the job of the police and the military to
face up to that challenge.

But it would also pose serious problems to them. First, it
would well provide them an opportunity to assume power, or at
least to resume a crucial role in politics. This, however, would
raise doubts on their acceptability among the people. Second,
should they have to deal militarily, are they solidly united?
Third, would they be well equipped?

There is, however, a choice for the military and the police in
the interest of the nation offered by the special session of the
MPR. Together with the members of the National Awakening Party
(PKB) and possibly regional and functional representatives, and
even some members of Golkar, the runner-up in the 1999 elections,
the military and police faction in the MPR may oppose efforts to
impeach the President.

That would be possible, however, if in the little time
available the President should manage to take legal action
against politicians accused of corruption. This could be a kind
of long awaited "shock treatment", which might boost Gus Dur's
credibility.

In that way, the police and the military would not have to
carry out the impossible task of dealing militarily with the
people -- who in any case would not feel the need to resort to
violence as a result of the President's impeachment.

The President would not need to issue a decree on a state of
emergency to dissolve the House of Representatives and the MPR,
nor to set an earlier date for a general election that would be
very costly in any case; and then he may carry on to the end of
his term in 2004.

Only then can he compromise, particularly in respect to his
relations, in the form of proper power sharing with the Vice
President, who may hopefully be expected to improve her
performance.