Racing against time: Avoiding a state of emergency

In the little time he has left the President may still be able to gain a much needed boost of credibility and avoid declaring a state of emergency, writes analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono.

JAKARTA (JP): Speech is civilization itself, writes Thomas Mann in The Magic Mountain. "The word, even the most contradictory word, preserves contact -- it is silence which isolates."

Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri is clearly aware of her increasing importance. She is now a key to the solution of the political stalemate; small wonder that she plays hard to get. Yet it is doubtful if she is playing her cards right from the perspective of the interest of the nation.

Megawati certainly played a decisive role in President Abdurrahman Wahid's failure to initiate a meeting with political party leaders. Her refusal to attend that meeting was clearly the main reason the leaders of the major political parties, particularly Hamzah Haz of the United Development Party (PPP) and Akbar Tandjung of Golkar, stayed away from the meeting, too, with the rest following suit.

The failure of the meeting may be interpreted in different ways. It has been suggested that there is no more trust in the President on the part of the party leaders, or that he has lost all confidence.

Whatever the case may be, it was an indication that no matter how erratic and enigmatic the President may have been, he was still willing to offer a last, probably belated effort, whatever the guile behind it, to break the deadlock.

By contrast, the unwillingness of Megawati as chairwoman of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and the leaders of the rest of the parties to attend the meeting clearly indicated that they were not willing to come to a compromise. It proved Gus Dur's (Abdurrahman) accusation right that they had blocked the road to a compromise. They wanted a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) at all costs.

The reasons Megawati refused to attend the meeting were beyond comprehension. First, the argument that the agenda of the meeting was unclear was not appropriate for a politician of her position. Did she expect the agenda on a possible political compromise to be made public first, which could have been counterproductive?

Second, to claim that she had a tight schedule for the day was a display of disrespect for the office of the President. Both reasons only show how immature she appears as a high-ranking politician with a (formal) potential to be president.

Indeed, after the meeting failed to materialize, Gus Dur reiterated his threats: if there was no progress toward a compromise by July 20, and if the MPR should insist on his accountability report, he would issue a decree on a state of emergency and dissolve the legislature and the MPR. After all, the legal and constitutional basis of a demand for accountability is highly debatable.

It is important to remember that the "impeachment" of first president Sukarno was done against the backdrop of a real tragedy in consequence of the Sept. 30, 1965 Gestapu affair, resulting in the murder of half a dozen Army generals and the loss of the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in retaliation, most of whom were probably innocent.

President Abdurrahman said that the absence of military support would only apply to high-ranking officers, not to the rank and file. He added that the people would have their own way of dealing with the consequences. This did sound frightening and he did sound callous about possible violent communal conflicts and their possible dire consequences.

He may be either callous or smart, and hence his repeated threats and bluffing. A "civil war" would pose a serious challenge to the military as well as the police. In a chaotic condition that might put the survival and integrity of the state at stake, it would be the job of the police and the military to face up to that challenge.

But it would also pose serious problems to them. First, it would well provide them an opportunity to assume power, or at least to resume a crucial role in politics. This, however, would raise doubts on their acceptability among the people. Second, should they have to deal militarily, are they solidly united? Third, would they be well equipped?

There is, however, a choice for the military and the police in the interest of the nation offered by the special session of the MPR. Together with the members of the National Awakening Party (PKB) and possibly regional and functional representatives, and even some members of Golkar, the runner-up in the 1999 elections, the military and police faction in the MPR may oppose efforts to impeach the President.

That would be possible, however, if in the little time available the President should manage to take legal action against politicians accused of corruption. This could be a kind of long awaited "shock treatment", which might boost Gus Dur's credibility.

In that way, the police and the military would not have to carry out the impossible task of dealing militarily with the people -- who in any case would not feel the need to resort to violence as a result of the President's impeachment.

The President would not need to issue a decree on a state of emergency to dissolve the House of Representatives and the MPR, nor to set an earlier date for a general election that would be very costly in any case; and then he may carry on to the end of his term in 2004.

Only then can he compromise, particularly in respect to his relations, in the form of proper power sharing with the Vice President, who may hopefully be expected to improve her performance.