Quest for independent local councils
By Yulius P. Hermawan
BANDUNG, West Java (JP): The recent controversial elections of the governors of Central and East Java have raised questions over just how independent provincial councils should be in electing their local executives.
The New Order regime's system for gubernatorial elections provided a certain amount of leverage to the central government by giving it the right to approve candidates nominated by provincial councils.
Usually the president, through the minister of home affairs, chose three out of five candidates nominated by a provincial council. The council would then elect one of the three as its new governor.
This election mechanism provided a means to the central government to intervene in the planning of local development projects. The philosophy behind the system was that the central government wanted to make sure that the heads of local administrations would be able to cooperate with it in the implementation of development programs and in continuing national integration.
In practice, the government preferred candidates with backgrounds acceptable to the president. This sometimes created conflict, particularly when a central government nominee was not acceptable to the majority of the local council or the population. It particularly mattered when the government disapproved of the province's most popular candidates.
Recent elections give strong indications that the Habibie administration plans to continue the system.
The new government has attempted to exert its influence in the elections of governors, regents and mayors. The gubernatorial elections in Central and East Java are examples of excessive central government involvement in the process.
There are several reasons why the government should reconsider its role and influence in provincial and local elections:
* The system created by the New Order is inherently contradictory to the principles of democracy. Local council members are elected by the people. They should, therefore, be responsible to their constituents. Local legislatures hold the people's mandate and, hence, should play a key role in electing the heads of local administrations and in the creation of policies in their territories.
In practice, local administration leaders, even though they are elected by local councils, are more responsive to the central government. Their decisions often reflect the central government's interests.
* The system in place also leads to the absence of effective supervision, evaluation and control.
In a democracy, local administrations are responsible to their constituents. Local councils should play a key role in supervising, evaluating and controlling the activities of local executives. Unfortunately, governors seem to prefer to report to the central government rather than to their councils.
Without a clear-cut mechanism for supervision, evaluation and control, local administrations may create priorities and policies not in the true interest of their constituents.
* Excessive central government influence in the election process may contribute to the development of separatist aspirations in certain areas -- particularly when the government treats provinces differently.
Such preferential treatment could lead to opposition against the central government. These problems become even more complicated when the central government controls provincial resources to finance so-called national development programs. It also controls most of the funds generated from local development programs.
Social jealousy has occurred in certain territories over the perception that the majority of the profits from exploiting local resources are funneled away from the province. Such jealousies may lead to an opposition to efforts at national integration.
Irian Jaya and East Timor are two cases in point in which elements of the local populations have perceived unequal treatment from the central government in the distribution of local wealth.
* Central government intervention leads to a dependence of provincial administrations on it in the handling of local affairs, especially those related to the setting of priorities in local development programs.
This actually leads to serious problems for the central government itself because it distracts central government officials from important national and international issues. Local administrations, on the other hand, never develop the capability to solve their own affairs.
It is, therefore, time to reconsider the system.
A certain extent of autonomy should be given to local administrations. Local councils should be given a larger role in the development of good local governance and should supervise the implementation of local policies. Local executives should also refocus their sense of responsibility from the central government to their local communities. In this way, each local administration will better its capability to develop its own region.
The writer is a Monash University graduate, a lecturer on comparative politics at the Catholic University of Parahyangan and a researcher at the Parahyangan Center for International Studies in Bandung.