Qiao purged but still visible

As Chinese President Jiang Zemin meets President Bill Clinton at the summit in Washington DC, The Jakarta Post Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin explores the way in which power politics within the Chinese Communist Party is having an unexpected result at home -- and how that realpolitik may have predictable impact on Sino-American relations.

HONG KONG (JP): As Chinese President Jiang Zemin departed from Beijing on his self-proclaimed "landmark visit" aimed at improving relations with the United States, he vividly illustrated the great puzzle which has emerged from China's secretive politics in the wake of the 15th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

He also illustrated that American, and other, China specialists may be misguided when they dismiss all speculation on the linkage between CCP factionalism and Chinese foreign policy.

As is customary, top officials of the CCP and the Chinese government lined up within the Great Hall of The People on Beijing's Tiananmen Square to bid farewell to Jiang and his party.

Normally the line-up carefully follows protocol order with the members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau (PSC) at the top of the line. As the television cameras panned along the reception line for Jiang's departure, they revealed the old protocol order which preceded the 15th Party Congress.

Specifically, the former third-ranking CCP cadre, and chairman of the Chinese parliament, the National Peoples Congress (NPC) Qiao She was there is his old position while the new number three, deputy Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, was absent on this occasion.

In Chinese terms, Jiang greeted Qiao warmly, while Qiao half- reciprocated his smile. Yet at the 15th Party Congress, Qiao was demoted from the PSC, from the politbureau itself, and even from membership of the much larger CCP Central Committee (CCPCC).

Clearly, the main objective of the departure coverage was to convey to Chinese viewers the image of who was really in charge -- hence the extended and particularly cordial handshake between Jiang Zemin and Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng. Jiang and Li made a point of warmly shaking hands for the photographers. The China Daily gave precedence to a front page picture of Mr. and Mrs. Jiang bidding farewell to Li Peng.

Clearly, the message for the Chinese people -- and for the few foreigners who noticed -- was that a Jiang-Li alliance was in charge of Chinese politics. Li Peng is, after all, most unlikely to want to go to the United States, even if he was invited, given the deep emotions still aroused by his perceived leading role in ordering the 1989 Beijing Massacre.

So, if this had been an isolated appearance by Qiao, there would be less mystery. His reappearance as number three in the protocol order could be put down to a desire to express CCP unity, prior to the "landmark visit to the U.S.", the words headlined by the China Daily.

The mystery arises because Qiao has been regularly appearing on China's strictly controlled television news, ever since he lost all standing in the CCP. Several times he has been given his former rank, appearing as the third leader reported on the news.

Formerly, mystery arose frequently in Chinese, Soviet or other communist parties because those who were purged proceeded to disappear from view. Qiao's case is different. He has been purged but continues to appear.

First and last, this is a pointed reminder of the intense secretiveness of Chinese politics -- a fact largely ignored in the extensive American coverage of Jiang, prior to his visit.

Since Jiang is, by virtue of his titles as state President, CCP Secretary General, and chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, nominally in charge of the party, the government and the military, it is blandly assumed that he is in charge.

But in Chinese politics title and power do not necessarily go together and are often separated. From the little we know it is equally conceivable that while Jiang is the front man, Li Peng is the key power player, even though he is due to retire from the Prime Ministership in six months time.

Again, we do not know enough to know why Qiao was purged. Many have assumed that Qiao was a "reformer" advocating a greater degree of change than Jiang or Li were willing to accept. There is some circumstantial evidence for this. But it is equally possible that his fall was due to the intensely personal factionalism that traditionally permeates the CCP. We simply do not know, the CCP politicians do not reveal anything.

The element of mystery is enhanced because of Qiao's known though shadowy background in China's intelligence and security apparatus. A common assumption, prior to his abrupt demotion at the 15th Party Congress, was that he was bound to be influential in the post-Deng Xiaoping CCP, simply by virtue of having access to the secret dossiers of top cadres.

Conceivably this fact helps explain why Qiao continues to appear in the strictly controlled media. It could also be because, until March or April next year, he remains NPC chairman. But in that case, why remove him from the PSC, the politbureau and even the CCPCC? He could have retained his PSC standing until stepping down from the NPC. Changes of membership of the politburo do not only take place at CCP congresses.

Deng Xiaoping dispossessed Mao Zedong's designated successor Hua Guofeng in the early 1980s, but Hua still remains a member of the CCPCC until now, while Qiao does not.

Conceivably, Qiao continues to appear because Jiang and Li wish to convey the image of a CCP which is no longer vindictive toward those who oppose the mainstream. But in that case, why not allow Qiao to remain on the CCPCC?

Conceivably, Qiao's continued appearances are an indication that, within the remorseless world of CCP factionalism, the inner-party struggle continues, despite and because of the self- proclaimed "highly successful" 15th Party Congress.

Perhaps Jiang and Li Peng, who aims to replace Qiao as NPC chairman next year, overplayed their hand in purging him completely from the upper ranks of the CCP. Perhaps Qiao's appearances are a belated effort to be conciliatory.

Conceivably, too, if Jiang Zemin can carry off his visit to the U.S. successfully, without conceding to the Americans on human rights, without releasing imprisoned dissidents Wei Jingsheng or Wang Dan, without making specific concrete pledges on weapons or nuclear proliferation to Iran and Pakistan, and without giving away anything very tangible on other Sino-American differences, the Li-Jiang hardline will be so strengthened within the CCP that Qiao She may not be appearing on the news any more.

Put another way, if President Bill Clinton, as he negotiates with President Jiang Zemin, fails to be both hard-nosed and tough-minded, then he, like Qiao, will undoubtedly be relegated from the ranks of those whom the Li-Jiang power alliance believes it has to take seriously.