Qiao purged but still visible

Qiao purged but still visible

As Chinese President Jiang Zemin meets President Bill Clinton
at the summit in Washington DC, The Jakarta Post Asia
correspondent Harvey Stockwin explores the way in which power
politics within the Chinese Communist Party is having an
unexpected result at home -- and how that realpolitik may have
predictable impact on Sino-American relations.

HONG KONG (JP): As Chinese President Jiang Zemin departed from
Beijing on his self-proclaimed "landmark visit" aimed at
improving relations with the United States, he vividly
illustrated the great puzzle which has emerged from China's
secretive politics in the wake of the 15th Party Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

He also illustrated that American, and other, China
specialists may be misguided when they dismiss all speculation on
the linkage between CCP factionalism and Chinese foreign policy.

As is customary, top officials of the CCP and the Chinese
government lined up within the Great Hall of The People on
Beijing's Tiananmen Square to bid farewell to Jiang and his
party.

Normally the line-up carefully follows protocol order with the
members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau (PSC) at
the top of the line. As the television cameras panned along the
reception line for Jiang's departure, they revealed the old
protocol order which preceded the 15th Party Congress.

Specifically, the former third-ranking CCP cadre, and chairman
of the Chinese parliament, the National Peoples Congress (NPC)
Qiao She was there is his old position while the new number
three, deputy Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, was absent on this
occasion.

In Chinese terms, Jiang greeted Qiao warmly, while Qiao half-
reciprocated his smile. Yet at the 15th Party Congress, Qiao was
demoted from the PSC, from the politbureau itself, and even from
membership of the much larger CCP Central Committee (CCPCC).

Clearly, the main objective of the departure coverage was to
convey to Chinese viewers the image of who was really in charge
-- hence the extended and particularly cordial handshake between
Jiang Zemin and Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng. Jiang and Li made
a point of warmly shaking hands for the photographers. The China
Daily gave precedence to a front page picture of Mr. and Mrs.
Jiang bidding farewell to Li Peng.

Clearly, the message for the Chinese people -- and for the few
foreigners who noticed -- was that a Jiang-Li alliance was in
charge of Chinese politics. Li Peng is, after all, most unlikely
to want to go to the United States, even if he was invited, given
the deep emotions still aroused by his perceived leading role in
ordering the 1989 Beijing Massacre.

So, if this had been an isolated appearance by Qiao, there
would be less mystery. His reappearance as number three in the
protocol order could be put down to a desire to express CCP
unity, prior to the "landmark visit to the U.S.", the words
headlined by the China Daily.

The mystery arises because Qiao has been regularly appearing
on China's strictly controlled television news, ever since he
lost all standing in the CCP. Several times he has been given his
former rank, appearing as the third leader reported on the news.

Formerly, mystery arose frequently in Chinese, Soviet or other
communist parties because those who were purged proceeded to
disappear from view. Qiao's case is different. He has been purged
but continues to appear.

First and last, this is a pointed reminder of the intense
secretiveness of Chinese politics -- a fact largely ignored in
the extensive American coverage of Jiang, prior to his visit.

Since Jiang is, by virtue of his titles as state President,
CCP Secretary General, and chairman of the CCP Central Military
Commission, nominally in charge of the party, the government and
the military, it is blandly assumed that he is in charge.

But in Chinese politics title and power do not necessarily go
together and are often separated. From the little we know it is
equally conceivable that while Jiang is the front man, Li Peng is
the key power player, even though he is due to retire from the
Prime Ministership in six months time.

Again, we do not know enough to know why Qiao was purged.
Many have assumed that Qiao was a "reformer" advocating a greater
degree of change than Jiang or Li were willing to accept. There
is some circumstantial evidence for this. But it is equally
possible that his fall was due to the intensely personal
factionalism that traditionally permeates the CCP. We simply do
not know, the CCP politicians do not reveal anything.

The element of mystery is enhanced because of Qiao's known
though shadowy background in China's intelligence and security
apparatus. A common assumption, prior to his abrupt demotion at
the 15th Party Congress, was that he was bound to be influential
in the post-Deng Xiaoping CCP, simply by virtue of having access
to the secret dossiers of top cadres.

Conceivably this fact helps explain why Qiao continues to
appear in the strictly controlled media. It could also be
because, until March or April next year, he remains NPC chairman.
But in that case, why remove him from the PSC, the politbureau
and even the CCPCC? He could have retained his PSC standing
until stepping down from the NPC. Changes of membership of the
politburo do not only take place at CCP congresses.

Deng Xiaoping dispossessed Mao Zedong's designated successor
Hua Guofeng in the early 1980s, but Hua still remains a member of
the CCPCC until now, while Qiao does not.

Conceivably, Qiao continues to appear because Jiang and Li
wish to convey the image of a CCP which is no longer vindictive
toward those who oppose the mainstream. But in that case, why not
allow Qiao to remain on the CCPCC?

Conceivably, Qiao's continued appearances are an indication
that, within the remorseless world of CCP factionalism, the
inner-party struggle continues, despite and because of the self-
proclaimed "highly successful" 15th Party Congress.

Perhaps Jiang and Li Peng, who aims to replace Qiao as NPC
chairman next year, overplayed their hand in purging him
completely from the upper ranks of the CCP. Perhaps Qiao's
appearances are a belated effort to be conciliatory.

Conceivably, too, if Jiang Zemin can carry off his visit to
the U.S. successfully, without conceding to the Americans on
human rights, without releasing imprisoned dissidents Wei
Jingsheng or Wang Dan, without making specific concrete pledges
on weapons or nuclear proliferation to Iran and Pakistan, and
without giving away anything very tangible on other Sino-American
differences, the Li-Jiang hardline will be so strengthened within
the CCP that Qiao She may not be appearing on the news any more.

Put another way, if President Bill Clinton, as he negotiates
with President Jiang Zemin, fails to be both hard-nosed and
tough-minded, then he, like Qiao, will undoubtedly be relegated
from the ranks of those whom the Li-Jiang power alliance believes
it has to take seriously.