Pyongyang relenting?

The Straits Times Asia News Network Singapore

North Korea appears to have modified its hardline insistence that direct dealing with the United States is the only way out of the nuclear dispute. A remark at the weekend attributed to the Foreign Ministry said Pyongyang would not insist on that format if the U.S. made a "switchover" in its equally tough policy.

This promising lead has to be seized upon. It is helpful the U.S. responded positively by offering to make exploratory contact. This has been the break in the clouds long sought by Pyongyang's interlocutors.

Caution is advised, however. North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) became final last Thursday after the 90-day notice period passed. No signatory, not even Iraq, had renounced the 187-nation pact since its establishment in 1968.

A previous notice of withdrawal given by Pyongyang in 1992 lapsed after a nuclear energy deal (now stalled) was reached. The day before the latest notice expired, the United Nations Security Council had met to consider the pullout. (Why it met this late on a grave matter is one of the enduring mysteries of scattershot diplomacy.)

The expectation was that the Council would come down hard on Pyongyang, or give preliminary notice of imposing sanctions for breaching NPT conditions. Neither happened.

The U.S. wanted the Council to issue a resolution condemning the withdrawal, but stood down on the advice of China and Russia. It gets intriguing at this stage. Unlike the Iraq disarmament issue which led to a split of tectonic magnitude, all five permanent members are opposed to North Korea acquiring a nuclear capability.

A clear denunciation might have warned off nuclear adventurists. Why did the council stay its hand? Conjecture would point towards China and Russia having prior notification of Pyongyang's intentions. Both countries had been working hard behind the scenes to persuade Pyongyang to be less dogmatic about the framework for talks.

They disagree -- correctly -- with the U.S. propensity to resort to sanctions. In the event, a resolution backed up with a warning of sanctions would have played into Pyongyang's hand. It has said, as it did in 1992-1993, that it would treat sanctions as an act of war. Restrictions like a trade ban and freezing of moneys repatriated by North Koreans domiciled in Japan would not trouble it that much, at any rate.

Now that it is out of the NPT, Pyongyang is in theory free of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) strictures. Until the 1991 Gulf War, IAEA inspectors checked only civilian nuclear facilities and materials declared by signatory states.

After the war, the IAEA demanded and got access to "suspicious" sites in mandatory "special inspections". North Korea fell into this category. A report quoting an IAEA source said there was some doubt among legal experts where exactly North Korea stood now. Japan said there was no consensus Pyongyang had actually withdrawn.

But its interlocutors should have to assume that where Pyongyang stands is clear: post-NPT, it now retains the right to go nuclear for what it says is self-preservation. State media reported last week the Iraq war showed North Korea's security could be ensured only by having a "physical deterrent force". Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov echoed this assessment in meetings in Seoul last week.

The change of heart implied in the weekend statement, if it yields results, would not of itself cancel out inherent risks of having North Korea outside the NPT. But the outlook is much less ominous than it has been for many months.