Putting test ban on fast track

By Brahma Cheellaney

GENEVA (JP): A number of key differences over a nuclear test ban remain unresolved after more than two years of intense negotiations in Geneva. The Conference on Disarmament concluded its first 1996 session on March 29 without settling differences over the proposed treaty's scope, preamble and entry into force, and the final design of its verification regime.

The sluggish progress on the core issues threatens to upset the U.S. strategy of achieving agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) by late June. As the top U.S. arms control official, John Holum, has admitted, the current negotiations show "it will not be possible" to meet that deadline if the negotiators "con tinue to try and work section-by-section through the 1,200 or so bracketed -- not agreed-upon -- portions" of the draft "rolling text", the basis of the negotiations.

The negotiations also stand in jeopardy of being derailed by the positions of the world's two most populous states, China and India. Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, facing an uncer tain political future in the upcoming national election, has vowed "not to relent" on his government's proposals to tie the CTB's entry into force to a binding disarmament timetable and ensure the treaty does not allow any disguised explosive or non- explosive testing.

The Conference on Disarmament works by consensus and, according to Holum, India has been "indicating it may obstruct the CTB's completion". India's neighbor and rival, China, also has thrown a spanner in the works by seeking to shield "peaceful nuclear explosions", although it seems willing to accept certain safeguards to deter their application for military purposes. In addition, the five declared nuclear powers have so far failed to reconcile their dissimilar perceptions on the CTB's scope.

In an effort to get round these problems, Dutch Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, the current chairman of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee at the Conference on Disarmament, unveiled on March 28 his own draft CTB outline in the form of a 135-page "working paper". The paper identifies the major outstanding issues that need to be resolved through political dialog among the key states in the period before the Conference on Disarmament reconvenes on May 13.

Among the cited differences is the language of the very preamble of the proposed treaty, with the Western nuclear powers fighting shy of accepting the CTB's principal purpose to be to prevent qualitative improvements in existing stockpiles and to block the design of new nuclear weapons. Among the other major differences are the composition of the Executive Council that will oversee the treaty's implementation and the role of national technical means in triggering on-site inspections in a suspect state.

Ramaker originally had desired to replace the rolling text with a "clean chairman's text" as the negotiating document, but opted for a working paper as a mere reference in view of the continuing deadlock on key issues. With encouragement from the Mason Group comprising the Western bloc and East European states, Ramaker is expected to follow up his resource paper with a "clean text" as early as late May.

The Conference on Disarmament's structure calls for a "bottom- up" negotiating process, with full details of a proposed agreement to be sorted out in specialized working groups before being presented to the full conference. Presently, one working group is examining legal and institutional issues relating to the CTB's scope, organization and entry into force, while another, backed by the Group of Scientific Experts, is dealing with verification. The working groups in turn are supported by several "Friends of the Chair".

A chairman's text will be a "top-down" mechanism to eliminate the segment-by-segment consideration of the rolling text. The proposed Ramaker Draft, like the Dunkel Draft during the GATT negotiations, would put the Geneva talks on the fast track. The draft could also come handy to politically isolate India and China.

Critics, however, are likely to see the chairman's text as undermining the negotiating process and conferring unfair advantages on the most advanced nuclear states. The loopholes currently sought to be shielded by the most powerful states can be plucked out only on the basis of a section-by-section scrutiny of any draft text.

The weeks ahead will witness high-pressure international lobbying spearheaded by the United States in support of the Western CTB version, including at the nuclear summit of the G-7 and Russia in Moscow from April 18. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has signaled that he would especially be pressing China and India not to block a pact in Geneva. A spotlight may also be trained on Russia, which has derided the professed acceptance of a zero-yield CTB by the Western nuclear powers.

The United States, Britain and France say they want a CTB that will permit no explosive tests that release any nuclear energy, but do not want to give an explicit zero-yield commitment in the treaty. Instead, they continue to push the Australian proposal, predating their "zero option" announcements last year, which seeks to simply ban "any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The United States' plan to conduct six underground tests at Nevada from June at ostensibly "subcritical" levels has fueled demands for an unambiguous zero-yield undertaking.

A CTB treaty opened for signature by September is, in Christopher's words, "one of the highest U.S. national strategic priorities". This is because Washington sees a test ban as a vital instrument to throw a roadblock into the path of nations intent on developing nuclear weapons. Backed by Russia and the states it shelters under its giant nuclear umbrella, the United States opposes the inclusion of disarmament as a specific test- ban objective.

The goal of disarmament can be advanced not only through a timetable for deep cuts in existing arsenals but also by a tight ly written CTB that makes maintenance of current stockpiles more difficult. Blocking access to all forms of testing, including hydronuclear and very-low-yield experiments, will gradually increase the technical costs and challenges of keeping nuclear weapons.

On the pretext of ensuring that a test ban does not impede the maintenance of their stockpiles, the nuclear powers have reached an understanding outside the Conference on Disarmament on what they claim to be "activities not treaty prohibited", such as very-low-yield underground testing and virtual-reality simulations in labs. Their current closed-door talks are aimed at an agreement on activities to be banned under a CTB.

The new feet-track negotiating process sought to be initiated through a chairman's text has its roots in a couple of earlier developments this year. First was the unveiling in February of a "model text" by Iran at the apparent urging of Russia, followed by another draft treaty text by Australia. The Australian model text, developed after consultations with a number of Conference on Disarmament members, was intended to serve as a catalyst in the negotiations.

By getting Iran, the country dubbed by Washington as "the world's most dangerous sponsor of terrorism", to submit a not-so- stringent draft, the leading powers, in one stroke, sowed confusion in the non-aligned camp and tried to discredit as too radical the proposals backed by India and some other developing nations. Another development was Ramaker's brief to the various "Friends of the Chair" to complete their "informal" consultations within a short time-frame so that he could release a draft outline from his side.

While there is an obvious need to put the negotiations on the fast track, such a process should not be allowed to create a CTB with gaping loopholes. A test ban can be credible only if it explicitly prohibits all tests that release any nuclear energy. The "stockpile stewardship" programs in which the nuclear powers currently are investing tens of billions of dollars should not be allowed to offset or evade a CTB's intended restrictive effects.

Loopholes to continuously upgrade warhead design capabilities and engage in underground testing in the guise of "subcritical" or other experiments could spark a future arms race centered on a new generation of very-low-yield weapons. This danger has been underscored by the latest U.S. intelligence suspicion that Rus sia, violating its test moratorium, conducted a secret low-yield test in January.

Professor Brahma Chellaney, an arms control specialist, is currently in Geneva.