Putting military 'meat' on diplomatic 'bones'

By Damien Kingsbury

VICTORIA, Australia (JP): Following the successful if largely symbolic visit by Prime Minister John Howard to President Megawati Soekarnoputri, the question now facing ministers and senior bureaucrats in Australia and Indonesia is how to put policy 'meat' on the repaired diplomatic 'bones'. This will be the substantial test of how the previously damaged bilateral relationship develops.

Fleshing out the relationship comes in three guises; aid, trade and military links. Australia's aid program to Indonesia remains small compared with some, but comprises a large part of the Australian aid budget. And it is well targeted and a useful means of expressing support for the people of the archipelago, especially in the less developed eastern islands.

In terms of trade, while Indonesia has shown signs of economic recovery, including a more stable currency, what amounts to a foreign investment strike continues. And Australia is a part of that. The reasons include a banking sector and judiciary that remain untrusted, an enormous and unsustainable level of foreign debt, and a process of economic decentralization that is in administrative disarray. A few Australian companies are still in Indonesia trying to ride out the problems, but they are looking to a long term future well beyond most shareholders' patience.

But the most difficult area for renewed Australian links with Indonesia is military cooperation. Even when Australian soldiers and what might politely be called Indonesian "irregulars" were shooting at each other along the border of East Timor a year ago, senior officers at the Indonesian army's staff training and command college (Seskoad) at Bandung were expressing a desire to resume military links.

That call was repeated, during the visit to Jakarta, to Howard by the recently reappointed Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, (retired Lt-Gen.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono was the primary architect of the Indonesian military's "New Paradigm", which was intended to reform and depoliticize the armed forces. He remains close to the core officer group of the military (TNI), and on both the subject of reform and renewing links with the Australian Defense Force (ADF) their views are essentially the same.

There are three reasons for the TNI wanting to rebuild links with an army they have, on the surface, been hostile towards. The first reason is that there are genuine skills to be learned. The second and more important reason is that, cut off from U.S. military aid, the TNI sees links with the Australian Defense Force as being a "back door" to the United States. This is especially so at a time when US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld is trying to convince Congress to resume US military aid to the TNI, and Australian assessment is increasingly seen as the barometer of Indonesian politics.

The third reason for wanting to renew links is because two countries with military cooperation are much less likely to want to attack each other. For all the paranoia that can exist in Australia, there is no desire in Indonesia for military confrontation with Australia, or anyone else. The TNI exists primarily to maintain Indonesia's territorial integrity. And, for resuming military ties, that is the problem.

Ties were cut, from Australia's perspective, because of the TNI's role in the mayhem surrounding the East Timor ballot of 1999. There was also earlier disquiet about training with TNI special forces (Kopassus) and the internally repressive use to which much of that training was put. And there continues to be problems with TNI activity in West Papua, Aceh and elsewhere.

Hence, ahead of Australia's coming elections, neither the government nor the Opposition will want to commit to this controversial issue. But, after November, it is almost inevitable that whoever is in government in Australia will move cautiously towards re-establishing military links. The question will be, however, what form should such links take?

If support for Indonesia's developing democracy is to be meaningful, renewed training links with Kopassus will remain off limits. In simple terms, Kopassus has been far too active in dirty tricks campaigns against Indonesia's own citizens. Australians would be rightly disturbed if the ADF's Special Air Service Regiment was helping them to do that.

Renewed links initially are likely to take the form of support for maritime surveillance and, increasing their role in civil affairs, for the national police. Beyond that, officer training might be useful, especially if the training was not with the ADF but through the universities that provide post-graduate education to the ADF. TNI officers, it seems, need to learn less about tactics and strategies than they do about management, control and political principle. In this they would benefit from undertaking post-graduate work in an areas that focus on how to best assist local communities through development programs.

Even with such "soft options", no matter what form renewed military links take, they will remain politically unacceptable to most in Australia while the Indonesian government seeks military as opposed to political solutions to its regional problems. But perhaps carefully targeted education, as opposed to "training", might assist in helping the TNI fulfill its reformist "New Paradigm".

Dr Damien Kingsbury is senior lecturer in international development at Deakin University, Geelong. He recently co-edited, with professor Arief Budiman, 'Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition (Crawford House, 2001).