Putting Humpty-Dumpty together again

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, The Indonesian Quarterly, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

Is Indonesia, under Megawati's presidency, facing crisis? The answer is perhaps yes, based on the indicators identified below.

These are: public recognition of the failure of government in development policy; failure in conflict management (as indicated by the escalation of conflict in Aceh, Poso, Papua, etc); clear signs of defects in the democratic process indicated, among other things, by the abuse of state institutions in the promotion of certain political interests. Failure in conflict management is less likely when there is full functioning of the democratic process.

Other indicators include: the continuation of corruption, collusion and nepotism; failure in the state's capacity to uphold basic law and order and security. The overall mood continues to be pessimistic.

As 2001 draws to an end, Megawati's government has so far not been able to convince the public that it is on the right track in bringing the country out of the deep crisis it has experienced since late 1998.

Although she was, at the outset, highly praised by the public because she was flanked by strong political and "economic dream" teams led, respectively, by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, the policies they adopted only bred pessimism among the public.

The Megawati government's six-point working program provided only the broadest of guidelines, and the first 100 days of her office achieved very little.

The confession Megawati made before the Annual Session of the MPR that little had been done by the government to tackle the domestic crisis was indeed viewed by some as an honest gesture. But this was not exactly what the public wanted to hear. In the aftermath of her speech, there was a strong demand from the public that the next two and a half years should be characterized by concrete steps to remedy domestic problems.

There are still concerns, however, that Megawati's government is unwilling to follow the spirit of reform that Indonesia now needs: Instead, her government seems to prefer incremental steps that will certainly do very little to solve domestic problems.

The public should mobilize whatever resources it has at its disposal to pressure Megawati's government to move rapidly beyond symbolism to the implementation of clear policies on the economy, political security and judicial reform if she is to gain more sympathy.

Few Indonesians feel that 2001 will close with an excellent report on the performance of Megawati's government. Sectarian conflicts in Poso, Maluku and other locations, conflicts in Aceh and Papua, uncertainty in the economic recovery, the issue of decentralization, the endless wait for human rights trials and the lack of willingness to combat corruption, collusion and nepotism, to mention a few, are indicators of the slowness or inability of the government to address the real issues.

The government's inability to resolve the issues will further strengthen public perceptions that the government is not very serious in seeking a fresh approach. If such issues persist or become even more complex, or if there is no basic change in the approach to the crisis, then one cannot expect that the beginning of 2002 will witness significant policy steps.

There is already a strong perception that Megawati has never had a deep understanding of national issues, the economy in particular, and that her past record provided very little indication that she had the vision and strategy to revive the reform agenda.

Her policies during 2002 will be tested against the background of such cynicism. And, of course, one wonders what she will say in her year-end speech.

A strong sense of urgency in dealing with the current crisis is also manifest in the recent steps initiated by the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas). In a presentation before the President and her aides, Lemhannas proposed eight steps to solve the crisis (satunet.com, Nov. 23).

Commenting on the proposals, the President reportedly felt the need to have such a program executed by respective ministries. This is, of course, a positive sign, which will further stimulate enthusiasm to bring Indonesia out of the crisis and is also in line with the six working programs of the Cabinet. It is normal to adopt new policies in every crisis condition.

Thus, the Lemhannas initiative can be seen as one that will strengthen government efforts to solve the crisis. But the introduction of one new policy after another will be considered valid and applicable only when it is supported by a broad-based coalition of the public.

The government should not ignore the possibility that if such policies fail, it is community members and those in the regions that will suffer the most. This will, in turn, create not only further opposition and dissatisfaction among the pubic and regional factions, but also broaden the arena for conflict among societal groups and even among different factions in the government.

The worst scenario one could imagine is perhaps a mass revolt set off by the failure of the state to deliver the promised benefits of development or one arising from the growing prominence of ethnic, regional or religious identities. What the government must bear in mind now is that its policies for the crisis should be well-formulated and followed up by concrete and realistic steps. Such steps are needed to prevent contradictions and social tensions, already in place, from developing into concentrated and dangerous pressures.

Unless the government is able to restore stability and peace and the people's trust, and resolve protracted regional conflict without resort to violence, the state will either collapse or disintegrate, and it will either be contested or weakened. The daunting challenge for the government is therefore "how to put Humpty-Dumpty together again" in the form of a viable state capable of dragging the country out of its multidimensional crisis.

Public distrust and pessimism will definitely continue toward 2002, and even beyond. Perhaps we shall witness even unwanted and dangerous trends, unless the government shows its full commitment to take bold steps in the following crucial areas: The eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism; the realization of human rights trials; restoration of the economy; the resolution of regional conflicts (in Aceh, Papua and other provinces with potential for disruption); implementing fresh approaches to decentralization.

As the expectations of the public will become higher in the future, Megawati should not make public speeches that merely create doubt that her government is able to carry out the reform program. If Megawati's government fails to uphold the trust it has enjoyed so far and implements its stated policies, the subsequent failures will certainly guarantee a crisis in other fields or turn crisis into disaster.