Putting Humpty-Dumpty back together again

Putting Humpty-Dumpty back together again

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, The Indonesian Quarterly, Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

Is Indonesia, under Megawati's presidency, facing crisis? The
answer is perhaps yes, based on the indicators identified below.

These are: public recognition of the failure of government in
development policy; failure in conflict management (as indicated
by the escalation of conflict in Aceh, Poso, Papua, etc); clear
signs of defects in the democratic process indicated, among other
things, by the abuse of state institutions in the promotion of
certain political interests. Failure in conflict management is
less likely when there is full functioning of the democratic
process.

Other indicators include: the continuation of corruption,
collusion and nepotism; failure in the state's capacity to uphold
basic law and order and security. The overall mood continues to
be pessimistic.

As 2001 draws to an end, Megawati's government has so far not
been able to convince the public that it is on the right track in
bringing the country out of the deep crisis it has experienced
since late 1998.

Although she was, at the outset, highly praised by the public
because she was flanked by strong political and "economic dream"
teams led, respectively, by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and
Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, the policies they adopted only bred
pessimism among the public.

The Megawati government's six-point working program provided
only the broadest of guidelines, and the first 100 days of her
office achieved very little.

The confession Megawati made before the Annual Session of the
MPR that little had been done by the government to tackle the
domestic crisis was indeed viewed by some as an honest gesture.
But this was not exactly what the public wanted to hear. In the
aftermath of her speech, there was a strong demand from the
public that the next two and a half years should be characterized
by concrete steps to remedy domestic problems.

There are still concerns, however, that Megawati's government
is unwilling to follow the spirit of reform that Indonesia now
needs: Instead, her government seems to prefer incremental steps
that will certainly do very little to solve domestic problems.

The public should mobilize whatever resources it has at its
disposal to pressure Megawati's government to move rapidly
beyond symbolism to the implementation of clear policies on the
economy, political security and judicial reform if she is to gain
more sympathy.

Few Indonesians feel that 2001 will close with an excellent
report on the performance of Megawati's government. Sectarian
conflicts in Poso, Maluku and other locations, conflicts in Aceh
and Papua, uncertainty in the economic recovery, the issue of
decentralization, the endless wait for human rights trials and
the lack of willingness to combat corruption, collusion and
nepotism, to mention a few, are indicators of the slowness or
inability of the government to address the real issues.

The government's inability to resolve the issues will further
strengthen public perceptions that the government is not very
serious in seeking a fresh approach. If such issues persist or
become even more complex, or if there is no basic change in the
approach to the crisis, then one cannot expect that the beginning
of 2002 will witness significant policy steps.

There is already a strong perception that Megawati has never
had a deep understanding of national issues, the economy in
particular, and that her past record provided very little
indication that she had the vision and strategy to revive the
reform agenda.

Her policies during 2002 will be tested against the background
of such cynicism. And, of course, one wonders what she will say
in her year-end speech.

A strong sense of urgency in dealing with the current crisis
is also manifest in the recent steps initiated by the National
Resilience Institute (Lemhannas). In a presentation before the
President and her aides, Lemhannas proposed eight steps to solve
the crisis (satunet.com, Nov. 23).

Commenting on the proposals, the President reportedly felt the
need to have such a program executed by respective ministries.
This is, of course, a positive sign, which will further stimulate
enthusiasm to bring Indonesia out of the crisis and is also in
line with the six working programs of the Cabinet. It is normal
to adopt new policies in every crisis condition.

Thus, the Lemhannas initiative can be seen as one that will
strengthen government efforts to solve the crisis. But the
introduction of one new policy after another will be considered
valid and applicable only when it is supported by a broad-based
coalition of the public.

The government should not ignore the possibility that if such
policies fail, it is community members and those in the regions
that will suffer the most. This will, in turn, create not only
further opposition and dissatisfaction among the pubic and
regional factions, but also broaden the arena for conflict among
societal groups and even among different factions in the
government.

The worst scenario one could imagine is perhaps a mass revolt
set off by the failure of the state to deliver the promised
benefits of development or one arising from the growing
prominence of ethnic, regional or religious identities. What the
government must bear in mind now is that its policies for the
crisis should be well-formulated and followed up by concrete and
realistic steps. Such steps are needed to prevent contradictions
and social tensions, already in place, from developing into
concentrated and dangerous pressures.

Unless the government is able to restore stability and peace
and the people's trust, and resolve protracted regional conflict
without resort to violence, the state will either collapse or
disintegrate, and it will either be contested or weakened. The
daunting challenge for the government is therefore "how to put
Humpty-Dumpty together again" in the form of a viable state
capable of dragging the country out of its multidimensional
crisis.

Public distrust and pessimism will definitely continue toward
2002, and even beyond. Perhaps we shall witness even unwanted and
dangerous trends, unless the government shows its full
commitment to take bold steps in the following crucial areas: The
eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism; the
realization of human rights trials; restoration of the economy;
the resolution of regional conflicts (in Aceh, Papua and other
provinces with potential for disruption); implementing fresh
approaches to decentralization.

As the expectations of the public will become higher in the
future, Megawati should not make public speeches that merely
create doubt that her government is able to carry out the reform
program. If Megawati's government fails to uphold the trust it
has enjoyed so far and implements its stated policies, the
subsequent failures will certainly guarantee a crisis in other
fields or turn crisis into disaster.