Putin profits from split over U.S. antimissile defense

By Norbert Kremp

BERLIN (DPA): American plans to develop an anti-missile defense system are souring relations between America and its NATO allies, Russia and China.

President Bill Clinton is due to meet his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin at the beginning of June.

At the top of his agenda will be disarmament, reflecting Clinton's desire to round off a term marred by scandal with the signing of an international arms agreement.

His opponents in Congress are determined to prevent this at all costs while the Europeans are keen to wrap up the disarmament issue for good.

Thus, curiously, it is for the most part differences of opinion in the West which are strengthening Putin's hand although he in fact has no trumps to play.

The various negotiating positions make for interesting comparison. In the United States, opinion is turning against the old deterrent principle of vulnerability which was the cornerstone of the ban on anti-missile defense systems.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was designed to ensure world powers would turn the other cheek rather than risk fatal nuclear strikes. Anyone launching an assault would be sure of hitting his target -- but wouldn't be able to protect himself from the inevitable counterpunch.

That strategy was the product of a Washington policy think- tank and it was not easy to persuade the Kremlin to accept the idea. The "clean" strategy of deterrents was effective in preventing hot as opposed to Cold War, even if the cold version was enough to send a chill down the spine.

It worked because the war was being fought between no more than two opposing camps with just two separate ideologies. The disarmament lobby has never understood this fact.

Today the situation has changed -- the world is now multipolar. Alongside the five official nuclear powers, seven other states can boast nuclear research programs as well as nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and missiles with a range of between 150 and 2,000 kilometers.

North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria have only partly complied with the weapons control agreements.

Moreover, military technology development continues apace in every country with a nuclear capability, and the weapons produced are becoming ever more potent. The manufacture of intercontinental missiles is nothing more than a matter of time.

Even more significant is the fact that the deterrent principal is no longer universally applicable. In 1984, both Iran and Iraq used chemical weapons in the field, with Iraq even going so far as to turn its chemical arsenal on rebels within its own borders.

Does anyone trust North Korea? The rationale based on a comparable nuclear response in a comparable situation is without foundation among the "rogue nations".

The U.S. is asking itself just four questions. Is there a real threat? Is ABM interception technology effective against incoming missiles? And how much is the policy going to cost the country in both financial and diplomatic terms?

The Americans have yet to provide answers to all these questions. For example, strategically, an opponent's potential threat capability is the prime factor in weighing up a course of action, not a just the threat he currently poses.

The Russians know that -- they are themselves exposed to the risks posed by the growing capability of rogue nations and are thus in a similar situation to the Americans.

As much as they view the U.S. plans for a national ABM system as a humiliation, the Russians' rational streak may well lead them to accept a "thin defense shield" if this were sweetened with a massive disarmament program in accordance with START III (which allows for no more than 1,500 warheads on both sides).

They might even decide to adopt the system themselves, for they are only too aware of terrorists' capabilities.

Clinton would very much like to ratify a treaty but his priority is clearly a crowning glory to finish off his presidential term.

Putin knows any compromise would damage his cause and would stand little chance in Congress. The Republicans do not trust the plans for a treaty -- they know their president and his gambler's bent all too well.

The "thin shield" could intercept no more than a dozen incoming missiles at one go and therefore could not guarantee total security. For Washington, the system is not worth committing the U.S. to a substantial reduction in its own nuclear arsenal in an attempt to buy Russia's consent.

Cutting the nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads on each side would put Moscow in a position where it could afford to finance a thorough modernization of all its aging weapons systems.

All parties in the ABM debate are subject to non-military considerations. It would be thus desirable if it were the new U.S. president who were to decide on the policy which will put an end to the age of deterrents, not only for the U.S. but also for its allies, all of which would be equally vulnerable in the event of a nuclear strike.