Putin and Megawati, the political twins

Putin and Megawati, the political twins

Dmitri Kosyrev, Political Columnist, RIA Novosti, Moscow

Lord of the Ruins -- is an appropriate title for Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Indonesian President Megawati
Soekarnoputri when each assumed power. Even today, having
survived the worst, both leaders still face problems which look
very much alike. Which is surprising, especially when you
contemplate the cultural, economic and the physical distance
between the two countries.

Both countries shook off the authoritarian regimes and passed
through several years of turmoil that at times threatened the
very existence of the nations. Both have learned the lessons that
proved to be almost identical. And that was the moment when Putin
and Megawati each assumed power.

Sharing their experience might be very useful for Russia and
Indonesia. Nothing is more helpful in understanding the nations'
past, than making comparison to a very similar, yet still very
different country.

Let us have a look at several key problems shaping the
policies of the Russian and Indonesian presidents.

o War for the territorial integrity

Chechnya, the tiny Muslim autonomous republic in southern
Russia, was (and is) very much like East Timor for Indonesia.
While you cannot say that Megawati's ascendance to power was
shaped by the East Timor problem only, Chechnya practically made
Putin president.

That was in August 1999, when the conference of the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Oakland, New
Zealand, was almost shuttered by the bloody clashes in Timor.
Russia was represented by then newly-appointed Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin (the PM is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the government, mainly its economic affairs). Two
days before the end of the conference, news came to Oakland:
Another large apartment block in Moscow was being demolished in
the middle of the night by explosives, set off by unknown
terrorists. Hundreds of Moscovites died instantly. Another
explosive charge was found but it was successfully defused. The
Prime Minister rushed home across the globe, flying over
Indonesia.

TV cameras caught him descending the steps in Moscow, boiling
with fury. Before he landed, police disclosed that the explosives
were laid by the Chechen terrorists. Putin uttered his now famous
phrase in the police street slang: "We are going to rub them off,
wherever they are. If they hide in the toilet, we'll rub them off
in the toilet."

The Russian public saw a very human, very angry and decisive
man -- and they liked what they saw. Within three months, he was
handed the job as acting president by Boris Yeltsin, a position
that had to be confirmed by the national election three months
later. Putin was not even campaigning for presidency -- he was
busy waging the long-expected war in Chechnya, and that was the
best campaign you could imagine. He won the election easily, a
man whom few Russians have heard of six months previously.

The lesson here is that if there is a bad problem affecting
the daily life of the nation, you have to settle it one way or
another. Inaction is the worse thing of all.

In the previous years, every Russian knew that the Chechen
street crime in Moscow and other cities have terrified the
police; not to mention the bank frauds, car-napping and holding
people for ransom. The government of president Yeltsin failed
miserably in conquering Chechnya in a bloody and reluctant war;
as a result the plague has spread over all the rest of Russia.

There is a stark difference with East Timor, where the problem
had at least been contained within the borders of the territory.
But the public has clearly shown that the leader of a country has
to be sincere and should not delay in dealing with the problem of
armed insurrection -- whatever the solution may be.

Unfortunately, the war in Chechnya is showing all the signs of
being long, in fact -- indefinite. It is a problem that calls for
an economic solution as well as for the military one. But the
public, as ratings and surveys show, still supports Putin, who
has shown that it is better to wage war on the enemy's territory
than to let him take it to your land.

o Globalism as a fallen enemy

Neither Putin with his relentless war against the criminal
kingdom in Chechnya, nor Megawati would have had much chance of
success, if not for the change in the global tide: The demise of
the liberal globalists, and the rise of the modern nationalists,
like the Republicans in the United States.

Ideologically Putin, Megawati and George W. Bush belong to the
same camp, while most of European leaders are still holding to
the old set of values, like putting human rights above the rights
of the nations to survive, putting the right of a nation to be a
separate state, above the inevitably ensuing economic disaster.

There were many dark thoughts about the real goals of the
globalists -- somehow their activities seemed to lead to
weakening and sometimes disintegration of the big regional powers
like Yugoslavia, Russia or Indonesia. Now the presidents of
Russia and Indonesia are lucky to be operating in a different
world, where the terrorists are not habitually called freedom
fighters.

Of course the good old American delusion of omnipotence, of
the American right to strike first whoever they suspect of
anything sinister, hardly makes this world fair and just -- but
still it is better than in the hypocritical 1990s.

o The army as a political factor

The obvious things are the hardest to prove -- like, say, that
Russia (and Indonesia) are different from Europe and America. It
is still true that in such countries there must be some
institutions to hold the nation together, which means that they
have to play some political role, be it democratic or not.

In the Communist Russia's case, the special role of the Army
and the special services have never been constitutionalized, but
have always been there. So it was not surprising that the
military became a serious political problem under Yeltsin. It
could not be otherwise in a cash-strapped country that was losing
its strategic parity with the former arch-rival, America.

Two coups d'etat, staged by Yeltsin in 1991 and in 1993, where
he had to use at least some factions in the military, have
strained the military's relations with the Russian presidency.

Putin is not particularly popular there, even though he is
generally liked for his constant attention to the military
problems. His real test will be the much-needed military reform.
And there are still no signs that the reform will indeed happen.

As a recognition of this serious problem, Putin appointed his
close friend Sergey Ivanov to head the Ministry of Defense. His
job is to tackle the problems of underpaid, overstaffed by the
generals, and understaffed by the rank-and-file institution on
the brink of collapse. There is a clear need to spend more money
and cut the ranks of these forces to make them effective.

Not to mention the problem of the deep unpopularity of the
military service in Russia -- again, a question of money to pay
for the professional army instead of the drafted one.

Putin's problems with the military are far from being solved,
which leaves a deep impact on the foreign policy, and on the
president's relations with his reluctant friends among the
liberals. Like in Indonesia, this is one of these key national
problems which will determine the success of the president.

The author, vice-president of the Foreign Policy Association
in Moscow, contributed this article to The Jakarta Post.