Put pressure on Serbia

The Bosnian city of Bihac is supposedly under UN and NATO protection, but by now it is probably too late to save it by military means. Differing European and American agendas and a divided command structure requiring both NATO and UN approval ruled out a timely and effective use of air power.

Fearing a divisive rift in NATO, the Clinton administration has dropped its calls for more aggressive bombing, bowing once again to Europe's preference for letting the Serbs batter Bosnia into a negotiated settlement. There is also talk of rewarding Serbian military gains by redrawing the proposed peace map in their favor.

Sparing NATO further damage makes sense. But if diplomacy is to be the focus, Washington needs to lead the way to a more tough-minded diplomatic approach. Stopping the Serbs by military force may now be impossible. Rewarding them only invites further offensives against civilian centers.

Instead Serbia's president, Slobodan Milosevic, has to be told that the Croatian Serb units that have tipped the military balance in Bihac must immediately pull back across the international border they have violated. Pro-government forces were pushing back Serbian lines around Bihac a few weeks ago, before Croatian Serbs joined the fighting.

Unlike the Bosnian Serbs with whom Milosevic has allegedly broken, the Croatian Serbs still respond to Belgrade's wishes. Milosevic should be put on notice that unless his Croatian Serb allies withdraw immediately, Serbia will be held responsible and further relief from UN sanctions will be blocked, if necessary by a U.S. veto.

The reasons the world's most powerful alliance could not halt the Serbian drive on Bihac were more political than military. Air power, for example, might have been used, not just against Croatian airfields but also against Serbian aircraft and the artillery moving on Bihac.

Britain and France have always been more sympathetic to the Serbs than Washington has. The Serbs were their allies in two World Wars. London and Paris have also refused to treat the mostly Muslim government as an innocent victim of aggression and have tried to discourage it from fighting on to regain lost territory. Perhaps allowing the Serbian counteroffensive to proceed seemed a useful way to press this point.

Explanations like the onset of darkness or problems coordinating with UN forces should be viewed as no more than convenient excuses for not using air power more decisively. The UN commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, is a British officer acting in complete accord with London's policies.

The hard reality is that Britain and France, along with Russia, effectively reject the use of force against the Serbs and base their entire diplomatic strategy on cooperating with Milosevic. Though Serbia's president was the original architect and crucial sponsor of the war, he claims to have broken with his Bosnian Serb proteges and to support the latest international peace plan. For this he is being rewarded with phased relief from the economic sanctions.

But the role of the Croatian Serbs in the Bihac offensive calls Milosevic's good will into question. Perhaps he feels obliged to provide at least indirect help to the Bosnian Serbs when they suffer battlefield reverses. But in that case, he is not entitled to any further relief from sanctions.

-- The New York Times