Protecting secrecy without jeopardizing democracy

By Mochtar Buchori

JAKARTA (JP): Who shot the four Trisakti students to death on May 12? Will we ever know the truth? Or will it remain a "buried secret" like the Marsinah and Udin cases?

I do not think that anyone among the lay public can answer these questions. And I do not think that those who have the facts will volunteer to answer these questions. I think that the facts will emerge to the surface only if there is tremendous public pressure on the military establishment.

I do not think I am alone in my skepticism. People like me feel that the military is not being quite honest to the public. I feel personally that the military has been trying to cover up something big in this case.

Against the background of the firm promises made by the generals in the Armed Forces (ABRI), including Gen. Wiranto, that this case will be investigated in a thorough and objective manner, the performance of the military tribunal is very, very disappointing. Based on ABRI's promises, the public expects that the military tribunal will open the case by examining those suspected of doing the shootings. But what the public has witnessed instead is the prosecution of police officers accused of not obeying an order given to them.

My immediate reaction to this was disbelief. "What is this? Is this a joke? What does 'disobeying an order' have to do with the death of the four students? Is this the most important element that caused their deaths?"

Until today, I am still disappointed and frustrated. I know I am illiterate in matters related to legal proceedings, but my common sense has prompted me to conclude that the military has decided to conceal many secrets in this case, and resist any attempt to uncover them.

Every good citizen realizes that there are things which cannot be revealed to the public. We know there are secrets that must be tightly guarded for the sake of maintaining public security and preventing chaos.

Experiences show, however, that too much secrecy can lead to too little accountability, and that this in turn can lead to excessive practices among intelligence "professionals".

The torture of people kidnapped by intelligence officers is one testimony of such excesses. The mysterious death of Marsinah is another testimony. And the prosecution of Dwi Sumaji, an entirely innocent man, in the case of the mysterious death of Udin is still another testimony.

Something must be inherently wrong when the intelligence apparatus has so much freedom to do so much harm, and all to no advantage to the country.

I think there are too many unnecessary secrets, too many unexplained events in Indonesia. In addition to the Marsinah and Udin cases mentioned above, there are many other events that until today remain unexplained. They have become buried with time.

The recent kidnappings, riots that seemed to be quite well organized and the physical assault on Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) Megawati supporters at the PDI headquarters on July 27, 1996 are all secrets that the military seems unwilling to uncover.

These are not trivial events, but events of great significance for the rehabilitation and cultivation of democracy in Indonesia.

These are practices that flatly deny and reject respect for the people, the highest political authority in any well- functioning democracy.

The very important question ABRI has to answer in this respect is: "How should intelligence work be carried out effectively without betraying the principles of democracy?"

It should not be forgotten that ABRI is a part of Indonesian society. And if the promises to carry out total reform are genuine, then it should reexamine its definition of "secret" and rethink the present classification of its secrets.

According to Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA during the Carter administration from 1977 to 1982, there are two kinds of secrets that are truly important in intelligence work: secrets concerning the identity of the people who risk their lives spying on "hostile" territories, and secrets concerning technical means used to conduct spying.

This definition can be employed to raise a number of questions, the answers of which can then be used to reclassify Indonesia's existing secrets into two groups: secrets that are really vital for protecting the country and the nation, and secrets that stand in the way of the nation's efforts to generate a clean and just society.

We can ask in this regard, for instance, what or which should be considered as "hostile" territory. Are university campuses "hostile" territory?

If the answer is yes, it was a very grave mistake on the part of ABRI to leak signals concerning their operations within campuses. It was truly unprofessional conduct.

If, on the other hand, university campuses are not considered "hostile", then it was also a grave mistake to spy on them. It was again totally unprofessional conduct.

It must be admitted, I think, that public esteem toward certain elements of ABRI has sunk to a very low point. The word "intel" -- short for "intelligence" -- has a very bad connotation in the public's mind.

To restore the reputation and trust of the military, especially that of the intelligence apparatus, Adm. Stansfield Turner prescribed the following two principles: objectivity and legality.

The principle of objectivity requires that all "reporting and analyses coming from intelligence community must be scrupulously free of bias, either conscious or unconscious". And the principle of legality demands that "intelligence agencies, like all arms of government, must reflect the mores of the nation and abide by its laws".

To restate our main question, the essential issue in this case is whether or not the military will allow the public know the entire truth.

Will the military let the public know who did the shootings and for what reason? Or will ABRI treat the answer to this essential question as a "secret" that must be guarded at all costs, even at the risk of killing once again the seeds of democracy in our society?

The writer is an observer of social and cultural affairs.