Pros and cons of the TNI under the defense ministry
Pros and cons of the TNI under the defense ministry
Supama P Dikrama, Jakarta
Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono recently made quite an
interesting statement, that ideally the Indonesian Military
(TNI) should be under his ministry's authority, while the
National Police (Polri) should be under the Ministry of Home
Affairs.
He added that it would take at least three to five years to
see this ideal arrangement become a reality. Currently both the
National Police and the TNI are directly under the President. The
National Police separated from the TNI and were put under the
president's control in April 1999, or one year after Soeharto's
fall.
Juwono has also said it is common practice for the President
to have direct access to the TNI chief and the National Police
chief.
Although TNI Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto quickly played
down the minister's idea, questioning the readiness of the
civilian minister to lead the powerful body, and lacking
assurance that he would not abuse the TNI role for his own
political interests, the idea will very likely grow at high speed
in the coming years.
The discourse that Juwono has introduced seems to accommodate
a number of ideas and statements that observers of military
affairs put forward some time ago, when the bill on the TNI
became a polemic following its deliberation by the House of
Representatives. Under the new law, the TNI structurally remains
under the President.
There are growing aspirations that ideally the TNI should be
placed under the defense ministry and be accountable to the
minister of defense. This is modeled upon the structure of the
military in advanced democracies, where the military is placed
under the authority of a civilian.
In a democracy, differing discourses and opinions naturally
exist. What matters, though, are the pluses and minuses of
placing the TNI under the minister of defense. In this context,
whether civilian politicians are really prepared to manage the
TNI institution as one free of any political influence, must also
be taken into account.
Another question is whether a civilian defense minister would
be able to manage the TNI professionally, as an institution fully
reflecting its identity as a military institution.
These simple questions require further deliberation among
observers, academics and, more particularly, civilian
politicians. They must develop a keen understanding of the
civilian's capability and maturity as a political player.
The nation's level of political maturity also raise questions
as to whether the TNI should be placed under the ministry of
defense.
Actually, TNI personnel have nothing to worry about. It would
be acceptable for them to see the TNI placed under the ministry
of defense, or under the President. In either position, the TNI
knows that it serves to defend the state. It would be different,
however, if the TNI became a political machine or the tool of the
ruling government.
Juwono was in some ways correct when he hinted that some elite
members of the TNI would reject this idea. The argument for
rejection, however, is not groundless.
First, we can clearly see that civilian political leaders are
yet to reach maturity in implementing democracy.
Second, political parties still strongly influence their
members who assume bureaucratic positions (in executive, judicial
or legislative institutions.)
It is easy to imagine the TNI's future if it fell into the
hands of political party members.
One could assume that these decisions would eventually drag
the TNI into partisanship, whereby it would lean toward the
political party the minister of defense comes from. In such a
situation, it would be very difficult for the TNI to remain
politically neutral.
The question is, are civilian politicians ready to ensure that
the TNI never serves as the instrument of a political party or a
political tool?
Not so long ago, the TNI was an instrument of the political
machine of Soeharto during his 32-year tenure.
The current political reality, and past experiences, must be
taken into consideration before determining the place of the TNI
within this state. These efforts are also necessary to ensure
that the President, who is now directly elected by the people,
will not seek to influence the TNI's leadership, or abuse the
military as an institution to maintain his political power.
A defense minister's political leaning must never be allowed
to affect the professional duty of the TNI as a state's
instrument to maintain territorial integrity and national unity
and ensure the safety of the people.
Defense minister Juwono himself will certainly be able to
secure the TNI as a state institution exempt from the political
interests of individuals, groups or political parties. Why? The
answer is simple: Juwono is not a politician and his capability
is highly regarded. When a non-politician like Juwono holds the
position of defense minister, the TNI will not have any worries
concerning its neutrality. Juwono is a professional with
unquestionable integrity and, more importantly, he is not a party
man.
What would happen if a party man -- not of the same caliber as
Juwono -- became defense minister? That is a scenario that all
relevant parties should think hard about.
As long as civilian politicians consider democracy only as a
means to seek power, the TNI should not be placed under the
defense minister. Will our civilian politicians advance to the
expected level in the coming three to five years? Let's just wait
and see.
Our trust in the capability of civilian politicians rests with
their own performance. Until now, our impression of civilian
politicians has always been that they are greedy for positions
and power and will pursue their own interests, by hook or by
crook.
The writer is a postgraduate student at Prof Dr. Moestopo
University (Beragama), Jakarta. He can be reached at
supamadikrama@yahoo.com