Progress of Chinese assimilation

By Junus Jahja

JAKARTA (JP): At a very early stage Indonesia issued a "political manifesto" for Chinese people residing in Indonesia. This was announced in an official statement on Nov. 1, 1945. Through citizenship regulations all Indo-Asians and Indo- Europeans should quickly become full-fledged Indonesians.

Now, half a century later, how is the journey "from Chinese to Indonesian" developing?

Together with a number of fellow ethnic Chinese, I left Indonesia in 1949 for the Netherlands, to attend the well-known Rotterdam School of Economics. A couple of years later we were joined by pribumi (indigenous) Indonesians.

We all got along very well, and avoided coming together on exclusively ethnical grounds. Our way of life was based on the very fact that we were all Indonesians, irrespective of racial and cultural background. These daily contacts in Rotterdam could be considered a total 100 percent assimilation, although we never used that word at the time.

During this time there were, in fact, two different groups of Indonesian students in the Netherlands. The first was under the umbrella of Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia (PPI), and the other was united in the Chung Hua Hui (CHH). The PPI consisted of a group of students sent by the Indonesian government and other pribumi students. In the CHH were ethnic Chinese students. The principle question that arose was whether CHH had a right to exist.

During the colonial period, ethnic Chinese were so-called Nederlands onderdaan (Dutch subjects), but in 1952 the majority of CHH members (307 out of 329) had opted for Indonesian citizenship. Therefore, was it still appropriate to be a member of an organization based on Chinese ethnicity? In fact, Chung Hua Hui means Chinese Association. According to the board of CHH, in 1952, people of Chinese descent who have Indonesian citizenship, should loosen their ties with their Chineseness and replace it with a strong orientation toward Indonesia only.

They should abandon any orientation toward China; nor should they strive for overseas Chinese citizenship. Therefore, the only solution acceptable was to dissolve CHH and join PPI. To liquidate CHH, the Articles of Association had to be amended, for which the approval of two-third of the votes was needed.

This could not be obtained, but all those voting for the amendment left the meeting, handing in their CHH membership cards, stating that they would join PPI instead. In February 1978, the now defunct Tempo magazine described this event as the "first shot" aimed at total assimilation. (CHH was finally dissolved 10 years later, 1962.)

Returning from Holland, we were confronted with a totally different situation. In fact, two years later, on March 13 1954, 44 prominent ethnic Chinese founded Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki). The objective was to fight against racial discrimination (by the government) and to enlighten members about their obligations as citizens. It was stipulated that Baperki was not a political party, although it participated in the General Elections in its own right.

However -- although it was open to all Indonesians irrespective of race -- it was not a big surprise that in practice only ethnic Chinese became members. At one time, according to Baperki's regional, Central Java, chairman (Semarang, Dec. 30 1963 press coverage) there were 260,000 members, almost 100 percent Chinese origin. Baperki boasted being the "spokesman" for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

It was only after their leaders, including Siauw Giok Tjhan and Oei Tjoe Tat, began increasingly leaning towards the left -- Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and Partai Indonesia (Partindo) -- that ethnic Chinese start questioning the wisdom of "building" political strength through ethnic/racial solidarity.

Is it not so that, as a result of such policy, any controversy with other ideologies or groups involving Baperki (although sometimes supported by President Sukarno) will, in fact, be seen as "political antagonism", identical to "racial antagonism"? Thus jeopardizing the future of ethnic Chinese and their offspring in Indonesia. Baperki's fame was further accentuated when its trumpet Republik was banned because of "hostility towards the people, state and government of the Republic of Indonesia".

In 1960 a number of prominent ethnic Chinese challenged Baperki and Baperkiism. They were known as the assimilationists, who stated that "the Chinese minority problem should be solved by voluntary and active assimilation in all fields".

According to them, the time had come for ethnic Chinese to assimilate and unite with pribumi Indonesians and abandon racial exclusivism/isolation. For whatever purpose, it was not proper anymore to associate along racial lines. The above ideas were widely supported, especially by the Armed Forces.

My former colleagues from PPI in the Netherlands actively joined us, including Soemantri Brodjonegoro, Moeljoto Djojomartono, Radius Prawiro, Frans Seda, Hendrobudijanto and many others. Some were board members in Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (LPKB), which later became a governmental body coordinating the process of assimilation.

How risky the existence of Baperki was for ethnic Chinese was demonstrated when there were strong indications that its leaders (Siauw Giok Tjhan, Oei Tjoe Tat and others) were involved in the abortive communist coup of Sept. 30 1965.

In this context, Dr. Charles Coppel, in Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (1983), referred to the important role of ethnic Chinese assimilationist leaders in LPKB during the two years after the abortive coup. Their partnership with the Armed Forces and other anti-communist Indonesian groups demonstrated that there were "good Chinese", neither pawns of Peking, nor camp-followers of PKI.

By pressing the rank and file membership of Baperki to dissolve all their branches voluntarily, LPKB moderated the extent of anti-Chinese violence at that time. LPKB was further successful in presenting Baperki's mass following as a politically "illiterate" group, which had merely been duped by a leftist leadership. As a result, 260,000 ethnic Chinese and their family-members narrowly escaped a major disaster.

In 1985, Professor Stuart W. Greif wrote a book titled Indonesians of Chinese Origin: Assimilation and the goal of one nation-one people. According to Greif, the New Order government can be proud of its assimilation-policy successes. The young generation, among ethnic Chinese, supported it. People under 10 have become more and more Indonesian-centered, and the orientation toward China has diminished sharply. I am reminded of the following event.

My good friend Ridwan Saidi has just returned from Kuala Lumpur, after not having visited there for quite some time. While driving through the Thamrin/Sudirman business-center, which is now crowded with sky-scrapers, he said to me: "Junus, economic development here is much better than at our neighbor." I agreed and said: "Frankly speaking, if our new citizens of Chinese origin could be heartily accepted as fellow-Indonesians by the people in this country, there wouldn't be any problem whatsoever. We are economically much better off, what else could we want?" However, in the case of rapid economic progress in Indonesia, whereby ethnic Chinese Indonesians are in a remarkable position, there are apparently still big problems.

A minority is making very fast progress, while the people at large are left far behind. So there are very serious economic grievances.

In this respect, retired general Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo once wrote that ethnic Chinese Indonesians (through the process of assimilation) should have a national consciousness, as is now possessed by their pribumi compatriots. At the same time, pribumi entrepreneurs should emerge, becoming the backbone of our middle class, to strengthen the nation.

Only by achieving a strong Indonesia will sensitive issues disappear. Then will the Chinese (especially those belonging to totok, newcomers, dominating our economy) become interested in assimilation and see the advantage of participation. On the other hand, being economically well-off, the pribumi feel like "masters at home", making the acceptance of ethnic Chinese as compatriots more feasible.

In this context we welcome the Bali Declaration, in which 100 big businessmen (mostly ethnic Chinese) expressed their commitment to build a strong Indonesia, not only beneficial to the few at the top, but also to the men on the street, paving the way toward "From Chinese to Indonesian". Let's wait and see.

On July 19 my assimilationist friends and I met with Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security Soesilo Soedarman. We asked the government to introduce a militia which also involved ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Such compulsory military service would certainly speed up assimilation.

As a matter of fact, in the 1960s, the government introduced Wamilda Wajib Militer Darurat, which was obligatory for new university graduates, and involved many ethnic Chinese Indonesians. For a short period of time, its positive impact is still felt today. The effect would be more so if we had a fully- fledged militia, involving every Indonesian citizen finishing secondary school. Minister Soesilo Soedarman was apparently very interested. Let's also wait and see. We have been independent now for 50 years. We must look forward.

The writer is Director of the Institute for Studies on Ethnic Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia.