Progress of Chinese assimilation

Progress of Chinese assimilation

By Junus Jahja

JAKARTA (JP): At a very early stage Indonesia issued a
"political manifesto" for Chinese people residing in Indonesia.
This was announced in an official statement on Nov. 1, 1945.
Through citizenship regulations all Indo-Asians and Indo-
Europeans should quickly become full-fledged Indonesians.

Now, half a century later, how is the journey "from Chinese to
Indonesian" developing?

Together with a number of fellow ethnic Chinese, I left
Indonesia in 1949 for the Netherlands, to attend the well-known
Rotterdam School of Economics. A couple of years later we were
joined by pribumi (indigenous) Indonesians.

We all got along very well, and avoided coming together on
exclusively ethnical grounds. Our way of life was based on the
very fact that we were all Indonesians, irrespective of racial
and cultural background. These daily contacts in Rotterdam could
be considered a total 100 percent assimilation, although we never
used that word at the time.

During this time there were, in fact, two different groups of
Indonesian students in the Netherlands. The first was under the
umbrella of Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia (PPI), and the other was
united in the Chung Hua Hui (CHH). The PPI consisted of a group
of students sent by the Indonesian government and other pribumi
students. In the CHH were ethnic Chinese students. The principle
question that arose was whether CHH had a right to exist.

During the colonial period, ethnic Chinese were so-called
Nederlands onderdaan (Dutch subjects), but in 1952 the majority
of CHH members (307 out of 329) had opted for Indonesian
citizenship. Therefore, was it still appropriate to be a member
of an organization based on Chinese ethnicity? In fact, Chung Hua
Hui means Chinese Association. According to the board of CHH, in
1952, people of Chinese descent who have Indonesian citizenship,
should loosen their ties with their Chineseness and replace it
with a strong orientation toward Indonesia only.

They should abandon any orientation toward China; nor should
they strive for overseas Chinese citizenship. Therefore, the only
solution acceptable was to dissolve CHH and join PPI. To
liquidate CHH, the Articles of Association had to be amended, for
which the approval of two-third of the votes was needed.

This could not be obtained, but all those voting for the
amendment left the meeting, handing in their CHH membership
cards, stating that they would join PPI instead. In February
1978, the now defunct Tempo magazine described this event as the
"first shot" aimed at total assimilation. (CHH was finally
dissolved 10 years later, 1962.)

Returning from Holland, we were confronted with a totally
different situation. In fact, two years later, on March 13 1954,
44 prominent ethnic Chinese founded Badan Permusyawaratan
Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki). The objective was to fight
against racial discrimination (by the government) and to
enlighten members about their obligations as citizens. It was
stipulated that Baperki was not a political party, although it
participated in the General Elections in its own right.

However -- although it was open to all Indonesians
irrespective of race -- it was not a big surprise that in
practice only ethnic Chinese became members. At one time,
according to Baperki's regional, Central Java, chairman
(Semarang, Dec. 30 1963 press coverage) there were 260,000
members, almost 100 percent Chinese origin. Baperki boasted being
the "spokesman" for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

It was only after their leaders, including Siauw Giok Tjhan
and Oei Tjoe Tat, began increasingly leaning towards the left --
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and Partai Indonesia (Partindo)
-- that ethnic Chinese start questioning the wisdom of "building"
political strength through ethnic/racial solidarity.

Is it not so that, as a result of such policy, any controversy
with other ideologies or groups involving Baperki (although
sometimes supported by President Sukarno) will, in fact, be seen
as "political antagonism", identical to "racial antagonism"? Thus
jeopardizing the future of ethnic Chinese and their offspring in
Indonesia. Baperki's fame was further accentuated when its
trumpet Republik was banned because of "hostility towards the
people, state and government of the Republic of Indonesia".

In 1960 a number of prominent ethnic Chinese challenged
Baperki and Baperkiism. They were known as the assimilationists,
who stated that "the Chinese minority problem should be solved by
voluntary and active assimilation in all fields".

According to them, the time had come for ethnic Chinese to
assimilate and unite with pribumi Indonesians and abandon racial
exclusivism/isolation. For whatever purpose, it was not proper
anymore to associate along racial lines. The above ideas were
widely supported, especially by the Armed Forces.

My former colleagues from PPI in the Netherlands actively
joined us, including Soemantri Brodjonegoro, Moeljoto
Djojomartono, Radius Prawiro, Frans Seda, Hendrobudijanto and
many others. Some were board members in Lembaga Pembinaan
Kesatuan Bangsa (LPKB), which later became a governmental body
coordinating the process of assimilation.

How risky the existence of Baperki was for ethnic Chinese was
demonstrated when there were strong indications that its leaders
(Siauw Giok Tjhan, Oei Tjoe Tat and others) were involved in the
abortive communist coup of Sept. 30 1965.

In this context, Dr. Charles Coppel, in Indonesian Chinese in
Crisis (1983), referred to the important role of ethnic Chinese
assimilationist leaders in LPKB during the two years after the
abortive coup. Their partnership with the Armed Forces and other
anti-communist Indonesian groups demonstrated that there were
"good Chinese", neither pawns of Peking, nor camp-followers of
PKI.

By pressing the rank and file membership of Baperki to
dissolve all their branches voluntarily, LPKB moderated the
extent of anti-Chinese violence at that time. LPKB was further
successful in presenting Baperki's mass following as a
politically "illiterate" group, which had merely been duped by a
leftist leadership. As a result, 260,000 ethnic Chinese and their
family-members narrowly escaped a major disaster.

In 1985, Professor Stuart W. Greif wrote a book titled
Indonesians of Chinese Origin: Assimilation and the goal of one
nation-one people. According to Greif, the New Order government
can be proud of its assimilation-policy successes. The young
generation, among ethnic Chinese, supported it. People under 10
have become more and more Indonesian-centered, and the
orientation toward China has diminished sharply. I am reminded of
the following event.

My good friend Ridwan Saidi has just returned from Kuala
Lumpur, after not having visited there for quite some time. While
driving through the Thamrin/Sudirman business-center, which is
now crowded with sky-scrapers, he said to me: "Junus, economic
development here is much better than at our neighbor." I agreed
and said: "Frankly speaking, if our new citizens of Chinese
origin could be heartily accepted as fellow-Indonesians by the
people in this country, there wouldn't be any problem whatsoever.
We are economically much better off, what else could we want?"
However, in the case of rapid economic progress in Indonesia,
whereby ethnic Chinese Indonesians are in a remarkable position,
there are apparently still big problems.

A minority is making very fast progress, while the people at
large are left far behind. So there are very serious economic
grievances.

In this respect, retired general Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo once
wrote that ethnic Chinese Indonesians (through the process of
assimilation) should have a national consciousness, as is now
possessed by their pribumi compatriots. At the same time, pribumi
entrepreneurs should emerge, becoming the backbone of our middle
class, to strengthen the nation.

Only by achieving a strong Indonesia will sensitive issues
disappear. Then will the Chinese (especially those belonging to
totok, newcomers, dominating our economy) become interested in
assimilation and see the advantage of participation. On the other
hand, being economically well-off, the pribumi feel like "masters
at home", making the acceptance of ethnic Chinese as compatriots
more feasible.

In this context we welcome the Bali Declaration, in which 100
big businessmen (mostly ethnic Chinese) expressed their
commitment to build a strong Indonesia, not only beneficial to
the few at the top, but also to the men on the street, paving the
way toward "From Chinese to Indonesian". Let's wait and see.

On July 19 my assimilationist friends and I met with
Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security Soesilo
Soedarman. We asked the government to introduce a militia which
also involved ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Such compulsory
military service would certainly speed up assimilation.

As a matter of fact, in the 1960s, the government introduced
Wamilda Wajib Militer Darurat, which was obligatory for new
university graduates, and involved many ethnic Chinese
Indonesians. For a short period of time, its positive impact is
still felt today. The effect would be more so if we had a fully-
fledged militia, involving every Indonesian citizen finishing
secondary school. Minister Soesilo Soedarman was apparently very
interested. Let's also wait and see. We have been independent now
for 50 years. We must look forward.

The writer is Director of the Institute for Studies on Ethnic
Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia.