Priority for Aceh: Saving lives, peaceful settlement

Priority for Aceh: Saving lives, peaceful settlement

Rizal Sukma, Director of Studies, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Jakarta

After being postponed for almost two weeks from Aug. 5, the
government finally issued a "new policy" for Aceh on Aug. 19. The
policy, while it continues to stress the relevance of previous
"comprehensive policy" to deal with the Aceh problem, has two
new, additional elements.

First, it gives the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), an ultimatum to
accept the Special Autonomy Law by early December 2002. Moreover,
the government maintains that future peace talks will depend upon
GAM's acceptance of the law.

Second, if GAM does not conform with the ultimatum by the
deadline, the government pledges to intensify its military
operations and take "firmer" action in the province. It is also
important to note that despite the tough warning, Jakarta has
abandoned its previous plan to impose a state of emergency in
Aceh, be it military or civil.

However, there is skepticism that the new policy will solve
the Aceh problem for two main reasons. First, the new policy,
especially the ultimatum to GAM to accept the law by December, is
clearly based on flawed logic. While maintaining that it is still
open to a negotiated political settlement, the government
apparently fails to understand the logic of peace negotiations in
resolving a secessionist conflict such as in Aceh.

The conflicting choice between independence (for GAM) and
autonomy (for the government) is the core issue in such conflict.

It is predictable that GAM will reject and ignore the
ultimatum, because, if GAM does accept the special autonomy law
by the deadline, this implies abandonment of the independence
demand and then the problem is virtually solved.

The peace talks are meant precisely to resolve the differing
position between the government and GAM on the future status of
Aceh in relation to Indonesia: autonomy or independence. In other
words, for Jakarta acceptance of the law should be the ultimate
goal of peace talks, not a precondition for them.

Second, the policy is still based on the assumption that the
problem in Aceh can at the end be resolved through military
means. This assumption is clearly reflected in Jakarta's threat
to intensify military operations in the province should GAM
refuse to accept the autonomy law at the end of this year.

In fact, history proves that military means have never
succeeded in solving the Aceh problem. The Armed Forces tried to
put down the Acehnese rebellion through brutal military
operations during the military operation era (DOM) from 1990 to
1998. The military operation, instead of bringing an end to the
rebellion, merely resulted in the growing appeal of independence
to the Acehnese. Gross violation of human rights by the military
during that period drove many to join the secessionist movement.

More importantly, it is difficult to understand what the
government means when it insists on "firm" military action
against GAM if it fails to meet the December deadline. Does it
mean that over these years, especially from early 1999 onward,
the government or TNI was not yet "firm" in carrying out its
counterinsurgency operation against GAM in Aceh?

Indeed, such a statement begs many questions. The military
authorities in Aceh, for example, revealed that security forces
killed more than 950 GAM members since May 2001 (Serambi
Indonesia, July 31, 2002). TNI forces also managed to kill GAM
Commander Teungku Abdullah Syafii earlier this year. Indeed,
media reports also suggest that the security apparatus in Aceh
has been actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations against
GAM.

In such circumstances, repeated threats by the government that
it will take "firmer" military action raises two areas of
speculation. First, as the threats have already been made
repeatedly over the last three years, the latest threat might
simply reflect the government's frustration due to its inability
to solve the Aceh problem. Second, the threat might also reflect
the inability of security forces to carry out a counterinsurgency
operation of sorts so that they would have a freer hand in using
military might.

Whatever message the government intends to convey through the
ultimatum and threat, it seems that peace remains as remote as
ever in Aceh. Here, it is important to stress that the peace
talks remain the best policy option for both sides.

GAM's acceptance of the special autonomy law as an entry point
for further peace talks and negotiations should be seen as
progress. The government should capitalize on that and move to
reach other agreements and achieve progress on areas that were
agreed upon by both sides in Geneva May 2002.

For the next round of peace talks, rather than quarreling on
autonomy or independence, both sides should focus on reaching an
agreement to an end of hostilities and violence and a monitoring
mechanism. At the moment, saving the lives of thousands of
Acehnese is more important than any other issue.

Indeed, priority should be given to peace talks. That, however
does not mean Jakarta should abandon its right to preserve and
maintain law and order in Aceh. The problem here is how to
exercise that right.

Professionalism, discipline, improved operational capability
in conducting counterinsurgency operations and an appropriate
degree of civilian control over the military have become
imperative. However, one should not forget that any operation "to
win hearts and minds" in Aceh would not bring about any
significant result if the government continued to ignore the
resolution of human rights cases and the implementation of
promises in socioeconomic fields.

The four dimensions of conflict resolution -- peace talks, the
maintenance of law and order, human rights trials and social and
economic improvements -- should be carried out in tandem.