Priorities: Legal, military reform

By Peter Milne

JAKARTA (JP): It is obviously impossible to say at this stage whether the rather surprising delay in announcing the cabinet line-up is a positive sign or not. It could be that great care is being taken over the suitability of the appointees. Or the delay could indicate bickering and problems in accommodating all the various political groups that made Megawati's ascendancy to the presidency possible.

Either way, the importance of getting the selection right for the future of the nation cannot be underestimated. The components of the new cabinet will represent either a second chance to continue along the difficult road to reform, or confirm many people's worst fears -- namely that the inclusion of technocrats and professionals of the highest integrity must be sacrificed to politicians seeking to hold as much influence as possible for their parties.

Already, the fact that the announcement seems to be taking longer than expected is beginning to take its toll on the gains made by the rupiah in the days following the special session of the People's Consultative Assembly. This in itself is rather disturbing and irresponsible, when maintaining the strength of the rupiah is of the utmost importance in allowing the government precious room for maneuver in its fiscal, and consequently monetary, policy.

In the meantime while we wait, one great gift that the Golkar party could offer to the nation -- one that, regrettably, has very little chance of being forthcoming -- would be for the party, fresh from its rather dubious victory in its court case in the Supreme Court, to decline any seats in the new cabinet. As a gesture of goodwill and proof that it had truly reformed itself, Golkar should accept the role of a loyal opposition -- a constructive voice of criticism towards the new government.

By so doing, it would be able to fulfill an extremely important role in the House of Representatives (DPR), show people once and for all that it was capable of putting the interests of the nation ahead of its own immediate lust for power, and demonstrate the quality of its ideas in opposition. Soeharto's former ruing party could even go so far as to copy the British system of parliamentary opposition, by announcing its own "shadow cabinet", to monitor and criticize the performance of the executive cabinet and groom legislators to assume those positions in a later government.

Not only would such a gift help to educate the Indonesian public in its painful discovery of democracy the value of constructive criticism, it could also prove to be the smartest move that Golkar ever made: If things go less than well in the Herculean task of managing recovery that lies ahead, Golkar would be ideally placed to win a sweeping victory at the next general election in 2004, based on its responsible opposition and the appeal of its alternative policies to the electorate.

Back to the real cabinet: As many observers have already noted, those individual selected to take up the economic portfolios, followed by the legal portfolios, will give the first clear indications of what lies ahead for Indonesia. Undoubtedly, markets will be riveted by the decisions that are on the verge of being made, and their reading of those decisions is likely to have an immediate and significant impact on both the rupiah and the stock market.

Even in the best case scenario where professionals and technocrats able to work closely and cooperatively together are appointed to these posts, there is one further problem. The longer term sustainability of economic reform rests on reform of the legal system. In recent legal cases, and now with the disturbing assassination of a Supreme Court justice involved in setting up a tribunal for human rights abuses in the first days of Megawati's presidency, it is clear that Indonesia continues to operate under the "ruler's law" and not under the "rule of law".

But who are the rulers now? Apart from the elite, who have the money and the resources to continue making their own "rules" much as they have always done, there is also the Indonesian Military (TNI)

Having been the decisive factor in helping Megawati to the presidency, the military will be looking for a major payback. This may come in a variety of forms. Given Megawati's well-known sympathy for the military and its nationalistic goals, one form is likely to involve a far freer hand in putting down separatist insurgencies. This implies a significant increase in bloodshed. An increase in bloodshed hardly bodes well for post-New Order Indonesia on the road to reform.

Another form is in military influence over the legal system, to circumvent cases of human rights abuses that could be brought against its members. This will inevitably mean that the status quo will continue in the legal system, with all that this implies.

Therefore, as we wait for the announcement of the new cabinet, it is worth remembering that even if the best possible candidates are appointed to the economics team and the markets rally in applause, in the longer term it is legal reform that will underwrite sustainable progress towards economic recovery.

But legal reform is most unlikely to come about unless there is serious reform and true accountability of the Indonesian military. President Megawati would do well to remember that there is a link between ultimate success in terms of economic recovery and real reform of the military. She will need to show great courage and skill in tackling this issue over the coming months.

Her distaste for the fray hardly inspires confidence. But if she does not rise to the challenge, she is likely to find that she has little more success than her predecessor in achieving sustainable recovery beyond an impressive but temporary surge in the markets.

The cycle of violent political change of power in Indonesia has apparently been broken. Economic recovery is now within Indonesia's grasp as sentiment hovers, hopeful of seeing the right signals in the coming days. But this is only a fleeting opportunity. Economic recovery depends, ultimately, on legal reform and therefore military reform.

Both Megawati and the rising stars within the military need to realize that the cycle of military impunity must also be broken if Indonesia is not to slide backwards. A sound economics team would be a great start, but it is not on its own enough. The nettle of military reform must also be grasped, something that is ultimately also in the best interests of the military itself as an institution, if not all its individual members.

Former President Aburrahman Wahid failed in his attempt early on in his presidency, despite a valiant try. Indonesia now has a second chance. It may not have the luxury of a third.

The writer is managing editor of the Van Zorge Report, published by the Jakarta-based political risk consultancy firm Van Zorge Heffernan & Associates.