Priorities: Legal, military reform

Priorities: Legal, military reform

By Peter Milne

JAKARTA (JP): It is obviously impossible to say at this stage
whether the rather surprising delay in announcing the cabinet
line-up is a positive sign or not. It could be that great care is
being taken over the suitability of the appointees. Or the delay
could indicate bickering and problems in accommodating all the
various political groups that made Megawati's ascendancy to the
presidency possible.

Either way, the importance of getting the selection right for
the future of the nation cannot be underestimated. The components
of the new cabinet will represent either a second chance to
continue along the difficult road to reform, or confirm many
people's worst fears -- namely that the inclusion of technocrats
and professionals of the highest integrity must be sacrificed to
politicians seeking to hold as much influence as possible for
their parties.

Already, the fact that the announcement seems to be taking
longer than expected is beginning to take its toll on the gains
made by the rupiah in the days following the special session of
the People's Consultative Assembly. This in itself is rather
disturbing and irresponsible, when maintaining the strength of
the rupiah is of the utmost importance in allowing the government
precious room for maneuver in its fiscal, and consequently
monetary, policy.

In the meantime while we wait, one great gift that the Golkar
party could offer to the nation -- one that, regrettably, has
very little chance of being forthcoming -- would be for the
party, fresh from its rather dubious victory in its court case in
the Supreme Court, to decline any seats in the new cabinet. As a
gesture of goodwill and proof that it had truly reformed itself,
Golkar should accept the role of a loyal opposition -- a
constructive voice of criticism towards the new government.

By so doing, it would be able to fulfill an extremely
important role in the House of Representatives (DPR), show people
once and for all that it was capable of putting the interests of
the nation ahead of its own immediate lust for power, and
demonstrate the quality of its ideas in opposition. Soeharto's
former ruing party could even go so far as to copy the British
system of parliamentary opposition, by announcing its own "shadow
cabinet", to monitor and criticize the performance of the
executive cabinet and groom legislators to assume those positions
in a later government.

Not only would such a gift help to educate the Indonesian
public in its painful discovery of democracy the value of
constructive criticism, it could also prove to be the smartest
move that Golkar ever made: If things go less than well in the
Herculean task of managing recovery that lies ahead, Golkar would
be ideally placed to win a sweeping victory at the next general
election in 2004, based on its responsible opposition and the
appeal of its alternative policies to the electorate.

Back to the real cabinet: As many observers have already
noted, those individual selected to take up the economic
portfolios, followed by the legal portfolios, will give the first
clear indications of what lies ahead for Indonesia. Undoubtedly,
markets will be riveted by the decisions that are on the verge of
being made, and their reading of those decisions is likely to
have an immediate and significant impact on both the rupiah and
the stock market.

Even in the best case scenario where professionals and
technocrats able to work closely and cooperatively together are
appointed to these posts, there is one further problem. The
longer term sustainability of economic reform rests on reform of
the legal system. In recent legal cases, and now with the
disturbing assassination of a Supreme Court justice involved in
setting up a tribunal for human rights abuses in the first days
of Megawati's presidency, it is clear that Indonesia continues to
operate under the "ruler's law" and not under the "rule of law".

But who are the rulers now? Apart from the elite, who have
the money and the resources to continue making their own "rules"
much as they have always done, there is also the Indonesian
Military (TNI)

Having been the decisive factor in helping Megawati to the
presidency, the military will be looking for a major payback.
This may come in a variety of forms. Given Megawati's well-known
sympathy for the military and its nationalistic goals, one form
is likely to involve a far freer hand in putting down separatist
insurgencies. This implies a significant increase in bloodshed.
An increase in bloodshed hardly bodes well for post-New Order
Indonesia on the road to reform.

Another form is in military influence over the legal system,
to circumvent cases of human rights abuses that could be brought
against its members. This will inevitably mean that the status
quo will continue in the legal system, with all that this
implies.

Therefore, as we wait for the announcement of the new cabinet,
it is worth remembering that even if the best possible candidates
are appointed to the economics team and the markets rally in
applause, in the longer term it is legal reform that will
underwrite sustainable progress towards economic recovery.

But legal reform is most unlikely to come about unless there
is serious reform and true accountability of the Indonesian
military. President Megawati would do well to remember that there
is a link between ultimate success in terms of economic recovery
and real reform of the military. She will need to show great
courage and skill in tackling this issue over the coming months.

Her distaste for the fray hardly inspires confidence. But if
she does not rise to the challenge, she is likely to find that
she has little more success than her predecessor in achieving
sustainable recovery beyond an impressive but temporary surge in
the markets.

The cycle of violent political change of power in Indonesia
has apparently been broken. Economic recovery is now within
Indonesia's grasp as sentiment hovers, hopeful of seeing the
right signals in the coming days. But this is only a fleeting
opportunity. Economic recovery depends, ultimately, on legal
reform and therefore military reform.

Both Megawati and the rising stars within the military need to
realize that the cycle of military impunity must also be broken
if Indonesia is not to slide backwards. A sound economics team
would be a great start, but it is not on its own enough. The
nettle of military reform must also be grasped, something that is
ultimately also in the best interests of the military itself as
an institution, if not all its individual members.

Former President Aburrahman Wahid failed in his attempt early
on in his presidency, despite a valiant try. Indonesia now has a
second chance. It may not have the luxury of a third.

The writer is managing editor of the Van Zorge Report,
published by the Jakarta-based political risk consultancy firm
Van Zorge Heffernan & Associates.