Preventing next Asian crisis: The China factor

Preventing next Asian crisis: The China factor

Matthew Williams, Asia Studies Department, Council on Foreign
Relations, New York

When foreign ministers from 22 countries convened in Brunei
from July 26 to Aug. 2 to discuss security concerns facing the
Asia-Pacific region, not surprisingly, terrorism, Kashmir and the
Korean Peninsula dominated the agenda.

Sadly, unresolved territorial claims to the Spratly Islands in
the South China Sea, an increasingly volatile flashpoint,
received only token consideration. The continual lack of
substantial progress on this issue marches East Asia closer to
disaster.

Rich in minerals, oil, natural gas and fish, the sea lanes of
the South China Sea -- passage for one-quarter of global trade --
are an attractive prize for the six players, including Brunei,
China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, with
claims in the region. An outbreak of conflict would impact every
member of the Asia-Pacific community and would have a negative
rippling effect on the global economy.

While there are minor clashes among the Southeast Asian
countries, China is the primary source of conflict. China's
"creeping assertiveness" into the 200 islets and reefs, along
with its unwillingness to negotiate multilaterally, left the
other claimants with little recourse.

In 1995 China built a small "outpost" on Mischief Reef, which
has since led to periodic skirmishes between China and both
Vietnam and the Philippines. Just recently, Vietnam accused China
of conducting military exercises with live ammunition in
Vietnamese waters. Meanwhile, an increasingly clear race is
emerging among East Asian countries for maritime strength.

This year's ninth ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific's sole mechanism
for discussing regional security concerns, did not adequately
address the South China Sea factor. Frequently avoided or
shelved, the dispute is difficult to discuss given the differing
diplomatic styles of the states involved.

China does not easily consent to Southeast Asia's multilateral
approach because of its sensitivity to national sovereignty.
China did agree to approach the issue multilaterally in 1995 --
itself a huge achievement -- but in every attempt at progress
since the country has nonetheless emerged as the main impediment.

The claimants have agreed on a code of conduct that would
govern movements in the region, but this has yet to emerge in
practice due to China's consistent disagreements over certain
clauses. Working with China in a regional forum is understandably
a slow process, but as the South China Sea is downplayed, China
feels less pressured to accommodate any external demands. As time
passes and more parties build "outposts," compromise will become
more difficult necessitating withdrawal and loss of face.

As the Chinese stake their claims, forums like the ARF have
been powerless to rein them in, so efforts have centered on
"confidence building." But much confidence building has yielded
limited results. Resources and the steadfast defense of national
sovereignty fuel the dispute, international law struggles to make
sense of the claims (i.e., China's is based on archaeological
evidence proving the Islands were always a part of the Chinese
"motherland"), and regional discussions avoid the debate for fear
of halting progress elsewhere.

All of this, of course, does not mean that the ARF is a
failure. Terrorism, the Korean peninsula and Kashmir are serious
security issues, and the ARF did generate improvements.

Workshops to flesh out regional coordination to combat
terrorism and concerted efforts to freeze terror funds were
significant developments in the global campaign. Agreement
between North and South Korea to resume dialog and U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell's 15-minute meeting with North Korea's
Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun were both major steps toward
progress on the peninsula.

In addition, spokesman for India's Foreign Ministry, Nirumpama
Rao, said New Delhi was pleased with the discussion on South
Asia.

Still, regional forums, especially security-oriented ones,
must make the South China Sea a higher priority.

The international community has learned that China will
participate in policy or dialogue when it perceives enough self-
benefit. Negotiations must appeal to China's desire for a
leadership role in Asia. A code of conduct and proposals
outlining the economic integration of the Spratlys may be the
impetus necessary to bring China on board.

This means greater cooperation wherever possible, resulting in
joint-development and joint-benefactors. Also necessary in these
proposals are face-saving gains for China: Greater economic
benefits and a greater voice in how multilateral development will
proceed.

As the Spratlys simmer on the back burner, other problems grab
the spotlight. This has happened before. Challenges like
terrorism and AIDS were not addressed appropriately when first
identified. Now they have greatly intensified and handling them
will cost governments far more than it initially would have.

If not tackled now, the Spratlys will one day join this list
of should-haves. Unfortunately, restoring peace following an
eruption in the South China Sea would demand something much more
precious than money: Lives.