Preventing next Asian crisis: The China factor

Matthew Williams, Asia Studies Department, Council on Foreign Relations, New York

When foreign ministers from 22 countries convened in Brunei from July 26 to Aug. 2 to discuss security concerns facing the Asia-Pacific region, not surprisingly, terrorism, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula dominated the agenda.

Sadly, unresolved territorial claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, an increasingly volatile flashpoint, received only token consideration. The continual lack of substantial progress on this issue marches East Asia closer to disaster.

Rich in minerals, oil, natural gas and fish, the sea lanes of the South China Sea -- passage for one-quarter of global trade -- are an attractive prize for the six players, including Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, with claims in the region. An outbreak of conflict would impact every member of the Asia-Pacific community and would have a negative rippling effect on the global economy.

While there are minor clashes among the Southeast Asian countries, China is the primary source of conflict. China's "creeping assertiveness" into the 200 islets and reefs, along with its unwillingness to negotiate multilaterally, left the other claimants with little recourse.

In 1995 China built a small "outpost" on Mischief Reef, which has since led to periodic skirmishes between China and both Vietnam and the Philippines. Just recently, Vietnam accused China of conducting military exercises with live ammunition in Vietnamese waters. Meanwhile, an increasingly clear race is emerging among East Asian countries for maritime strength.

This year's ninth ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific's sole mechanism for discussing regional security concerns, did not adequately address the South China Sea factor. Frequently avoided or shelved, the dispute is difficult to discuss given the differing diplomatic styles of the states involved.

China does not easily consent to Southeast Asia's multilateral approach because of its sensitivity to national sovereignty. China did agree to approach the issue multilaterally in 1995 -- itself a huge achievement -- but in every attempt at progress since the country has nonetheless emerged as the main impediment.

The claimants have agreed on a code of conduct that would govern movements in the region, but this has yet to emerge in practice due to China's consistent disagreements over certain clauses. Working with China in a regional forum is understandably a slow process, but as the South China Sea is downplayed, China feels less pressured to accommodate any external demands. As time passes and more parties build "outposts," compromise will become more difficult necessitating withdrawal and loss of face.

As the Chinese stake their claims, forums like the ARF have been powerless to rein them in, so efforts have centered on "confidence building." But much confidence building has yielded limited results. Resources and the steadfast defense of national sovereignty fuel the dispute, international law struggles to make sense of the claims (i.e., China's is based on archaeological evidence proving the Islands were always a part of the Chinese "motherland"), and regional discussions avoid the debate for fear of halting progress elsewhere.

All of this, of course, does not mean that the ARF is a failure. Terrorism, the Korean peninsula and Kashmir are serious security issues, and the ARF did generate improvements.

Workshops to flesh out regional coordination to combat terrorism and concerted efforts to freeze terror funds were significant developments in the global campaign. Agreement between North and South Korea to resume dialog and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's 15-minute meeting with North Korea's Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun were both major steps toward progress on the peninsula.

In addition, spokesman for India's Foreign Ministry, Nirumpama Rao, said New Delhi was pleased with the discussion on South Asia.

Still, regional forums, especially security-oriented ones, must make the South China Sea a higher priority.

The international community has learned that China will participate in policy or dialogue when it perceives enough self- benefit. Negotiations must appeal to China's desire for a leadership role in Asia. A code of conduct and proposals outlining the economic integration of the Spratlys may be the impetus necessary to bring China on board.

This means greater cooperation wherever possible, resulting in joint-development and joint-benefactors. Also necessary in these proposals are face-saving gains for China: Greater economic benefits and a greater voice in how multilateral development will proceed.

As the Spratlys simmer on the back burner, other problems grab the spotlight. This has happened before. Challenges like terrorism and AIDS were not addressed appropriately when first identified. Now they have greatly intensified and handling them will cost governments far more than it initially would have.

If not tackled now, the Spratlys will one day join this list of should-haves. Unfortunately, restoring peace following an eruption in the South China Sea would demand something much more precious than money: Lives.