Preventing conflicts within ASEAN

Philips Jusario Vermonte, Jakarta

Two recent incidents in the southern part of Thailand and in Maluku province, Indonesia, should certainly serve as an eye opener for ASEAN. After four days of deadly clashes in Ambon, the capital city of Maluku, more than 30 people were killed and hundreds badly injured.

Meanwhile, more than 100 were killed during a clash between Thai security forces and the alleged members of a militant separatist group in southern Thailand where the Muslim minority of the country lives.

The two violent incidents clearly show that Southeast Asia is vulnerable to conflicts that have a religious or ethnic ingredient. At first sight, it seems that these kind of conflicts occur within a state's boundary. Nevertheless, the conflicts could spill over and endanger the security and stability of the entire region.

For example, the event in southern Thailand appears to have worried Malaysia for the reason that the members of the rebel group who are being hunted down by the Thai military will cross the border. Worse, sympathy and support from Malaysians for their fellow Muslims in Thailand may eventually emerge. In the end, things will become more complicated for the region and hence more difficult to resolve.

Coincidentally, these incidents took place at a time when all ASEAN member countries are deliberating a proposal for the creation of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC). Heated debates have been going on across the region since the proposal was first put forward by the Indonesian government last year. One point of contention is the idea within the framework of ASC that suggests ASEAN should establish its own peacekeeping force.

We have heard so far pessimism and negative responses to this idea by some ASEAN members. This is, of course, not without reason.

Indeed, a late response to a conflict situation, such as the deployment of a peacekeeping force to a conflict area, is obviously more expensive than an early response, not only in terms of money, but also social and political costs. The case of East Timor in 1999 is particularly instructive.

It is unfortunate that the debates on the ASC have mostly focused on conflict resolution, such as the issue of a peacekeeping force. What is missing from the discussion is apparently the aspect of conflict prevention, while we continue to witness the recurrence of violence in several spots in the region.

In this regard, ASEAN needs to have an early warning system that enables it to take "early action at the earliest possible stage of a conflict situation", be it an interstate conflict or interethnic or interreligious conflict.

One good example of such a region-wide early warning system can be found in Europe. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided in 1992 to establish the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities, which is tasked to "identify -- and seek early resolution of -- ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or friendly relations between the participating states of the OSCE".

The experience of the OSCE in handling internal tensions within its member states provides at least three valuable lessons that, to a certain extent, suit the interests of ASEAN. First, the High Commissioner is not a national minorities ombudsman nor an investigator of human rights violations since it is a high commissioner on national minorities and not for national minorities.

The mandate is to obtain first-hand information and to alert the OSCE whenever tension threatens to develop to an alarming level. Second, the High Commissioner is mandated to promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation between parties concerned that may involve minority groups and government representatives.

Last, but surely not least, the main principle underpinning the work of the High Commissioner is confidentiality. It means that although the High Commissioner could work independently and be given access to enter any OSCE country, the High Commissioner must respect the confidentiality approach by exercising so-termed quiet diplomacy.

This serves several purposes: It reduces any feelings of suspicion or stigmatization that any government may feel by having the High Commissioner involved in sensitive issues within their countries; it keeps issues away from the media; and it avoids the possibility of sensationalization or misrepresentation of sensitive issues such as internal ethnic or religious conflicts.

ASEAN members, through the Bali Concord II, have asserted their commitment to establishing closer political and security cooperation. In this regard, it is imperative for ASEAN to develop a regional mechanism in dealing with its internal conflicts.

ASEAN members would prefer quiet diplomacy, as was the case during the 1970s and 1980s. ASEAN would also perhaps opt for a mechanism in addressing internal conflicts of its member states that avoids the "naming and shaming" practice. In short, the discussion on conflict prevention needs to be advanced and should be placed higher on the agenda of the ASC than the debates on conflict resolution. As one old saying rightly suggests, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure".

The writer (pjvermonte@csis.or.id) is a researcher in the department of international relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).