Preventing conflicts within ASEAN

Preventing conflicts within ASEAN

Philips Jusario Vermonte, Jakarta

Two recent incidents in the southern part of Thailand and in
Maluku province, Indonesia, should certainly serve as an eye
opener for ASEAN. After four days of deadly clashes in Ambon, the
capital city of Maluku, more than 30 people were killed and
hundreds badly injured.

Meanwhile, more than 100 were killed during a clash between
Thai security forces and the alleged members of a militant
separatist group in southern Thailand where the Muslim minority
of the country lives.

The two violent incidents clearly show that Southeast Asia is
vulnerable to conflicts that have a religious or ethnic
ingredient. At first sight, it seems that these kind of conflicts
occur within a state's boundary. Nevertheless, the conflicts
could spill over and endanger the security and stability of the
entire region.

For example, the event in southern Thailand appears to have
worried Malaysia for the reason that the members of the rebel
group who are being hunted down by the Thai military will cross
the border. Worse, sympathy and support from Malaysians for their
fellow Muslims in Thailand may eventually emerge. In the end,
things will become more complicated for the region and hence more
difficult to resolve.

Coincidentally, these incidents took place at a time when all
ASEAN member countries are deliberating a proposal for the
creation of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC). Heated debates
have been going on across the region since the proposal was first
put forward by the Indonesian government last year. One point of
contention is the idea within the framework of ASC that suggests
ASEAN should establish its own peacekeeping force.

We have heard so far pessimism and negative responses to this
idea by some ASEAN members. This is, of course, not without
reason.

Indeed, a late response to a conflict situation, such as the
deployment of a peacekeeping force to a conflict area, is
obviously more expensive than an early response, not only in
terms of money, but also social and political costs. The case of
East Timor in 1999 is particularly instructive.

It is unfortunate that the debates on the ASC have mostly
focused on conflict resolution, such as the issue of a
peacekeeping force. What is missing from the discussion is
apparently the aspect of conflict prevention, while we continue
to witness the recurrence of violence in several spots in the
region.

In this regard, ASEAN needs to have an early warning system
that enables it to take "early action at the earliest possible
stage of a conflict situation", be it an interstate conflict or
interethnic or interreligious conflict.

One good example of such a region-wide early warning system
can be found in Europe. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided in 1992 to establish the
post of High Commissioner on National Minorities, which is tasked
to "identify -- and seek early resolution of -- ethnic tensions
that might endanger peace, stability or friendly relations
between the participating states of the OSCE".

The experience of the OSCE in handling internal tensions
within its member states provides at least three valuable lessons
that, to a certain extent, suit the interests of ASEAN. First,
the High Commissioner is not a national minorities ombudsman nor
an investigator of human rights violations since it is a high
commissioner on national minorities and not for national
minorities.

The mandate is to obtain first-hand information and to alert
the OSCE whenever tension threatens to develop to an alarming
level. Second, the High Commissioner is mandated to promote
dialogue, confidence and cooperation between parties concerned
that may involve minority groups and government representatives.

Last, but surely not least, the main principle underpinning
the work of the High Commissioner is confidentiality. It means
that although the High Commissioner could work independently and
be given access to enter any OSCE country, the High Commissioner
must respect the confidentiality approach by exercising so-termed
quiet diplomacy.

This serves several purposes: It reduces any feelings of
suspicion or stigmatization that any government may feel by
having the High Commissioner involved in sensitive issues within
their countries; it keeps issues away from the media; and it
avoids the possibility of sensationalization or misrepresentation
of sensitive issues such as internal ethnic or religious
conflicts.

ASEAN members, through the Bali Concord II, have asserted
their commitment to establishing closer political and security
cooperation. In this regard, it is imperative for ASEAN to
develop a regional mechanism in dealing with its internal
conflicts.

ASEAN members would prefer quiet diplomacy, as was the case
during the 1970s and 1980s. ASEAN would also perhaps opt for a
mechanism in addressing internal conflicts of its member states
that avoids the "naming and shaming" practice. In short, the
discussion on conflict prevention needs to be advanced and should
be placed higher on the agenda of the ASC than the debates on
conflict resolution. As one old saying rightly suggests, "an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure".

The writer (pjvermonte@csis.or.id) is a researcher in the
department of international relations at the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS).