Pressure mounts for political change in Zimbabwe

LONDON: By African standards, Zimbabwe has enjoyed a high degree of political stability since gaining independence in 1980. However, the de facto one-party state created by 74-year-old President Robert Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is starting to unravel.

This situation results in part from the natural erosion of popular support for a party and, especially, a leader that are perceived to have been in office for too long. But more importantly, it is a reflection of the government's failure to deliver its political promises of land, houses, jobs and improved living standards for Zimbabwe's 12.5 million people.

On balance, it seems probable, although by no means certain, that Mugabe will remain in office until presidential elections are held in 2001. However, the intervening years are likely to witness growing discontent and an increasing number of violent protests. If Mugabe decides to seek re-election, it could have grave implications for the stability and progress of Zimbabwe, and, indeed, the region.

Mugabe won power in the country's first universal elections in March 1980, following a seven-year guerrilla war against the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia. The polls were contested by two liberation parties, then Prime Minister Mugabe's ZANU and Joshua Nkomo's rival Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). ZANU won the elections outright, but Mugabe set up a coalition government with ministers from Nkomo's minority party and representatives of the white population.

Mugabe promised to pursue a policy of socialist transformation and reconciliation. However, this strategy was short-lived, and relations with ZAPU deteriorated rapidly, resulting in the outbreak in 1983 of a low-level civil war in Matabeland province. By 1986, the ZAPU rebels had been defeated in a campaign involving brutal attacks against civilians by ZANU troops trained by the North Korean Army.

Nkomo and his top lieutenants were effectively absorbed into a government of national unity in 1987, with Mugabe as President and Nkomo as junior Vice-President. The unity agreement marked the end of overt rivalry between the two main tribal groupings -- the Shona in the east of the country and the Ndebele in the west -- and created the fabric for Zimbabwe's one-party state.

In the 1985, 1990 and 1995 elections, the ruling party consolidated its hold on power. However, growing apathy among the country's adult population resulted in a voter turnout of below 35 percent in the 1995 poll.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe after 1989, and relentless pressure from donor countries and international lenders, forced Mugabe reluctantly to abandon his commitment to Marxism, and adopt a World Bank structural adjustment program. These factors, combined with a dramatic improvement in the region's geopolitical prospects, led observers to believe that Zimbabwe's economy would improve in the 1990s.

However, the country's economic performance has deteriorated further since the implementation of reforms in 1991, partly because of two serious droughts in the first half of the 1990s. While Zimbabwe has a fairly well-balanced economy, with a broad range of exports, it remains heavily reliant on agriculture, especially tobacco, which accounts for a quarter of total export earnings.

Geopolitical changes, drought and inappropriate economic policies have contributed to Mugabe's deepening unpopularity. The effects of these developments include:

* stagnant per capita incomes and a steep fall in average real wages;

* rising unemployment, as well as high inflation and interest rates;

* declining real government spending on healthcare and education;

* widening levels of social inequality; and

* growing public anger over government corruption and the luxurious lifestyles of senior officials.

Mugabe has responded by adopting increasingly desperate tactics to win back electoral support. First, in August 1997, he announced that veterans of the war against the white government in the 1970s would receive compensation expected to amount to more than US$330m in total. Second, the administration has promised to repossess five million hectares of primarily white- owned commercial farmland to resettle thousands of landless black families. The government estimates that more than one million houses need to be constructed in order to accommodate the country's growing population.

These two initiatives have had disastrous consequences. In December 1997, the government's attempt to finance the compensation package through increased taxation provoked a demonstration that forced the President to abandon all but one of the proposed tax increases. The protest was organized by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which has become the main focus of political opposition in the country. ZCTU leader Morgab Tsvanigirai, who led the demonstration, is considered a likely contender for the presidency.

The land policy has dismayed the country's business community, contributing to a 40 percent depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar in December 1997, as well as rapid inflation. White-dominated commercial farming is of critical importance both for exports and urban food supplies.

Workers participated in further demonstrations in January against increased food prices. As a result, the government was forced to reintroduce the informal price controls that it had abolished in 1991. The ZCTU organized a highly successful two-day strike on 3-4 March 1998 supported by more than 75 percent of the urban workforce.

The unprecedented opposition to the government has led to demands that Mugabe retire from politics before his presidential term expires in 2001. The President has responded by threatening to expel members of the cabinet, and by tightening controls over the state-owned media. For instance, he has appointed Charles Chikerema, a self-confessed 'Stalinist', as editor of Zimbabwe's leading daily newspaper, The Herald. In addition, parliament is considering a new Public Order and Security Bill designed to curb trade union activities.

Change in Zimbabwe is still most likely to come from within the ZANU-PF, which is riven by personality and tribal differences. There is no obvious successor at present to Mugabe -- both Vice-Presidents, Nkomo and Simon Muzenda, are of a similar age, if not older. Consequently, when the President either steps down or is forced to resign, there is likely to be a bitter internal power struggle. The leading contender to succeed Mugabe is probably the Minister for Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Emmerson Mnangagwa.

However, Mnangagwa belongs to the Karanga tribe, a subgroup of the Shona people who constitute 70 percent of Zimbabwe's population. There is growing rivalry between the Karanga and the President's own clan, the Zezuru, which has gained increased prominence under Mugabe's rule. This could lead to Mnangagwa's candidacy being blocked from within the ZANU-PF. In that event, the Karanga may seek allies outside the Shona, most notably the alienated Ndebele. It is not clear whether this would ensure victory for Mnangagwa, but it would certainly increase tribal tensions in Zimbabwe.

Despite the speculation about a possible successor, Mugabe shows no sign of retiring. His health is good, and he appears to have a strong constituency of support in rural areas. With no obvious challenger from within or outside of the ZANU-PF, he may complete his presidential term.

However, if, in the intervening period, public disturbances become too violent and widespread, even the hitherto non- political Zimbabwe National Army may feel forced to intervene against the President. Whether this happens will primarily depend on whether Mugabe finds a solution to the land problem and on how he manages the economy.

The land requisition program is stalled because donor states refuse to provide financial support for the scheme until Mugabe makes a clear public statement promising that:

* the process will be transparent;

* full and fair compensation will be paid to white farmers; and

* a properly planned program of resettlement will be introduced.

The President insists that Zimbabwe will not pay compensation for land confiscated by white settlers in the early twentieth century. He has accused both white farmers and business people of supporting the strikes and demonstrations, and his own cabinet ministers of failing to implement government policy enthusiastically.

Mugabe has chosen an extremely risky strategy. If, as Western financiers predict, he abandons the policy, his support in rural areas could dissipate quickly. On the other hand, if he expropriates the land, the economic implications could be disastrous.

Whatever the outcome of this issue, Zimbabwe seems destined to under-perform economically. Mugabe has alienated the country's business elite, white farmers, foreign donors and international investors, and he is on poor terms with Pretoria.

It seems likely that, as long as Mugabe is running the country, Zimbabwe will be marginalized from South African-led efforts to build a stronger regional economy. This is a situation that Zimbabwe cannot afford to allow for a number of reasons:

* more than 200,000 people join the country's labor market annually, less than 60,000 of whom are finding employment; and

* population growth of 3.1 percent per year will only be reduced to 2 percent by 2015.

Zimbabwe has a great deal of catching up to do, but the level of support for anti-government demonstrations suggests that the public may not be prepared to wait. If Mugabe cannot satisfy popular demands -- and it is difficult to see how he can -- the pressure for change at the heart of Zimbabwean politics could become irresistible.

Equally, Mugabe's growing unpopularity means that, even if he survives in office and steps down voluntarily in 2001, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to nominate a successor. The presidential elections are likely to be thus thrown wide open, with tribal rivalries and economic discontent playing what could be a hugely destabilizing role.