Presidential elections: MPR contests for influence

Eddy O.S. Hiariej, Parliament Watch, School of Law, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta

On Thursday the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) began its Annual Session. One issue on the agenda is constitutional change, regarding the election of the president and vice president.

The concerned clause, clause 6/2 in the 1945 Constitution reads, "The President and Vice President are elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) by the most votes."

In this year's session a heated debate is expected over the issue, as Assembly factions have yet to agree on the MPR's role should it be stripped of its job of electing the president and VP.

A flashback to 1945 reflects how this same issue was a subject of debate in the early stage, toward the birth of the country. In one July meeting of the body tasked to lay the foundations of the new nation, BPUPKI, Dr. Sukiman said, "In view of the level of intelligence of our people, I fully agree that the president is to be elected by the People's Consultative Assembly and, for the moment, the president is not directly elected by the people".

Years later, when Abdurrahman Wahid assumed the presidency, he launched a discourse on direct presidential elections when opening the congress of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) in March 2000. The argument was that the president elect would secure greater legitimacy. Therefore, he said, such elections should be followed by the separation of powers between the state's highest institutions.

The same issue reemerged at the MPR's Ad-Hoc I Working Committee meeting on Sept. 10 this year. The MPR factions in the committee said the people should directly elect both national leaders in 2004. This system would mean abandoning the earlier method so far maintained by the MPR.

If main considerations of direct elections of the president and VP are popular intelligence, as indicated by Sukiman, then it seems that not only the public but even the political parties are not mature enough to practice politics and democracy.

This condition is reflected in several phenomena.

First, political parties still trust figures chosen on emotional grounds, without any rational approach to examining the platform of party struggle.

Second, political parties fail to educate their constituents to practice politics and democracy in a rational manner. The ban or threat against party leaders visiting areas dominated by constituents of other parties is a good example.

And third, criticism by party members against their leaders is still regarded as dissent. All this has resulted from the curbing of political freedom for about 40 years since the presidential decree of July 5, 1959 -- which marked the return to the 1945 Constitution following failed attempts to draft a new one.

However, the direct presidential elections as proposed by Abdurrahman and the considerations put forward by the MPR's working committee promise to give greater legitimacy to the president and VP elect, as well as preventing political conspiracy, including horse-trading, in MPR sessions. This system would also be able to minimize "money politics" in elections at the national and local levels.

Yet nearly all MPR factions want to preserve the body's involvement in presidential elections, with some variations.

This is clear from an examination of the proposed mechanisms for electing the president and VP.

One alternative suggests that the MPR determine two pairs of nominees for presidency and vice presidency, to be directly elected by the people. Second, the two pairs are first elected by the people for further election by the MPR. Third, if any pair of nominees wins over 50 percent of popular votes, the MPR needs only to inaugurate this team as president and VP. And fourth, if none of the pairs get over 50 percent, the MPR will select one of the two securing the most votes.

What does all this mean?

First, that the MPR expects the president and VP to be elected in one package, which seems in line with the intent of our Constitution. Its reference to "president" and "VP" in the spirit of teamwork indicates that both positions should be filled in one election package.

Another flashback to 1945: The historical interpretation that the president and VP are elected in one package was reflected in a session of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) on Aug. 18. At that time PPKI member Otto Iskandar Dinata proposed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta for the posts of president and VP, which was approved by all PPKI members.

However, the one package method has so far been applied differently. The president and VP have since been elected separately. Unfortunately, the separate elections in the MPR are not followed by individual descriptions of duties. The VP's jobs are determined by the president, while the president is not the official authorized to appoint and dismiss the VP despite the latter's position as presidential aide.

The Philippines have a fundamental difference in this regard. Citizens directly elect the president and VP separately, so that the president's mandate differs from the VP. The latter in the capacity of presidential aide can even occupy one of the ministerial posts.

Back to Indonesia: With regard to majority votes, the MPR's ad-hoc body of the working committee further presumes that the pair of candidates for president and VP must score at least 50 percent of votes plus one. This differs from the perception of our founding fathers that a majority vote decision is based on a single majority, except in the case of constitutional amendment.

The interpretation of a single majority was clearly shown in the voting during the 1945 sessions of the bodies preparing the nation's independence, BPUPKI and PPKI.

Third, as long as the MPR has the final word in electing the president and VP, there remains the fear of continued tug-of-war and horse-trading practices.

Another comparison with the Philippines shows that Batas Pambansa -- analogous to our MPR -- only determines the president and VP, who are elected by single majority. It will intervene only when there are two or more nominees for the presidency or vice presidency with equal vote numbers, which will be decided on the basis of majority votes of Batas Pambansa's membership.

Obviously, if the president and VP are directly elected, the MPR's election function is to be eliminated. Even if the MPR wished to be involved, it would be limited to the installment of the elected candidates as president and VP. If the MPR continues to make the final decision on the president and VP after these candidates are directly elected by the people, it would be like releasing a cat while keeping hold of its tail.

Regardless of the absence of consensus in this year's Annual Session on this subject, the MPR needs to issue a decree on the establishment of a Constitutional Commission -- as mentioned by Megawati Soekarnoputri in the early days of her presidency. The Commission should not only discuss amendments and other clauses on the schedule, but it should also be tasked to work on fundamental changes to the Constitution; in other words draw up an entirely new Constitution as mandated by our founding fathers.

Based on proposed drafts from the public, such as that from the Indonesian Transparency Society and the Gadjah Mada University team, the Commission would work for one year and report its results to the 2003 annual session.