Presidential elections: MPR contests for influence

Presidential elections: MPR contests for influence

Eddy O.S. Hiariej, Parliament Watch, School of Law, Gadjah Mada
University, Yogyakarta

On Thursday the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) began its
Annual Session. One issue on the agenda is constitutional change,
regarding the election of the president and vice president.

The concerned clause, clause 6/2 in the 1945 Constitution
reads, "The President and Vice President are elected by the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) by the most votes."

In this year's session a heated debate is expected over the
issue, as Assembly factions have yet to agree on the MPR's role
should it be stripped of its job of electing the president and
VP.

A flashback to 1945 reflects how this same issue was a subject
of debate in the early stage, toward the birth of the country. In
one July meeting of the body tasked to lay the foundations of the
new nation, BPUPKI, Dr. Sukiman said, "In view of the level of
intelligence of our people, I fully agree that the president is
to be elected by the People's Consultative Assembly and, for the
moment, the president is not directly elected by the people".

Years later, when Abdurrahman Wahid assumed the presidency, he
launched a discourse on direct presidential elections when
opening the congress of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) in March 2000. The argument was that
the president elect would secure greater legitimacy. Therefore,
he said, such elections should be followed by the separation of
powers between the state's highest institutions.

The same issue reemerged at the MPR's Ad-Hoc I Working
Committee meeting on Sept. 10 this year. The MPR factions in the
committee said the people should directly elect both national
leaders in 2004. This system would mean abandoning the earlier
method so far maintained by the MPR.

If main considerations of direct elections of the president
and VP are popular intelligence, as indicated by Sukiman, then it
seems that not only the public but even the political parties are
not mature enough to practice politics and democracy.

This condition is reflected in several phenomena.

First, political parties still trust figures chosen on
emotional grounds, without any rational approach to examining the
platform of party struggle.

Second, political parties fail to educate their constituents
to practice politics and democracy in a rational manner. The ban
or threat against party leaders visiting areas dominated by
constituents of other parties is a good example.

And third, criticism by party members against their leaders is
still regarded as dissent. All this has resulted from the curbing
of political freedom for about 40 years since the presidential
decree of July 5, 1959 -- which marked the return to the 1945
Constitution following failed attempts to draft a new one.

However, the direct presidential elections as proposed by
Abdurrahman and the considerations put forward by the MPR's
working committee promise to give greater legitimacy to the
president and VP elect, as well as preventing political
conspiracy, including horse-trading, in MPR sessions. This system
would also be able to minimize "money politics" in elections at
the national and local levels.

Yet nearly all MPR factions want to preserve the body's
involvement in presidential elections, with some variations.

This is clear from an examination of the proposed mechanisms
for electing the president and VP.

One alternative suggests that the MPR determine two pairs of
nominees for presidency and vice presidency, to be directly
elected by the people. Second, the two pairs are first elected by
the people for further election by the MPR. Third, if any pair of
nominees wins over 50 percent of popular votes, the MPR needs
only to inaugurate this team as president and VP. And fourth, if
none of the pairs get over 50 percent, the MPR will select one of
the two securing the most votes.

What does all this mean?

First, that the MPR expects the president and VP to be elected
in one package, which seems in line with the intent of our
Constitution. Its reference to "president" and "VP" in the spirit
of teamwork indicates that both positions should be filled in one
election package.

Another flashback to 1945: The historical interpretation that
the president and VP are elected in one package was reflected in
a session of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian
Independence (PPKI) on Aug. 18. At that time PPKI member Otto
Iskandar Dinata proposed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta for the posts
of president and VP, which was approved by all PPKI members.

However, the one package method has so far been applied
differently. The president and VP have since been elected
separately. Unfortunately, the separate elections in the MPR are
not followed by individual descriptions of duties. The VP's jobs
are determined by the president, while the president is not the
official authorized to appoint and dismiss the VP despite the
latter's position as presidential aide.

The Philippines have a fundamental difference in this regard.
Citizens directly elect the president and VP separately, so that
the president's mandate differs from the VP. The latter in the
capacity of presidential aide can even occupy one of the
ministerial posts.

Back to Indonesia: With regard to majority votes, the MPR's
ad-hoc body of the working committee further presumes that the
pair of candidates for president and VP must score at least 50
percent of votes plus one. This differs from the perception of
our founding fathers that a majority vote decision is based on a
single majority, except in the case of constitutional amendment.

The interpretation of a single majority was clearly shown in
the voting during the 1945 sessions of the bodies preparing the
nation's independence, BPUPKI and PPKI.

Third, as long as the MPR has the final word in electing the
president and VP, there remains the fear of continued tug-of-war
and horse-trading practices.

Another comparison with the Philippines shows that Batas
Pambansa -- analogous to our MPR -- only determines the president
and VP, who are elected by single majority. It will intervene
only when there are two or more nominees for the presidency or
vice presidency with equal vote numbers, which will be decided on
the basis of majority votes of Batas Pambansa's membership.

Obviously, if the president and VP are directly elected, the
MPR's election function is to be eliminated. Even if the MPR
wished to be involved, it would be limited to the installment of
the elected candidates as president and VP. If the MPR continues
to make the final decision on the president and VP after these
candidates are directly elected by the people, it would be like
releasing a cat while keeping hold of its tail.

Regardless of the absence of consensus in this year's Annual
Session on this subject, the MPR needs to issue a decree on the
establishment of a Constitutional Commission -- as mentioned by
Megawati Soekarnoputri in the early days of her presidency. The
Commission should not only discuss amendments and other clauses
on the schedule, but it should also be tasked to work on
fundamental changes to the Constitution; in other words draw up
an entirely new Constitution as mandated by our founding fathers.

Based on proposed drafts from the public, such as that from
the Indonesian Transparency Society and the Gadjah Mada
University team, the Commission would work for one year and
report its results to the 2003 annual session.