Present realities govern modern warfare

By Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo

This is the second of two articles on global security based on the advancement of technology in warfare equipment.

JAKARTA (JP): So far, we have not touched upon the use of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons. Will nuclear weapons or other mass destruction weapons alter the picture we have drawn? Will the use of nuclear weapons improve the position of the offense relative to the defense?

If both sides are in possession of nuclear weapons, as in the case of the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, it is very doubtful that those weapons will be used.

It is even doubtful if there is war at all. The use of nuclear weapons by one side, whether weapons of the strategic category or tactical nuclear weapons, will immediately be responded to by the other side with more nuclear weapons.

There is no way that it can be prevented by the other side. The result will be total destruction for both sides. That was the reason why there was never a hot war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Mutual Assured Destruction was the result of the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides.

If only the attacking side possesses nuclear weapons, will it use them in an attack to achieve political objectives? The U.S. did during World War II to defeat Japan. But they did not use nuclear weapons in Korea or in Vietnam, although there were strong suggestions by very important persons in the U.S. in favor of it.

That ultimately nuclear weapons were not used in Korea and Vietnam was not because of philanthropical reasons but based on rational and strategic considerations.

By that time, not only the U.S. was in possession of nuclear weapons, unlike its position at the end of World War II. It seems that it is not easy to use nuclear weapons to attack somebody who does not have them.

Also, the Soviet Union did not use its nuclear capability in Afghanistan, although they were in real trouble. If the U.S. was attacked by another nation it will definitely resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

That was made clear in the Massive Retaliation Strategy of the Eisenhower Administration and further refined in the Flexible Response Strategy of the Kennedy Administration.

However, although both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have never stated that they refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons, in reality, they have never done that despite the dire circumstances in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.

The conclusion we can draw is that nations with nuclear weapons do not use that capability easily because they are afraid of the consequences for themselves. Whether in the form of a similar or even stronger nuclear response by the victim of their attack, or by another side that cannot tolerate the use of nuclear weapons against a nonpossessor.

Also, a strong negative public opinion against the use of nuclear weapons for offensive purposes is an important factor to be considered. The more so since present day conventional weapons with precision-guided technology can achieve the same destructive results in the field, as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov already concluded.

It is perhaps based on these developments in military strategic thinking that the U.S. was conducting a different kind of warfare in the Gulf War, compared to its former military operations.

The U.S. did not take the risk of invading Iraq with ground forces, although they and their allies were definitely able to organize a superior military force.

The U.S. satisfied itself with a limited objective for its ground forces, namely the occupation of Kuwait. After occupying Kuwait, the U.S. continued its offensive by merely relying on its firepower to attack Baghdad and other strategic locations.

Aircraft and missiles were the main elements of attack. Precision-guidance technology has increased the damage that can be delivered by fire power.

Every point that is an aim of attack can now be destroyed with a high probability. If the defending party does not have an appropriate air defense, it can be attacked at any point with a high assurance of result. That was what happened in Baghdad at that time.

However, air and missile attacks do not guarantee the subjugation of the opponent. Only if the opponent thinks that a continuation of the air attacks can entirely destroy the nation will he surrender.

That was what happened with Japan at the end of World War II when the Emperor thought that a continuation of air attacks with atomic bombs would do too much harm the Japanese people. Saddam Hussein did not think like that and so, the U.S. did not achieve its political objective, which was the annihilation of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The achievement of the political objective of a military offensive was, in the past, guaranteed by dispatching ground forces into enemy territory. By occupying the capital city, the attacking ground forces can force the government of the enemy to surrender and agree to the wishes of the invading nation.

Nowadays, since dispatching ground forces into enemy territory can become very risky, a new means must be found to make the enemy government surrender or follow orders.

Here, the role of subversion has become very important. Before an offensive starts, the attacking party organizes a subversive element in the attacked nation. Nazi Germany was the first to use this method systematically, later followed by other nations, in particular by the Soviet Union.

There are always elements in a nation that can be influenced to take a positive stance toward the attacking nation. For that purpose Hitler organized Nazi parties in the west European nations.

Apart from the people who could be bought or bribed by Hitler, there were at that time enough people in Western Europe (and even in the U.S.) who were sympathetic to the Nazi Germany political thinking and aims.

The favorable condition was further strengthened by conducting a propaganda war by the ministry of propaganda under Dr. Goebbels.

The same technics were later used by the communists and also by the West in the Cold War. The objective: to create a breach in the defense of the opponent, so that with a certain supporting attack from the outside, the subversion can make the enemy crumble from the inside.

All kinds of action must be initiated by the subversion, starting from relatively peaceful political means like political demonstrations to economic sabotage and the use of physical force for revolts and coup d'etat.

The subversion must influence more and more people, especially members of the enemy government and armed forces. Subversion will be supported and strengthened by the use of intelligence forces of the attacking nation, including the so-called special forces units.

For the attacking side, subversion is much cheaper and less risky than conducting an invasion of ground forces. If it fails, the members of the subversion will be the victims, who are mostly people of the attacked nation. In terms of financial cost and logistics, subversion is much simpler than a large offensive or using armed forces.

However, subversion will not be successful if the defending nation is mentally and spiritually strong enough. This strength must be organized to withstand the effects of foreign propaganda.

Nazi Germany could easily build Nazi parties in western Europe but could not do that in the Soviet Union. That was why Nazi subversion in the Soviet Union was very limited, while on the contrary, people's resistance against the Nazi offensive was very successful.

U.S. efforts to undermine Saddam Hussein's influence in Iraq also failed, despite the strong American popularity in the world in general, especially after defeating the communist block in the Cold War.

It means that Iraq society was strong enough to overcome all U.S. efforts to weaken it from the inside, including the ban of Iraqi oil exports. That was why all U.S. air and missile attacks at Baghdad could not make the Saddam Hussein's regime fall or surrender.

Looking at the analysis above, the conclusion we can make is that war can be prevented if a nation can prepare proper defense systems. It should consist of a political system which unifies the majority of the population in a patriotic stance to defend the nation's independence.

That will prevent the establishment of an effective enemy subversion and at the same time it will mobilize the people to resist an enemy occupation with all means, including guerrilla actions.

There must also be an economic system which can make the national economy strong enough to finance an appropriate military defensive system. It would consist of a long or medium-range missile and air defense against invasion; an antimissile defense, which includes air defense against enemy missile and air attacks; an organized ground, sea and air defense for fighting an enemy invasion on land and at sea; and an organized area of defense which primarily consists of guerrilla actions.

These capabilities will have a deterrent effect on aggressive intentions of other nations, even if the nation is small. But to build these capabilities is not easy and not cheap. If the nation's economy is not strong enough to finance all these defense requirements, the first priority must be given to the political aspect of the nation's defense, enhanced by a capability to fight a fierce guerrilla resistance. Gradually, with the expansion of the economy, the other requirements must be realized.

A military occupation of another nation is too expensive and risky if it cannot attain the political objectives of an attacking nation in a short time.

Hopefully, that will be enough reason for a nation not to become aggressive and a reminder to all statement and political leaders with too many ambitions. The world will become more peaceful if these new realities are taken into consideration, although today even economic competition can be very severe.

The writer is former governor of the National Defense Institute now an Ambassador-at-Large to the Non-Aligned Movement.

Window A: War can be prevented if a nation can prepare proper defense system.

Window B: A military accupation of another nation is too expensive and risky if it cannot attain the political objectives of an atacking nation in a short time.