Preelection lame duck syndrome

Preelection lame duck syndrome

Rachmad Bahari, Institute for Policy and Community
Development Studies, Jakarta

The countdown to the 2004 general election continues. Amid
optimism and high hopes of a smooth and successful election that
is free and fair, there is fear of an imminent stumbling block to
the process of democratization. The likelihood of this process
being thwarted is based on two developments.

First, indications of possible sabotage in the run-up to the
election are beginning to emerge. Second, a decline in government
quality and effectiveness has taken place in parallel with the
countdown to the election. In other words, the Megawati-Hamzah
government suffers from premature lame duck syndrome.

Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto,
surprisingly, made a statement on the possibility of sabotage.
This warning was certainly not made without good reason. So far,
the commander has not yet described how the threat of sabotage
might threaten the election.

Should an attempt to amend Law No.12/2003 on general
elections, members of the House of Representatives (DPR), the
Council of Regional Representatives (DPD) and Regional
Legislatures (DPRD) in the run-up to polling on April 5, 2004, be
categorized as sabotage? Is the move by new political parties
that have failed to be verified to sue the Minister of Justice
and Human Rights and ask the General Elections Commission (KPU)
to suspend this phase of the election, indicative of sabotage? Or
perhaps TNI intelligence indeed possesses evidence, data and
facts pointing to sabotage aimed at disrupting the 2004 election.
The TNI has the power to withhold evidence, data or facts from
the public under certain circumstances.

Apart from the TNI commander's warning, which should be given
due credence, there is another crucial issue that demands greater
attention. It involves the downward trend in government quality
and effectiveness, or premature lame duck syndrome. In a general
sense, a "lame duck" is usually the underdog in an election, an
administration whose term of office is about to end so that no
more important policies can be made. What is happening in
Indonesia is quite the reverse, with the government remaining
powerful in the preelection period, but with a tendency toward
less-than-optimal performance.

Those from the executive and legislature, interested in
winning the election, are no longer as focused on their official
duties as they should be. The energy and thoughts of public
officials affiliated to political parties are not devoted to
their governmental responsibilities, but rather to efforts to
maintain their position or even increase their power after the
election.

The lack of seriousness in carrying out public duties was
evident, for instance, when they discussed the draft 2004 state
budget. Executives and legislators, who are usually enthusiastic
when dealing with draft budget details, appeared to be listless
and uninterested. Politicians at the DPR building are
concentrating more on election fundraising -- in their personal
interest as well as for the parties to which they belong.

In order to be reelected, politicians need a lot more in
funding than was required for the 1999 election. This has to do
with a move from a closed-list to an open-list proportional
system. In 1999 it was enough for politicians to use funds on
party executives so as to "win seats for candidates at various
levels in the legislature; in 2004 they will have to spend extra
money on individual campaigns to gain significant numbers of
votes, according to the "price" of a seat in their
constituencies.

In addition, politicians will also have to be more proactive
in collecting election funds for their relevant parties, by
conventional means, as specified in the elections law, and by
other, unconventional means, with a low degree of transparency
and accountability. The latter have great potential to inflict
financial losses on the state. Improper fundraising methods have
already become public knowledge, but the difficulty is producing
proof of such illicit acts, which makes it hard to take
perpetrators to court.

The conflict of interest between prioritizing party missions
and executing government duties on the eve of the election is a
matter of concern as long as no clear guidelines or rules are
issued to public officials during the period of an election
campaign. There would have been no such concern if legislators
had adopted a wiser attitude by emphasizing the interests of
society and democracy instead of political party short-term gains
in producing the law on elections. With House members' farsighted
nationalist vision and commitment to democracy, different
interpretations of the law would not have occurred.

The unfocused concentration of politicians and public
officials in this preelection period will obviously have a
significant impact on the effectiveness and smooth functioning of
the administration, until the formation of a new government. The
lame duck syndrome, already apparent among those in government
institutions, is expected to ease off in September or October
2004 after the establishment of national and regional
representative bodies, as well as the direct election of the
president and vice president.

This will be the case only if the election of DPR, DPD and
DPRD members and of the president and vice president in 2004 take
place smoothly, successfully and are organized in a free and fair
fashion.