Preelection lame duck syndrome

Rachmad Bahari, Institute for Policy and Community Development Studies, Jakarta

The countdown to the 2004 general election continues. Amid optimism and high hopes of a smooth and successful election that is free and fair, there is fear of an imminent stumbling block to the process of democratization. The likelihood of this process being thwarted is based on two developments.

First, indications of possible sabotage in the run-up to the election are beginning to emerge. Second, a decline in government quality and effectiveness has taken place in parallel with the countdown to the election. In other words, the Megawati-Hamzah government suffers from premature lame duck syndrome.

Indonesian Military (TNI) Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, surprisingly, made a statement on the possibility of sabotage. This warning was certainly not made without good reason. So far, the commander has not yet described how the threat of sabotage might threaten the election.

Should an attempt to amend Law No.12/2003 on general elections, members of the House of Representatives (DPR), the Council of Regional Representatives (DPD) and Regional Legislatures (DPRD) in the run-up to polling on April 5, 2004, be categorized as sabotage? Is the move by new political parties that have failed to be verified to sue the Minister of Justice and Human Rights and ask the General Elections Commission (KPU) to suspend this phase of the election, indicative of sabotage? Or perhaps TNI intelligence indeed possesses evidence, data and facts pointing to sabotage aimed at disrupting the 2004 election. The TNI has the power to withhold evidence, data or facts from the public under certain circumstances.

Apart from the TNI commander's warning, which should be given due credence, there is another crucial issue that demands greater attention. It involves the downward trend in government quality and effectiveness, or premature lame duck syndrome. In a general sense, a "lame duck" is usually the underdog in an election, an administration whose term of office is about to end so that no more important policies can be made. What is happening in Indonesia is quite the reverse, with the government remaining powerful in the preelection period, but with a tendency toward less-than-optimal performance.

Those from the executive and legislature, interested in winning the election, are no longer as focused on their official duties as they should be. The energy and thoughts of public officials affiliated to political parties are not devoted to their governmental responsibilities, but rather to efforts to maintain their position or even increase their power after the election.

The lack of seriousness in carrying out public duties was evident, for instance, when they discussed the draft 2004 state budget. Executives and legislators, who are usually enthusiastic when dealing with draft budget details, appeared to be listless and uninterested. Politicians at the DPR building are concentrating more on election fundraising -- in their personal interest as well as for the parties to which they belong.

In order to be reelected, politicians need a lot more in funding than was required for the 1999 election. This has to do with a move from a closed-list to an open-list proportional system. In 1999 it was enough for politicians to use funds on party executives so as to "win seats for candidates at various levels in the legislature; in 2004 they will have to spend extra money on individual campaigns to gain significant numbers of votes, according to the "price" of a seat in their constituencies.

In addition, politicians will also have to be more proactive in collecting election funds for their relevant parties, by conventional means, as specified in the elections law, and by other, unconventional means, with a low degree of transparency and accountability. The latter have great potential to inflict financial losses on the state. Improper fundraising methods have already become public knowledge, but the difficulty is producing proof of such illicit acts, which makes it hard to take perpetrators to court.

The conflict of interest between prioritizing party missions and executing government duties on the eve of the election is a matter of concern as long as no clear guidelines or rules are issued to public officials during the period of an election campaign. There would have been no such concern if legislators had adopted a wiser attitude by emphasizing the interests of society and democracy instead of political party short-term gains in producing the law on elections. With House members' farsighted nationalist vision and commitment to democracy, different interpretations of the law would not have occurred.

The unfocused concentration of politicians and public officials in this preelection period will obviously have a significant impact on the effectiveness and smooth functioning of the administration, until the formation of a new government. The lame duck syndrome, already apparent among those in government institutions, is expected to ease off in September or October 2004 after the establishment of national and regional representative bodies, as well as the direct election of the president and vice president.

This will be the case only if the election of DPR, DPD and DPRD members and of the president and vice president in 2004 take place smoothly, successfully and are organized in a free and fair fashion.