Power struggle looming in China

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): When China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, died in February this year, many analysts speculated that China would face the problem of succession.

Even though Deng had already appointed China's Communist Party (CCP) Secretary-General and President Jiang Zemin as his heir, many believed that this crucial issue would not be easily solved.

For a few months after Deng's death, however, China's leadership in Beijing managed to convey the impression to the outside world that such speculation was fanciful.

On the surface, it seemed that things were going as smoothly as planned. Jiang even managed to display his supreme grip on power, despite his credentials as the chosen successor, when leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) pledged to give their military loyalty to "the third generation leadership with Jiang Zemin at the core".

However, recent developments in China's domestic political scene suggest otherwise.

As the 15th Congress of the CCP approaches, scheduled to take place in the coming Autumn, it has become clearer that a power struggle among Chinese leaders is looming.

It began with the publication of the "10,000 characters" in May, an attack by leftists, on a number of issues often closely associated with Jiang's platform of reform. The document, in the main, warned of the danger that could be brought by "westernization", "bourgeois liberalization" and "privatization" to China's socialist system.

More directly, the letter accused provincial leaders, senior party cadres, state official and intellectuals of promoting "bourgeois liberalization."

Indeed, the leftists have been trying to highlight what they see as the destruction of state control over production and the selling out of socialism.

Signs of an imminent power struggle became even more evident when Jiang responded strongly to the charges. He warned that a group of leftists were trying to exploit some "social contradictions" within the society for their own political purposes.

He also warned that the CCP should never ignore a challenge from remnant Maoists.

Challenges from the leftists constitute one of the daunting problems that Jiang has to deal with in the run-up to the 15th CCP Congress. It seems that such defiance may even become more pressing if Jiang announced and pushed for greater economic reform and liberalization at the coming Congress.

Indeed, it has been reported that Jiang is preparing a major boost to reforms, especially in accelerating the process of creating the basic framework for a market economy in China and strengthening the role of the private sector.

In addition to such crucial issues, there is another problem for which Jiang must find a solution. In this regard, he must determine who should fill the key positions in the power structure.

The main issue will center around the question of who might become the prime minister. It has been widely speculated that it is very likely that Jiang will endorse the appointment of the reform-minded Zhu Rongji, currently deputy prime minister, to replace incumbent Prime Minister Li Peng.

It is also said that Li Peng would be made Chairman of the National People Congress (NPC) replacing Qiao Shi. This means that Jiang has to find a new position for Qiao Shi. It is not clear, therefore, whether Li Peng and especially Qiao Shi will accept this arrangement.

It is likely that Jiang might have thought about this problem. His plan to revive the post of chairman of the CCP, if accepted, will provide a position that can be offered to Qiao Shi, namely, the position of Vice-Chairman of the CCP.

However, it is apparently not easy for Jiang to revive that position. Many within the party are worried that the plan is actually intended to serve Jiang's personal ambition in elevating his own stature in China's politics.

Even Jiang's own followers and supporters maintain that reviving the position closely associated with Mao Zedong's unrivaled authority, which was abolished by Deng when he came to power at the end of the 1970s, will have negative consequences.

Many unhappy episodes in China's domestic politics were in part caused by the exercise of unlimited power held by Mao. Bad memories linger of the Wenhua Dageming (Cultural Revolution), for example, which existed in the not-too-distant past for most Chinese. No matter how much Mao is revered, surely no one would like to go back to the time where a leader's unlimited power could affect the lives of almost any individual.

What is, then, the prospect for Jiang to remain in power?

It seems that up to now, Jiang is one step ahead of his rivals. There are at least three noticeable tactics that Jiang is pursuing in order to secure his position.

First, Jiang continues to seek support from the military. The main support has, among others, come from the army's top man Gen. Li Huaqing, who is also vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo.

In a recent speech before a veterans' meeting to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the PLA, Gen. Liu clearly stated that the PLA should "resolutely obey the command of the CCP Central Committee and the CMC, with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the core."

At the closing of the speech, he again reiterated that "the whole Army must closely unite around the CCP Central Committee and the CMC with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the core" (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 12, 1997).

Second, Jiang has also engaged in "image-making" to elevate his own standing and credibility as the paramount leader of a post-Deng China. One indication of the use of this tactic is that the publication of a text book compiling the thoughts of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and also Jiang.

Indeed, the publication of the book can be interpreted as an attempt by Jiang to put himself on the same ideological level as Mao and Deng. By associating himself with the two Chinese great leaders, it seems that he attempts to further bolster his own legitimacy.

As an editorial in the People's Daily said: "Coming ahead of the 15th party congress, (the publication) is an ideological weapon for our party to understand and change the world..." (The Indonesian Observer, Aug. 8, 1997).

Third, Jiang has also tried to strengthen his position by pushing for further economic reforms. For example, Jiang has tried to boost his reformist credentials at the recent meeting of top leaders at the resort area of Beidahe.

More importantly, Jiang has made it known that he intends to endorse a number of measures that would further cut the role of the state in the economy. For example, Jiang proposes to transform some large and medium scale state-owned companies into share-holding companies. He has also endorsed the concept of shehuihua shengchan or "socialized production" to justify the idea. This has received strong support from provincial leaders.

However, it is still too early to say if Jiang has succeeded in securing his position in the run up to the congress. Other contending leaders, such as Li Peng and Qiao Shi, have not expressed their position clearly.

There is still Deng Liqun, an elder who is often identified as a leader of an anti-Jiang faction, to reckon with. Therefore, how Jiang plans to deal with these challenges will become clearer at the upcoming CCP Congress.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.