Power politics in the post-Cold War era

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): There is widespread agreement among political observers that the security of the post-Cold war world will be more complex and less predictable, if not highly dangerous. The situation after the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has allowed longstanding but previously suppressed hostilities to emerge.

President Clinton and his predecessor referred to "a new world order" which seems, to critics of U.S. policy, little more than a world order without Russians. To these critics, the new World Order is exemplified by the carefully orchestrated exercise in international cooperation dominated by the U.S. during the Gulf war. The way in which that victory was achieved made them pessimistic about the future.

Moreover, this collective action reportedly produced some considerable financial gains for America, with the U.S. General Accounting Office reporting a profit from the war.

Proponents of the dictum that military force remains the final arbiter of relations between states saw the final results of the Gulf War as a dramatic vindication of their position.

On the other hand, there is also a school of thought which believes that military force is of declining utility today.

Complex and interdependent societies, like the U.S. and West European countries, require a considerable degree of voluntary cooperation on behalf of their citizens if they are to function effectively. The fact that these countries need this voluntary cooperation gives their citizens what might be called "structural power" within the system.

A case in point are America's moves in Haiti. President Clinton's reaction to the crisis in Haiti initially unleashed American military power. But he was subsequently restrained from acting decisively because he could only elicit lukewarm support from Congress and the American people.

The present situation along the border of Iraq and Kuwait warrants attention to the dangers of inadvertent war. The defensive preparations of the U.S. and its allies in response to Iraq's military concentration along its border with Kuwait, have the potential to trigger a "conflict spiral" which would tend to increase mutual suspicion and hostility, and could lead to an unrestrained military build-up. And the historical evidence suggests that there is a strong tendency for an arms race to culminate in war.

The irony is that deterrence strategies involving military build-ups may cause the very wars they are intended to prevent. Such strategies create incentives for shooting first in a crises, and for escalation once the threshold to violence has been crossed.

I believe there are certain factors which could induce President Clinton to use military force against Saddam Hussein.

First of all, Congressional elections on Nov. 8 are expected to result in big losses for the Democrats. Therefore, the tense situation in Iraq could turn out to be a pre-election gift for Clinton.

Second, there is strong bipartisan support for the American president who is now described by the press as "a born again military strategist". This is quite a change from his image as an indecisive world leader and a draft dodger during the Vietnam war.

On the other hand, it might also be possible that Saddam Hussein's brinkmanship is intended to be no more than a nuisance factor, just to confuse the Americans. It is also hard to believe that he would make the elementary mistake of placing his forces in the open desert where they could not conceal themselves, thereby creating a battlefield perfectly suited to the massive application of American power.

Furthermore, although the U.S. retains unique military capabilities, its ability to use these capabilities in major crises is constrained both by economic and domestic political circumstances.

As I mentioned before, the "structural power" of the electorate within the American system can restrain President Clinton from applying massive military power. Because inside the U.S., neo-isolationism --- the opposition to entangling itself in costly overseas commitments to countries that most Americans either don't care about, or actively dislike --- is growing. And this is the case despite the fact that a person like President Saddam Hussein, with his brutish behavior that makes him a perfect villain, should make it easy for the American government to rally domestic support for doing just about anything.

Dr. Hilman Adil is director of the Center for Social and Cultural Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.