Power holders 'must minimize violent backlash'

Violence continues to linger on as a major destabilizing factor in the current political environment. Public affairs commentator Wimar Witoelar reflects on this phenomenon.

JAKARTA (JP): The recent bombing of the Istiqlal Grand Mosque in Central Jakarta is the latest incident of a form of terrorism new to Indonesia. Whether or not former president Soeharto is behind the terrorism, as some have speculated, is immaterial.

In fact, the latest news on the Istiqlal terrorists seems to indicate the involvement of extremist groups. But the blast would not have happened if this were not a time of transition.

Riots in Jakarta and Kupang, the widespread violence in Ambon, Maluku and in Sambas, West Kalimantan, are all part of the political scenario.

They were not spontaneous outbursts of ethnic, religious or social tension. They are the violent end of a power structure which arrived on the scene forcefully and ruled without mercy for 32 years. The leaders of the New Order regime, lacking a graceful exit scenario, have launched a desperate gambit to prolong their stay. This merely follows the examples of corrupt and bankrupt regimes all over the world too myopic to prepare for political transition.

When Soeharto was in office, his main achievement was to preserve the balance of power, over which he reigned supreme. Loyalties were sealed and opposition was obliterated by incisive maneuvers using various instruments of power: security, position, interests and money. Now, money is the main instrument to prolong the end game. That is why no clearly defined person or groups can be identified as the perpetrators of violence.

Terrorist bombings elsewhere in the world usually come with claims, demands or statements from the perpetrators. Here, terrorists have no motive except to create fear. No message is necessary because the mission is to confuse and demoralize. The term "provocateur" has become part of the political idiom of Indonesia today, implying professionals creating public mayhem.

There has been so little containment of violence that we do not know the position of the government. Cabinet leaders continue to prance about their administrative territories; action on violence is not on the agenda.

And no political force in Indonesia is powerful enough to challenge Soeharto, even when he is out of office.

The fall of Soeharto's New Order regime was not caused by political opposition, but by an implosion caused by external debt and internal loss of inspiration. The regime's bankruptcy was marked by economic collapse, treated only by political change and Soeharto's resignation.

The nation went into free fall because President B.J. Habibie could not fill the vacuum of authority. The dramatically labeled "Reform Cabinet" could not satisfy the reform-seeking public. Instead of serving as an interim government, the Habibie Cabinet became the focal point of controversy and corruption. They reformed politics just enough to allow new vested interest groups fill the vacuum.

Instead of the Soeharto-inspired conglomerates you now have groups who escape creditors by clinging closely to political power. Cabinet ministers are aligning themselves to launch their own political ambitions.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), naive to politics of greed, became unwitting accomplices of master manipulators of public trust.

Habibie himself shows little interest in supporting, let alone organizing, a smooth transition. A statesmanlike retreat could actually ensure him a golden place in history much better than his personal flights of ego.

Instead of meeting public needs, he is making promises. Instead of cleaning up, he is allowing government factions to help themselves to public assets.

Corrupt bankers, state enterprises and aid money have become fund sources for the Habibie campaign. The Golkar Party and the People's Rule Party (PDR) have become extremely defensive about the origins of their logistical strength.

The majority of the people support the coming general elections, but there is only lukewarm confidence in their impact. For the general public, there is a vast distance between the elections and an improvement in their lives.

With no clear standards to measure fairness, the outcome will have a strong bearing on public acceptance. Polls and random observations show the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) are major contenders. Golkar has the organizational and financial edge, but lacks emotional support. Should Golkar and pro-status quo elements win, instability is likely to increase.

The legal system is weak but political awareness is very high. The only good news in the reform picture is the free press, which is fiercely defended by Minister of Information Muhammad Yunus. "Better a free press without a nation than a nation without a free press," is a Thomas Jefferson quote Yunus fondly recites.

In fact, the Ministry of Information is much more protective of a free press than other groups close to political power. The media are playing an active role in raising levels of critical perceptions.

If the elections fail to satisfy the public, the specter of public protest becomes very real once again. The May 21, 1998 Soeharto resignation is only an interim step in the quest for total reform. Habibie and other leaders of the New Order government must also go. No matter how much Golkar and the New Order fall over backwards, history is not on their side.

We just hope the people in power realize they can make a difference in minimizing the backlash of violence, by taking positions alongside the people rather than with an unwanted regime. For that, they will earn the gratitude of a weary public.

The writer is a political observer based in Jakarta.