Power equation in the Gulf

With the Pentagon reinforcing U.S. air power in the Persian Gulf, events in Iraq seem to be moving toward an escalation in American military operations.

Though Saddam Hussein started the latest conflict, President Clinton owes Americans a clear explanation of how he means to deal with the complex political and military equation in the Persian Gulf before sending more forces into combat. He has not yet made a convincing case for intensified air strikes against Iraq.

Some retaliation against Iraq was justified after its armored thrust into the internationally guaranteed Kurdish region, and its ground fire at American aircraft overflying northern Iraq on Wednesday should not go unanswered.

While we supported Clinton's actions last week, he does not have a blank check from Congress or the American people to mount military operations without demonstrating that America's national security interests are threatened. It is not clear what would justify the "disproportionate" response that Defense Secretary William Perry ominously threatened Wednesday. Exchanging fire with Iraqi forces is not a policy. In the absence of a clear strategy for dealing with Saddam and the gulf region, and in the heat of an election campaign, retaliatory strikes could quickly escalate into a confrontation that ultimately damages American interests.

Circumstances in Iraq and the Middle East have changed since an American-led coalition drove Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. Iraq's conventional military forces, while much reduced from their prewar level, have been rebuilt and could once again pose a credible threat to neighboring countries.

Many Gulf war allies have seen their resolve to resist Saddam's belligerence eroded by domestic politics, economic considerations or the passage of time.

Saudi Arabia, a centerpiece of the coalition, faces internal unrest and anti-American terrorist threats under an ailing King Fahd. Turkey is now led by an Islamic prime minister eager to improve relations with Iraq. France, Russia and China no longer support military action against Baghdad. Iran, as always, waits to exploit weaknesses in Iraq.

All of this limits what the United States can and should do on its own to deal with Saddam. The vital American interest in the area is oil. Saddam cannot be allowed, through conquest or intimidation, to determine the availability or price of much of the global oil supply.

The challenge for Washington is to devise new policies that adequately protect American interests in the region but do not recklessly commit American military forces to combat or inadvertently destabilize other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkey, where the presence of American forces is a sensitive issue.

So far, Iraq has not threatened Saudi Arabia or Kuwait in its latest military maneuvering. Last week's American cruise-missile strikes against antiaircraft installations in southern Iraq, and the expansion of a no-flight zone there, make it much harder for Saddam to turn his forces south anytime soon.

In that sense, Clinton has accomplished what should be the primary American objective in the region.

American interests in northern Iraq are far less clear at this point. Clinton inherited a commitment from the Bush administration to shield the Kurds from Baghdad's abuses. Saddam's recent military campaign against one faction of Kurds required a measured response, which Clinton delivered last week, but America's role must be circumscribed in the tangled world of Kurdish internecine fighting.

Saddam should be checked when he threatens his neighbors, abuses his countrymen and defies Security Council resolutions. But the American response should be proportionate to the danger and determined by a careful calculation of American interests.

Saddam would like nothing more than to draw the United States into a conflict that could strengthen his hold over Iraq and destabilize the region.

-- The New York Times