Politics played key role in military reshuffle
The need for military support by the government and internal rivalry led to the latest military reshuffle, says military analyst Kusnanto Anggoro of the Jakarta-based Centre of Strategic and International Studies.
Question: What is your reaction to the removal of the controversial chief of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who bears an image of reformist officer?
Answer: This has nothing to do with reformist's pros or cons but with internal rivalry. It is true that Agus is among the more radical reformist group in the army. It is also true that in (Army Headquarters) Cilangkap's eyes Agus has made some mistakes like talking to the media first about an issue rather than in his own circle. His attempt to audit Kostrad's finances and his other mistakes have contributed to his downfall.
Q: What are the other mistakes?
A: It is better not to say at this point in time.
Q: Are they political in nature?
A: Yes they are.
Q: You mentioned about internal rivalry, could you elaborate?
A: Actually this is not purely internal rivalry, the reshuffle was also made possible by the civilian political elite. As you know civilian support for Gus Dur (President Abdurrahman Wahid) has been waning in the last two months. The latest recent example was the overwhelming support of legislators to employ their interpellation right (to question Gus Dur).
So Gus Dur has to seek whatever support he may get from the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The military's representatives both at the legislature (DPR) and MPR, totaling at least 38, have been consistently mute. This muteness sent a message to Gus Dur. Their support is crucial and badly needed by Gus Dur.
Q: And there is a price for this...?
A: Yes, in the form of concessions such as more leeway and maneuverability in reshuffling the internal organization of the Indonesian Military (TNI), and in controlling the recent civil emergency in Maluku.
Secondly, Gus Dur should display a more tolerant attitude toward conservative elements in TNI.
So Agus, seen as a reformist, has been less than an asset to Gus Dur in this kind of political situation.
This has been a very political reshuffle.
Q: So what will be the future of the reform movement?
A: It will move more slowly. This will also be determined by (behavior of) civilian politicians.
Q: How do you assess the post of Kostrad chief politically?
A: Actually it is not so significant politically. Kostrad has only 10,000 troops. Politically it is way down compared to the post of Territorial Chief, Chief of General Affairs or Secretary General of Defense. Agus himself is well aware of this.
Q: How do you see the whole picture of the reshuffle involving eight Army officers?
A: Ryamizard (Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, the chief of the Jakarta Military Command who took over Agus' position) is okay. He is an apolitical soldier, (Gen.) MacArthur type, so to say, while Agus is more like Eisenhower.
Out of the eight, only Simbolon (Brig. Gen. Romulo Simbolon, chief of staff of Jakarta Military Command who was assigned to an unspecified post at the TNI headquarters) is known as an Agus man. Lintang (Col. Lintang Waluyo, Army expert staff member to the Army Chief of Staff who was assigned as the new chief of staff of the Jakarta Military Command) is also an apolitical officer.
Q: Could you briefly describe the political map inside the Army?
A: There are mainly three categories in the Army's political grouping, so to say. The first one is the "institutionalized" group, meaning those officers who climb the ladder of ranks on a professional basis. This group has a "gradualist" attitude toward military reform. Gradualist means they would like to accomplish total political reform in 10 to 15 years.
The second one is those officers who always ride on somebody's backs to promote themselves to higher ranks. Their attitude toward reform is radical or progressive.
In term of military reform, both groups have their disadvantages. With the first group, who will know what will happen in 10 to 15 years? Can we really arrive at the designated destination? As for the second group, who can guarantee that a radical movement will not sink the boat?
The third group is the marginalized officers. Included in this group are fallen officers, gracefully or otherwise. Their attitude toward reform is reactionary.
But the nature of relations between the three groups is very dynamic. One group may regard the other group an ally at one point in time or an enemy at another time. (hbk)