Politics played key role in military reshuffle

Politics played key role in military reshuffle

The need for military support by the government and internal
rivalry led to the latest military reshuffle, says military
analyst Kusnanto Anggoro of the Jakarta-based Centre of Strategic
and International Studies.

Question: What is your reaction to the removal of the
controversial chief of the Army Strategic Reserves Command
(Kostrad) Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who bears an image of
reformist officer?

Answer: This has nothing to do with reformist's pros or cons
but with internal rivalry. It is true that Agus is among the more
radical reformist group in the army. It is also true that in
(Army Headquarters) Cilangkap's eyes Agus has made some mistakes
like talking to the media first about an issue rather than in his
own circle. His attempt to audit Kostrad's finances and his other
mistakes have contributed to his downfall.

Q: What are the other mistakes?

A: It is better not to say at this point in time.

Q: Are they political in nature?

A: Yes they are.

Q: You mentioned about internal rivalry, could you elaborate?

A: Actually this is not purely internal rivalry, the reshuffle
was also made possible by the civilian political elite. As you
know civilian support for Gus Dur (President Abdurrahman Wahid)
has been waning in the last two months. The latest recent example
was the overwhelming support of legislators to employ their
interpellation right (to question Gus Dur).

So Gus Dur has to seek whatever support he may get from the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The military's
representatives both at the legislature (DPR) and MPR, totaling
at least 38, have been consistently mute. This muteness sent a
message to Gus Dur. Their support is crucial and badly needed by
Gus Dur.

Q: And there is a price for this...?

A: Yes, in the form of concessions such as more leeway and
maneuverability in reshuffling the internal organization of the
Indonesian Military (TNI), and in controlling the recent civil
emergency in Maluku.

Secondly, Gus Dur should display a more tolerant attitude
toward conservative elements in TNI.

So Agus, seen as a reformist, has been less than an asset to
Gus Dur in this kind of political situation.

This has been a very political reshuffle.

Q: So what will be the future of the reform movement?

A: It will move more slowly. This will also be determined by
(behavior of) civilian politicians.

Q: How do you assess the post of Kostrad chief politically?

A: Actually it is not so significant politically. Kostrad has
only 10,000 troops. Politically it is way down compared to the
post of Territorial Chief, Chief of General Affairs or Secretary
General of Defense. Agus himself is well aware of this.

Q: How do you see the whole picture of the reshuffle involving
eight Army officers?

A: Ryamizard (Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, the chief of the
Jakarta Military Command who took over Agus' position) is okay.
He is an apolitical soldier, (Gen.) MacArthur type, so to say,
while Agus is more like Eisenhower.

Out of the eight, only Simbolon (Brig. Gen. Romulo Simbolon,
chief of staff of Jakarta Military Command who was assigned to an
unspecified post at the TNI headquarters) is known as an Agus
man. Lintang (Col. Lintang Waluyo, Army expert staff member to
the Army Chief of Staff who was assigned as the new chief of
staff of the Jakarta Military Command) is also an apolitical
officer.

Q: Could you briefly describe the political map inside the Army?

A: There are mainly three categories in the Army's political
grouping, so to say. The first one is the "institutionalized"
group, meaning those officers who climb the ladder of ranks on a
professional basis. This group has a "gradualist" attitude toward
military reform. Gradualist means they would like to accomplish
total political reform in 10 to 15 years.

The second one is those officers who always ride on somebody's
backs to promote themselves to higher ranks. Their attitude
toward reform is radical or progressive.

In term of military reform, both groups have their
disadvantages. With the first group, who will know what will
happen in 10 to 15 years? Can we really arrive at the designated
destination? As for the second group, who can guarantee that a
radical movement will not sink the boat?

The third group is the marginalized officers. Included in this
group are fallen officers, gracefully or otherwise. Their
attitude toward reform is reactionary.

But the nature of relations between the three groups is very
dynamic. One group may regard the other group an ally at one
point in time or an enemy at another time. (hbk)