Politics and RI foreign policy

By Juwono Sudarsono

The following article is an excerpt of a paper presented at a conference held by the Indonesian Students Association in Australia in Canberra on Aug. 20 and Aug. 21, 1996.

CANBERRA: I would like to address the domestic-foreign policy nexus in Indonesia through brief discussions on three general areas: the political role of the Armed Forces, the position of Chinese-Indonesians and Islam in domestic politics and foreign policy.

President Soeharto's starting point in conducting foreign policy effectively put the late President Sukarno's thesis on its head: a nation cannot be respected abroad unless its leaders in government deliver to its own people the basics -- human security, food, clothing, shelter. He also firmly believed in the imperative of ideological commitment and political stability as preconditions for sustained economic development.

Party politics and the government of the 1950s did not possess cultural roots within Indonesian society at large and was responsible for debilitated governance. The demise of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1966 left the Army leadership with the challenge of the possibility that radical Islamists may want to change the basis of the Indonesian nation-state.

The Army-inspired framework of state identity based on Pancasila, initiated since the landmark Second Army Seminar in August, 1966, was affirmed as the official national ideology in 1978. The consensus to settle once and for all the imperative for political stability was given added commitment through the promulgation of the series of legislation on political and social organizations passed by the Indonesian government in 1985.

Rather more by default than by design, the Army became the only institution that was capable of holding the country together on a nationwide basis, gradually displacing the tumultuous party- based politics which marked the 1950s and 1960s.

Foreign criticisms about the role of the Armed Forces in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy were largely based on the guiding assumption in industrialized countries that any form of military involvement in the conduct of governance must be illegitimate.

Popular depictions of "authoritarianism" and "militarism" became the staple diet in many foreign journalistic and academic writings on Indonesian politics in the 1970s and 1980s. Some of these observations surface from time to time in the Australian media, particularly when linked to unrest or demonstrations in East Timor, labor issues and human rights violations.

In spite of these reservations, even the most rabid critics of Indonesia grudgingly acknowledge that without the political stability that the Armed Forces provided, Indonesian could not have achieved the massive socioeconomic advancement that has taken place over the past 25 years. In fact, the very success in providing the political environment conducive to long-term economic development engendered further debate on the legitimacy of the development trinity of "stability, growth and equity".

Paradoxically, Indonesia's insistence on concentrating on economic development enabled its international standing to be put in a favorable light. Indonesia's low military budget, its carefully calibrated links between domestic economic performance and international prominence allowed it to play a more recognized role in Cambodia, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Moro problem in the southern Philippines and UN peacekeeping roles in Bosnia, Somalia and Nambia.

Another important domestic-international nexus is the question of the status of Indonesian citizens of Chinese origin. In the past, because of close identification of the Indonesian Communist Party with the revolutionary facets of pre-1978 People's Republic of China, the Indonesian government's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Beijing in August, 1990, constituted an important landmark in the domestic-political life of the nation.

Indigenous Indonesians had long adhered to the popular stereotype that all Chinese-Indonesians were always sympathetic to the People's Republic of China, at best harbored dual loyalty and held undue influence in all sectors of the domestic economy.

These questions remain touchy because of perceived preference on the part of Chinese-Indonesians to invest in the greater China area (southern China, Taiwan, Hong Kong) rather than in Indonesia. But Indonesian foreign policy with regard to China continues to reflect the unending issue of citizenship, political loyalty and the economic role of key Chinese-Indonesian owned conglomerates.

The recent presidential decree facilitating the process of Indonesian citizenship to about 210,000 citizens of Chinese descent marks another step in advancing our political maturity in domestic as well as in international terms.

Although Indonesia is the nation with the largest Moslem population, strict adherence to the principles of Pancasila firmly puts in place the basis of a clear ideological framework. With respect to membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, for example, Indonesia's unique position as "the largest Moslem nation" was accepted as the basis for its membership, rather than on the formal stipulation that the organization's membership were based on clear affirmation of an "Islamic state".

That is why, in the conduct of its foreign policy, Indonesia's stance in respect of such issues as Palestine, the crisis in the southern Philippines, the Gulf War and the Bosnian crisis was made explicit on the firm notion that in advocating its national interests, priority was given to the affirmation of an ideology which placed all religions on equal footing.

Unlike Malaysia, Pakistan and other professedly-Islamic states, Indonesia's adherence to a world view incorporating acceptance and tolerance among all religions reflected its internal concern to maintaining intercommunal and interreligious harmony.

The large majority of Indonesia's Islamic leaders do not have the gut reaction -- vehement and vitriolic -- to perceived sleights from Western culture that have characterized some Middle Eastern countries. To fall into the trap of locating anti-Islamic animosity primarily in the West would be to reject the central features of Islam -- love of knowledge, tolerance and egalitarianism.

Indonesian Islam seeks to reflect religion as encouraging breadth of vision, equilibrium and tolerance, as well as fulfillment of human destiny in the universe. That is central to the character of the Indonesian nation-state. That is also of central importance to Indonesia's credibility across all nations, cultures and religions abroad.

The writer is Vice Governor of National Resilience Institute in Jakarta.