Wed, 03 Apr 2002

Politicking Islam to solve Aceh problem

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Sociologist, Author, 'Dari Maaf ke Panik Aceh' (From Apologies to Aceh Panic), Jakarta

The Aceh administration seized the ritual momentum of the Islamic New Year, 1 Muharam 1423 (March 15, 2002) to declare the implementation of syariah or Islamic law in the province.

Aceh Governor Abdullah Puteh, whose management is still under the spotlight for alleged corruption, has also declared he is clean.

The declaration reflects that bureaucrats will be clean; it also implies a call to forget corruption cases involving members of the civilian and military bureaucracies -- instead of uncovering and eradicating corruption. Attempts to make people forget human rights violations seems to be the next step.

In Aceh, military domination marked by combat policy, the intelligence and territorial operation and the dispatch of some 50,000 soldiers has become the basis of Jakarta's bureaucracy from the provincial to village administrations.

However, crimes against humanity (mysterious murders, mass executions, burnings, lootings, kidnapping and extortion) and other crimes (illegal levies in the streets, corruption, illegal lotteries, drug abuse and prostitution) have increased rapidly, while public space for civil society which strives for a sovereign and dignified life is narrowing.

The introduction of syariah in Aceh has been said to serve as an instrument to help speed up the solution to the Aceh problem.

Yet there is a strong indication that syariah has been used as Jakarta's political instrument in solving its conflict with Aceh -- not as a means of fostering a civilized life as is inherent in the basic meaning of the word syariah.

Aceh is occupied by the oldest Muslim community in the archipelago. It is well known not only as the starting point of Islamic propagation in the country; it was also the center of Islamic thought in the era of Hamzah Fansuri, a Muslim religious leader related to Sufism.

Islam has become a foundation for the Acehnese community, one that lives as a sovereign, dignified and highly civilized people. Though the Acehnese strongly adhere to Islam, they have been able to accommodate sectarian, religious and ethnic plurality. Before Aceh became part of Indonesia, there were no sectarian, religious and ethnic conflicts in that region.

Therefore the Acehnese had never thought of establishing an Islamic country (except a sultanate) as much as they have neither thought of implementing syariah. The latter idea surfaced in the 1950s, when the Acehnese, led by Tengku Daud Beureueh as the region's head, were struggling to free themselves from Indonesia's "political betrayal" by establishing the Islamic Republic of Aceh.

In the reconciliation between Aceh and Jakarta, one demand was the implementation of syariah. During the New Order period, the special status was merely symbolic, serving as Indonesia's acknowledgement of the Acehnese' services to the Republic. It was not regarded as it should be: A result of reconciliation or as part of the Aceh-Indonesia political contract, which was renewed in the 1960s.

When Aceh's status as a military operation region (DOM) was revoked on Aug.7, 1998, and the demand for upholding human rights was ignored, the Acehnese strove to end Indonesia's role as the ruling state in Aceh. Demands emerged for a referendum of self determination, whether Aceh should separate from the Republic.

However Usman Hasan, the chairman of former president B.J. Habibie's team of advisors and Safwan Idris, rector of the Ar- Raniry State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) in Kutaraja in Aceh, who allegedly harbored ambitions to become minister of religious affairs, proposed the implementation of syariah in Aceh, a measure which was said to win the hearts of the Acehnese.

In mid 1999, the Acehnese began to be trapped in provocative actions such as raiding individuals who were suspected of violating syariah, long before it was officially introduced. There were instances of arbitrary capture, trial and punishment in public of males and females involved in adultery by stoning them to death, parading or cutting their hair in front of a mosque and so forth.

In some villages, men caught women and girls who did not wear the jilbab (head scarves) and women also caught men who failed to perform the Friday prayers at the mosque (compulsory for males). Seeds of conflicts between people, caused by religion, began to be sowed. Revenge spread from one village to another; villagers would capture other villagers on charges of violating syariah, when they had heard of the capture and abuse of fellow residents.

In time people realized that such actions could trigger needless conflicts among themselves. Unfortunately, Habibie's successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, in his globe-trotting trips, would repeatedly say that the Acehnese were fundamentalists and that the Free Aceh Movement harbored ambitions to set up an Islamic state. This tactic was adopted to ensure that the real tragedy of the Acehnese, who are victims of crimes against humanity, would not gain international sympathy.

Abdurrahman or Gus Dur, further encouraged the introduction of the syariah as a solution to the conflict between Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia.

Syariah in Aceh is the product of three regimes. The initiative for this special law first came into being when Habibie was president. Then in Gus Dur's era, it was legalized and today, during the administration of Megawati Soekarnoputri, it has been implemented.

Strangely, Gus Dur, renowned for his background of "cultural Islam" has legalized attempts to apply Islam in Aceh's social, economic and political structure -- a measure which can only be explained by political interests. Aceh's cultural Islam, which is inclusive as it accommodates many schools of Islam, could not be approached by the "exclusive" cultural Islam championed by Gus Dur. Hence, having Aceh adopt a "structural Islam" seems to be Jakarta's main current political agenda regarding Aceh.

Gus Dur's intention started to become clear when the Laskar Jihad entered Aceh, and KAMMI, the student movement affiliated with the Justice Party, raised artificial issues such as women having their photographs taken without headscarves, and raising opposition to Acehnese suggestions that a third country be involved as a mediator in the conflict with Jakarta.

Thus, Gus Dur's policies to politicize Islam are evident in the way that they have opened the door for a strict movement of Islam, whose proponents have appeared anti-Western, undemocratic and are not concerned with the crimes against humanity in Aceh.

Such proponents therefore share the above characteristics with those of Jakarta's mainly military policy.

If Laskar Jihad and KAMMI are not concerned with Indonesia's crimes against humanity in victimizing the Acehnese, then Jakarta will benefit from having these crimes hidden. If militaristic actions aim to divide the Acehnese and avoid the attention of the international community, then eventually this will happen, as a result from new problems posed by a shift of focus to symbolic religious matters and the rejection to outside "interference" on the state of the humanitarian affairs of the Acehnese.

If syariah cannot resolve Indonesian crimes against humanity in Aceh, then what is its significance? Is syariah only a means to control people who wear shorts, while those wearing trousers and carrying rifles continue to kill the Acehnese and are allowed to roam throughout all corners of Aceh and Indonesia?

The application of syariah in Aceh would therefore only be a waste of energy.