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Politicizing security matters: Deja vu

| Source: JP

Politicizing security matters: Deja vu

Mette Lykke Knudsen, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

Lately, and increasingly since the Aug. 5 JW Marriott Hotel
bombing, security has yet again surfaced as a "hot topic" in
politics here. The focus of this push for enhanced security is,
for example, the physical safety of Indonesians and foreigners
and political stability.

Thus, to counter the threat of terrorism it has for instance
been suggested that an Internal Security Act (ISA) a la Singapore
and Malaysia be introduced; that the military assists the police
in their efforts to enhance internal security; and that the
antiterrorism law be revised on matters concerning the legal
conditions for arrest and detainment of terror suspects, and to
generally give more power to all security-related agencies.

Likewise, Minister of Home Affairs Hari Sabarno has put
forward a plan to suspend the elections of 93 regional heads
scheduled to be held in the nine months surrounding the national
elections in mid 2004, due to fears that multiple, simultaneous
elections will potentially cause violence and further endanger
stability.

Such problems are not to be ignored. But questions should be
raised as to whether the rhetoric and means proposed to deal with
these "threats" to ensure "security" are appropriate in an
emerging democracy.

First, the use of the term "security" reflects a condition
where security does not exist. When security actually exists,
people do not talk much about it. Thus talking about security
does not reflect the actual level thereof, only that someone has
chosen to frame a political matter in terms of "security".

Second, framing a matter in terms of "security" is just one
way of presenting policy options, but it is a way that will often
lead to a narrower selection of solutions, and maybe even an
escalation of the problem.

Solutions to problems defined as "security issues" will often
come from the military milieu, i.e. the use of soldiers, weapons
and rules of war, whereas solutions to "political matters" are
picked from within a larger range of social, economic and
institutional possibilities.

Also, countering violence with violence (i.e. the security
approach) will often escalate a problem: Terrorists will perceive
the state as even more repressive and will resort to even harsher
means of terror leading to a spiral of violence. Thus handling a
matter such as a "security issue" rather than as a "political
matter" may prevent an actual, or even adequate, solution of the
problem. Therefore, a policy may be more successful if, for
instance, terrorism is handled within the sphere of "political
matters" rather than that of "security issues".

Finally, "securitization", i.e. making security issues of
political matters, constitutes a democratic problem. It is prone
to being arbitrary since power holders can easily claim that
something constitutes a threat and might do so for self-serving
purposes, and the management of the issue will often be left in
the hands and at the whims of generals rather than elected
politicians.

Additionally, the means will often include the setting aside
of the rule of law, repression of freedoms of speech and
movement, as well as special conditions relating to elections.
This is also the case with the recent examples of an ISA-like
antiterrorism law revision, the use of the military for internal
security purposes and suspension of elections.

The trouble with making security issues political, is that
politics are transferred into a more radical dimension. It gives
to much leeway for the use of means that can only be used when
"security" is endangered but are otherwise not acceptable, and
thus for instance provides opportunities for setting aside
democratic procedures.

It also preemptively rules out solutions that -- in the short
as well as long run -- might be more adequate. In these ways,
"more security" is not good for Indonesia.

Indonesian political figures, to a great degree, politicizes
security issues. In some cases the use of such extreme security
measures are not even explicitly related to the object in danger,
but seems more to be used as a standard solution to problems at
hand with little concern for the consequences (e.g. when
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono refers to the police's lack of personnel and
the military's surplus thereof as a reason to use military
personnel for police business).

This standard solution belongs to the ways of the past. It is
identical to the way Soeharto ran the country. Despite the fact
that the "security makers" of today stress that the idea is not
to return to the New Order state of affairs, it is exactly the
methods of the New Order that they are using.

During the New Order regime, the invocation of the term
"security" was used as a means to control certain political
developments. The objects referred to as threatened were usually
the unity of the country -- or the Pancasila state ideology --
and its economic development.

Thus, examples of measures that were taken in the name of
securing unity or economic development are the finalization of
Sukarno's government in 1966 and the introduction of the New
order, a dual role including political functions for the
military, the restructuring of political parties in 1973 followed
by depoliticization, the enforcement of Pancasila as the sole
ideology of all organizations in 1982, as well as more generally
proscribing political behavior and setting up permissible
boundaries of political discourse during the period.

Most people today acknowledge that the New Order was
problematic. However, political leaders have still not distanced
themselves from the ways of policy-making that were used by the
New Order. If politicians do not realize the need for a radical
change in this state of affairs, Indonesia will not be able to
stick to the track of democratic development it has claimed as
its goal.

Instead it will proceed on a path of a narrow view of
solutions, escalating tension, and undermining the ability of
society to conduct free debate and have democratic elections.
Rhetoric may not seem to be crucial, but in this case a change of
rhetoric -- and mind -- is pivotal.

The writer is a graduate student of political science and
international relations at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
She is also a student research assistant at the Institute of
International Studies in Copenhagen.

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