Politicizing security matters: Deja vu
Mette Lykke Knudsen, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
Lately, and increasingly since the Aug. 5 JW Marriott Hotel bombing, security has yet again surfaced as a "hot topic" in politics here. The focus of this push for enhanced security is, for example, the physical safety of Indonesians and foreigners and political stability.
Thus, to counter the threat of terrorism it has for instance been suggested that an Internal Security Act (ISA) a la Singapore and Malaysia be introduced; that the military assists the police in their efforts to enhance internal security; and that the antiterrorism law be revised on matters concerning the legal conditions for arrest and detainment of terror suspects, and to generally give more power to all security-related agencies.
Likewise, Minister of Home Affairs Hari Sabarno has put forward a plan to suspend the elections of 93 regional heads scheduled to be held in the nine months surrounding the national elections in mid 2004, due to fears that multiple, simultaneous elections will potentially cause violence and further endanger stability.
Such problems are not to be ignored. But questions should be raised as to whether the rhetoric and means proposed to deal with these "threats" to ensure "security" are appropriate in an emerging democracy.
First, the use of the term "security" reflects a condition where security does not exist. When security actually exists, people do not talk much about it. Thus talking about security does not reflect the actual level thereof, only that someone has chosen to frame a political matter in terms of "security".
Second, framing a matter in terms of "security" is just one way of presenting policy options, but it is a way that will often lead to a narrower selection of solutions, and maybe even an escalation of the problem.
Solutions to problems defined as "security issues" will often come from the military milieu, i.e. the use of soldiers, weapons and rules of war, whereas solutions to "political matters" are picked from within a larger range of social, economic and institutional possibilities.
Also, countering violence with violence (i.e. the security approach) will often escalate a problem: Terrorists will perceive the state as even more repressive and will resort to even harsher means of terror leading to a spiral of violence. Thus handling a matter such as a "security issue" rather than as a "political matter" may prevent an actual, or even adequate, solution of the problem. Therefore, a policy may be more successful if, for instance, terrorism is handled within the sphere of "political matters" rather than that of "security issues".
Finally, "securitization", i.e. making security issues of political matters, constitutes a democratic problem. It is prone to being arbitrary since power holders can easily claim that something constitutes a threat and might do so for self-serving purposes, and the management of the issue will often be left in the hands and at the whims of generals rather than elected politicians.
Additionally, the means will often include the setting aside of the rule of law, repression of freedoms of speech and movement, as well as special conditions relating to elections. This is also the case with the recent examples of an ISA-like antiterrorism law revision, the use of the military for internal security purposes and suspension of elections.
The trouble with making security issues political, is that politics are transferred into a more radical dimension. It gives to much leeway for the use of means that can only be used when "security" is endangered but are otherwise not acceptable, and thus for instance provides opportunities for setting aside democratic procedures.
It also preemptively rules out solutions that -- in the short as well as long run -- might be more adequate. In these ways, "more security" is not good for Indonesia.
Indonesian political figures, to a great degree, politicizes security issues. In some cases the use of such extreme security measures are not even explicitly related to the object in danger, but seems more to be used as a standard solution to problems at hand with little concern for the consequences (e.g. when Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono refers to the police's lack of personnel and the military's surplus thereof as a reason to use military personnel for police business).
This standard solution belongs to the ways of the past. It is identical to the way Soeharto ran the country. Despite the fact that the "security makers" of today stress that the idea is not to return to the New Order state of affairs, it is exactly the methods of the New Order that they are using.
During the New Order regime, the invocation of the term "security" was used as a means to control certain political developments. The objects referred to as threatened were usually the unity of the country -- or the Pancasila state ideology -- and its economic development.
Thus, examples of measures that were taken in the name of securing unity or economic development are the finalization of Sukarno's government in 1966 and the introduction of the New order, a dual role including political functions for the military, the restructuring of political parties in 1973 followed by depoliticization, the enforcement of Pancasila as the sole ideology of all organizations in 1982, as well as more generally proscribing political behavior and setting up permissible boundaries of political discourse during the period.
Most people today acknowledge that the New Order was problematic. However, political leaders have still not distanced themselves from the ways of policy-making that were used by the New Order. If politicians do not realize the need for a radical change in this state of affairs, Indonesia will not be able to stick to the track of democratic development it has claimed as its goal.
Instead it will proceed on a path of a narrow view of solutions, escalating tension, and undermining the ability of society to conduct free debate and have democratic elections. Rhetoric may not seem to be crucial, but in this case a change of rhetoric -- and mind -- is pivotal.
The writer is a graduate student of political science and international relations at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. She is also a student research assistant at the Institute of International Studies in Copenhagen.