Political will needed

What is the definition of corruption? Odd as it may seem, difficulties in answering this simple question in clear-cut legal terms seem to be among the obstacles hampering the search for the billions of dollars former president Soeharto is believed by many to have squirreled away during his 32 years in power. The most basic presumption is that corruption is owning wealth that can be proven to have been acquired unlawfully. Attorney General Lt. Gen. Andi Muhammad Ghalib, who President B.J. Habibie has entrusted with looking into public allegations of corruption by the former president, is probably using this definition to answer questions about why he seems to be making no progress with his investigations, particularly when he said: "The police have to ask where the chickens are, because how can someone be accused of stealing chickens when the stolen chickens are nowhere to be found."

Obviously, such a legalistic approach to investigating the corruption charges that critics have been throwing at the ex- president, his family and close associates satisfies practically no one. This is all the more true since corruption, as the public perceives it, is an evil that is easy to see, though often difficult to prove. For the public, it is hard to see how the ex- president's family and associates failed to benefit -- and benefit substantially -- when they controlled almost every sector of business and industry through monopolies and other forms of preferential treatment extended to them by Soeharto. Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), an independent private corruption watchdog based in Jakarta, for example alleges that at least 44 multinational companies were involved in Soeharto-linked projects and businesses.

To those critics, obviously, all the statements made by top law enforcement authorities that there is no proof of corruption by either Soeharto or members of his regime may sound like mere excuses designed to extricate themselves from wrongs committed in the past. For this reason, concerned citizens groups have been looking for more effective ways to prove corruption -- not only by Soeharto, but possibly also by other members of his New Order regime. ICW, for example, is urging the country's highest legislative body, the People's Consultative Assembly, or MPR, which is slated to convene in a special session next month, to pronounce a "political judgment" on public allegations that Soeharto abused his power to enrich his family and cronies, since the judicial means employed so far have proved to be ineffective. ICW is also urging Habibie to appoint a special prosecutor to take over the investigations from Ghalib, even though most analysts say there is little hope that any government investigation would ever manage to reach the truth because of the lack of political will on the part of the government.

Following a similar tack, another Indonesian corruption watchdog, the Indonesian Transparency Society (MTI), this week exposed no less than 79 decrees, issued by Soeharto when he was president, that were either designed or manipulated to benefit businesspeople close to him. Among the most conspicuous, and also cited by ICW, were two benefiting Soeharto's long-time golfing buddy Mohamad "Bob" Hasan and Soeharto's youngest son, Hutomo "Tommy" Mandala Putra, to the detriment of the state -- the first by giving financial assistance to the PT Kiani Kertas pulp and paper mill, the second by exempting PT Timor Putra Nasional from paying duties and luxury sales tax on imported cars.

For the sake of not only recovering any public money that may have been lost through such practices, but also to bolster the prestige and authority of the current regime, the government would be well advised to accept all the assistance that such watchdog institutions like the ICW and MTI will no doubt be most happy to provide. The most important factor to guarantee that the investigations stand a chance of success, however, remains that the government summons the necessary political will to carry through its efforts.