Political turmoil rocks Pakistan
LONDON: The ousting of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on Nov. 5, 1996 by her erstwhile ally President Farooq Leghari has plunged the country's quasi-democratic system back into turmoil.
Bhutto's sacking was not entirely unexpected. In the preceding eight weeks she had been embroiled in a series of crises: allegations that her husband Asif Ali Zardari was behind the shooting of her brother and political rival, Murtaza Bhutto, in Karachi on Sept. 20, 1996; the announcement, following pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, of a mini-budget that managed to antagonize everyone from wealthy landlords to the urban poor; and, just prior to the sacking, two days of demonstrations by the small but militant Islamic party, Jamaat Islami, to demand the Prime Minister's resignation for what it called rampant corruption and incompetence.
Surprisingly, Leghari's constitutional coup provoked minimal outrage. Although lauded in the West, Benazir's popularity in Pakistan has diminished considerably since her last election victory in October 1993.
Among the factors advanced by Leghari for his action were corruption, nepotism and general misrule, as well as the prevalence of extra-judicial killings - particularly in Karachi. Appointing a caretaker administration, led by Malik Meraj Khalid, the President set the date for new elections as Feb. 3, 1997. Whether that date will be adhered to, and whether polls will be held without restrictions, are among the questions now uppermost in the minds of Pakistan's political life. So far, President Leghari has acted well within his powers. When the late military dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, restored democracy in 1985, he introduced major changes to the Constitution - known collectively as the Eighth Amendment - which gave him, as President, powers to dismiss popularly elected governments. Even though Zia died in a highly suspicious air crash in 1988, the Eighth Amendment has never been repealed. In fact, since 1985, it has been invoked on four different occasions to dismiss successive prime ministers. Each time, however, fears of a return to military rule have proved groundless. It has been argued that the Eighth Amendment serves a useful purpose: reducing the risk of an army take-over by giving the generals a way of influencing the president to dismiss governments in which the army has lost faith.
That is what appears to have happened in November. Since Gen. Zia's death, political power in Pakistan has come to be informally shared between a troika of the elected prime minister, the unelected president and the army chief-of-staff. Competition for power among the three has been responsible for much of the instability since Zia's death. Benazir Bhutto's bid for primacy over the military-bureaucratic establishment brought down her government in 1990. There is no doubt that Bhutto's second sacking had the full support of the army leadership.
In Pakistan, the dominant influence of the army is taken for granted. More worrying to advocates of democracy are signs that the caretaker administration may not abide by its promise of fresh elections. Leghari has packed the caretaker administration with his cronies, and is encouraging splits in Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Meanwhile, Malik Meraj Khalid, the caretaker prime minister - like Leghari, a former loyalist of the PPP - has announced plans to draft an accountability law which could disqualify politicians facing corruption charges from contesting the polls.
Such a law might bar not only Benazir Bhutto from office, but also her rival Nawaz Sharif, leader of the main faction of the Pakistan Moslem League, who in an unrestricted election is considered most likely to regain the job of prime minister. Sharif, however, is not trusted by the army: like Benazir Bhutto, he has previously been dismissed from office on charges of corruption. The problem for the establishment is to find a more credible alternative.
The two men who stand to gain most from the disqualification of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have both spoken out in favor of an extension of the caretaker government's term. One is the leader of the Jamaat Islami, Qazi Hussein Ahmed, the other is the cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan. Of the two, Imran Khan has the better chance of winning the backing of the establishment. He has a clean image, as well as access to money, links with the army and crowd-pulling power. Even though his newly formed party, the Tehreeq-a-Insaaf, was only founded six months ago, the establishment has succeeded in the past in creating a 'third force' out of disparate coalition partners. But whoever wins the election, the disqualification of the two main party leaders would be an almost certain recipe for continued political instability.
The election result, however, holds only limited significance for the outside world. A new government might conceivably be less corrupt, less incompetent and less inclined to tamper with the bureaucracy and the judiciary. But in many crucial areas - such as the economy, nuclear proliferation and foreign affairs - new faces will be in no position to make significant changes. High defense spending, the nuclear option, relations with India and Pakistan's policies in Kashmir and Afghanistan are traditionally non-debatable areas of national interest, in which the military has a final say.
The paramount role of the army in policy-making is a direct result of the distortions caused to Pakistan's polity by Gen. Zia. His period of martial law (1977-1985) introduced military personnel and influence into governmental and quasi- governmental institutions at all levels. When martial law was lifted, he tampered with the Constitution to safeguard his own unchallenged position. More insidiously, his position as the West's front-line defender against Soviet expansionism after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 enabled him to expand the role and power of Pakistan's secret services. Subsequent civilian governments have never since been in a position to bring the ISI or other military agencies fully under their control.
Zia used the ISI for two main purposes: to keep checks on civilian politicians and defuse potential opposition at home; and to act as the main arms supplier and military adviser to the Afghan Mujaheddin groups headquartered on Pakistani soil. Since civilians gained control of the formal reigns of government, the domestic role of the ISI has largely been taken over by another group, Military Intelligence (MI), which reports directly to the army Chief-of-Staff. But the ISI continues to be the lead agency in covert operations, particularly interference in the affairs of Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Pakistan's role as the base-camp for the jihad has led to both domestic and regional distortions. The prevalence of AK-47s, rocket-launchers and heroin in both urban and rural areas, as well as the destabilizing presence of hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees, are the main domestic legacy of Islamabad's involvement. Equally destabilizing, however, is the continued pro-active role of non-accountable military agencies such as the ISI, as well as small Islamic parties, including the Jamaat Islami and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan. The close links of these parties with radical Islamic groups in Afghanistan and the Middle East have accrued for themselves an influence quite disproportionate to their popular support.
Over the past 15 years, Pakistan's military establishment, acting through the ISI, has sponsored various parties to the Afghan conflict. During most of the Soviet occupation, the Hizb-i Islami of former Afghan prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was its favorite client. But Hekmatyar - while still of considerable nuisance value - is currently on the sidelines, and over the last two years the ISI has switched its support to other groups. The dramatic emergence of the Taleban movement as Afghanistan's dominant force is due at least partly to support from Pakistan. While the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan provided the Taleban with many of its raw recruits, the ISI provided it with crucial military and diplomatic support. Nor does the ISI confine its activities to Afghanistan.
At various levels, it has been providing assistance - either direct or indirect - to Islamic militant groups active both in neighboring Kashmir and in other Moslem insurgences around the world. Most visible among these groups is the Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA), which is about to be officially designated by Washington as a terrorist group after kidnapping five Western hostages in Kashmir last year. While Islamabad denies sponsoring Islamic militancy, HUA offices can be found in many parts of Pakistan, and there is no check on its fund-raising and recruiting activities.
The HUA is now also operating in the Pashtun tribal region straddling the Pakistan-Afghan border. After the Mujaheddin captured Kabul, military and ideological training camps were set up in many parts of Afghanistan. Recruits arrived from Pakistan, Sudan and the Middle East.
When it first came to prominence in 1994, Taleban won a degree of support from the West by promising to close these camps down. On Nov. 20, 1996 it was revealed that at least two camps have recently reopened near the border town of Khost - this time under Harakat-ul-Ansar management.
Although most Kashmiri-based militant groups claim that active assistance from Pakistan has declined over the past 18 months, the increase in HUA activities indicates that elements within the Pakistani establishment - including the ISI - are still intent on fueling the long-running insurgency in the Kashmir valley. While the Pakistan military retains its paramount role in politics, and covert and unaccountable agencies like the ISI continue to conduct what amounts to their own independent foreign policy, fresh elections are unlikely to lead to any diminution of the small but significant destabilizing role which Pakistan continues to play in both regional and international affairs.