Political players need to negotiate

Political players need to negotiate

By Rizal Mallaranggeng

The following article is based on a paper presented at a
discussion on finding a "new vision" in the post-Soeharto era
held by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on
Aug. 25.

JAKARTA (JP): The reform process is entering a critical period
in which it could result in either a form of anarchy or
democracy.

Should the country fail to advance the reform process
effectively, we will find ourselves facing a "consolidated
anarchy" in our political institutions. Complications within the
political system and institutions would hamper institutional
development.

In this case, reforms would only take place unsystematically,
without a clear blueprint. Worse still, such changes would be
made simultaneously with other actions contrary to the logic of
the reform itself.

Therefore, consolidated anarchy would result in a political
situation marked by a high degree of political uncertainty,
cynicism, public turmoil and continuing ethno-religious
suspicions.

A return to authoritarian rule -- with militaristic and
despotic characteristics -- cannot be ruled out if such a
condition persists for a few years.

On the other hand, if the country can smoothly pass this
critical period, we could be heading for a form of democracy.

If a democratic system and institutions can be developed, the
reform process could end in the creation of what is termed as a
"consolidated democracy".

Such a result would not eliminate basic conflicts but at least
they would be institutionalized. Each political camp involved
would have to adhere to the rules of the same political game.

Indonesians would also be able to return to a "normal" life in
the sense that the political stage would be filled by
politicians, activists and public figures instead of marching
protesters.

Should we be able to achieve a consolidated democracy,
Indonesia could become a model of democracy for other developing
nations through good examples of how ethnic and religious
conflicts can be settled peacefully.

The question is, how do we get there?

Is such a system obtainable peacefully and without sacrificing
the systematic and rational steps needed to solve the economic
crisis?

Unfortunately, nobody knows. Social science experts cannot
really see into the future with any certainty. As Max Weber said,
only demagogues are able to make predictions, not social
scientists.

But to achieve a working democratic system, some preconditions
are in order. First, there needs to be a desire and the ability
to negotiate, while secondly, there needs to be a clear and
realistic choice of priorities in the country's political agenda.

Why are these important? In order to answer this question, we
must first consider something that has never been seriously
discussed by the media: the nature of the political transition
taking place toward the fall of the New Order regime and its
aftermath.

The current political situation can be characterized as having
a negative balance of forces among various groups, from
reformists as well as from current power holders.

Since Soeharto's fall, no single group has really possessed
sufficient power to win absolutely. The reformists and the middle
class can point to having moral strength and truth in their
arguments, but they are divided, unorganized and are relatively
small in number.

If the reformists did not suffer from these weaknesses, the
political situation would be much different from the one we face
now.

On the other hand, elements that made up the New Order regime
can count on organization and money, though they too are divided
and, most importantly, are severely demoralized.

The fact that no one group can take absolute control of the
political arena has resulted in a situation in which all sides,
both the reformists and the elements supporting the status quo,
can only point to partial wins over the past three months.

The reformists scored a partial victory when Soeharto stepped
down, but other aspects of their demands seem to have been
forgotten.

The resulting stalemate has resulted in a political transition
that can be called a reforma pactada, a reform that must be
negotiated, like the one in Spain in the 1970s.

Since each camp cannot win the political fight at this point,
both reformists and the power holders should realize that a
process of negotiations needs to take place to further the reform
process to a stage in which institutional changes can be made.

Hence the will and the capacity to negotiate at this moment
are absolute requirements to push our political transition
process another step farther.

We must understand that consolidated democracy is a political
objective. In a reforma pactada situation, this objective can
only be attained through negotiations.

It may look simple, but it is this aspect that gives cause for
great worry. For too long, we have not been trained to
compromise. All sides, including reformists, often demand
absolute terms -- thus narrowing the room for compromise.

Moreover, the possibility for negotiations is only open if a
kind of trust exists among the contesting sides.

Regrettably, what is flourishing now is chronic mistrust, a
mistrust against anybody, including among the reformists
themselves.

Recognizing reform priorities or creating a simple and
realistic agenda is also a necessary precondition to attaining a
consolidated democracy.

In this case, the reformists "outside the system", as well as
the sympathizers of reform ideas "inside the system", must be
able to see clearly that the most important priority in this
transitional period is the creation of a clean and fair general
election which could result in a legitimate legislature.

Only a legislature with a recognized public mandate can
endeavor to create the institutionalization needed to form a
democracy. In other words, a clean election is the bridge to the
next phase of reform.

Like the aspect of negotiation, the choice of priorities looks
simple and insignificant. But if we read the newspapers and
follow television news and analyses, we see that a sense of
priority is not clear.

Before May 21, the priorities of the reformists were clear:
take out Soeharto. Now, is there anybody who can give a simple
explanation as to what is the most important thing to do?

We read, hear and see too many things to be fought for or to
be done simultaneously. We are inundated by various reform
agendas. This is understandable, but the consequence is that the
reform process loses its focus.

By choosing a clean election as the main priority in the
reform agenda, we may be able to forget for the moment a number
of things that may be interesting but not urgent if seen from a
wider perspective.

It is we who must choose. Indeed, we should not forget that
politics is basically an art to determine a course given a
limited number of choices.

Rizal Malaranggeng is a PhD candidate in political science at
Ohio State University in the United States.