Political parties reluctant to make leadership changes

The following are excerpts of the interview with sociologist Daniel Sparingga with The Jakarta Post's A. Asip Hasani on the issue of political party leadership.

Question: Those calling for public officials, most notably, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, to resign from their party leadership posts, fear abuse of power given the strong position in the executive. Your comment?

Answer: My response to this issue is ambivalent. I've observed that it is difficult, on one hand, to promote the autonomy of civil society vis-a-vis the state, while on the other hand, the political reality in this country makes it hard to resolve the problem. But the present period of transition doesn't seem to provide the luxury of enabling both areas -- the state and civil society -- to be strictly segregated.

The New Order has caused the emergence of a leadership crisis, rendering such a dual function almost unavoidable. Political parties themselves, due to our weak civil society, still rely on their central figures to boost their authority. Political parties, therefore, find it difficult to give up their leaders when they have to join... the state, particularly the executive branch of the government. The case of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and the United Development Party (PPP) are the best example, because their leaders have become president and vice president while the two political parties continue to strive for greater authority and influence. Moreover, the general elections of 2004 are approaching.

So the charisma of political party leaders remains very significant to the relevant parties...

Not necessarily; charisma may apply in the case of Megawati and her party but it's not so relevant in the case of Hamzah Haz and PPP. Both leaders, however, are consolidating factors within their parties as well as their mass base. Replacing their leaders while the parties are expanding their influence will obviously disturb their stability, while elections are only two-and-a-half years away.

Q: Are you not worried about the possibility of power abuse stemming from political party leaders maintaining top positions in the executive?

A: In a more democratic system using the district system (in elections) the problem can be eliminated and it may not even be relevant to raise as an important political theme. In a democratic political system, the role of political parties is merely instrumental and very superficial, meaning that their votes are not everything. But we can understand public anxiety because in our present political framework a party leader and also chair of its central board, has a major right to votes.

While the country's political system has started the process of decentralization and power distribution, some political parties remain unchanged and even still replicate the New Order political system of centralization.

This is a peculiar phenomenon in a political system based on democracy, as a party chairman is actually no more important than a manager. Even in countries with a presidential or parliamentary system, a party president is just a head of office or administration in charge of conference or congress arrangements.

Q: You referred to the leadership crisis under the New Order. Can you elaborate?

A: The New Order created a particular political system, in which the entire force of civil society was integrated into the state by means of cooptation or intervention. Its direct consequence was that despite the presence of political parties other than Golkar, the parties which came forth were able to do so with the consent of the state. Anybody about to emerge as a political party leader, national or local, had to secure such consent. As a result, the party heads relied on the power of the state more than on their own constituents in a bottom-up fashion.

So when the multiparty system was applied following the demise of the New Order, the leadership crisis became a really crucial issue. Today's political parties are in dire need of turning out leaders who can consolidate both their parties and the masses. That's why these parties are reluctant to give up their leaders so easily. Separating them from their chiefs will be a great loss to the parties themselves.

But this situation should be understood as transitional in nature. When party leaders later only serve as office managers, the separation will automatically be easier without causing internal upheaval.

Q: The Golkar party seems better prepared. If Akbar Tandjung had to abandon his chairmanship of the party, his successor might be able to replace him without any significant upset. Do you agree?

A: Golkar's internal system is indeed the most well-organized in comparison with other political parties. This has been the case since the New Order's inception. Its structure is more inclusive and its organizational experience is more evenly spread among its leaders. In spite of problems with the grassroots and members, as managers Golkar leaders have a lot of resources and no prominent differences among each other.

Therefore, Golkar is indeed more ready for decentralization, because the quality of the leadership below Akbar is of a similar caliber and the number is fairly large. Golkar has a longer experience and tradition, while political parties like PPP, though long established, have never been organized as a modern party.

Q: Fears of power abuse refer to interparty competition for economic resources within the government and also abuse of public facilities for the interests of the parties involved. What's your opinion?

A: Though it's not easy to claim that both are directly connected, we can theorize that before any majority exists in the legislature, money politics would be a significant part of the country's political arena, as money helps settle unsolved factors due to the absence of a single majority. Vote transactions among factions will be very important. I think all parties realize this and it increases their need to accumulate resources not only for financing costly election campaigns but also for buying votes in legislative bargaining. And I don't see any prospect of achieving a single majority in the next 15 years.

Q: So would it more difficult to have autonomous political parties as one force of civil society while they are still very centralistic with leaders wielding broad powers?

A: That's right. This is the price parties have to pay and though undoubtedly figures like Megawati and Hamzah Haz will rhetorically state that national interests should take priority over party concerns, there will always be a conflict of interests. Similarly, their attention will be divided and the opposing interests will likely be hard to reconcile.

Q: So there's little we can do to promote a clean government while we have party leaders also acting as the country's executive leaders?

A: It will be disastrous if other political structures with control functions fail to develop. This involves civil society as well as public institutions like the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), ministries' inspectorates general, the legislature and other agencies set up for power supervision.

Development of power control bodies both within the state and in civil society becomes extremely important today, such as the Indonesian Corruption Watch, Parliament Watch, Government Watch and other nonpartisan organizations.

Q: What would happen to political parties, such as PDI Perjuangan, PPP, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the others, if their chairmen and top executives who also hold government posts were told to resign from their parties?

A: In a short period there would be jolts within the parties. The worst consequence would that they could be thrown into disarray and profound splits would occur as many would compete for vacant positions. It is widely assumed -- and is indeed true -- that central executive posts in parties, let alone chairmen, have great authority and access to government power.

Q: What do you recommend facing this dilemma?

A: If the district system cannot be introduced yet in the next general elections (2004), the parties themselves should carry out power decentralization. Actually the spirit of decentralization is already in their party statutes and internal rules, but their central boards still retain extensive authority in, for instance, making out the lists of legislative candidates for the elections' proportional system.

The central boards should receive the nominees from regions instead of sponsoring candidates, let alone determining their order. If a lot more central authority is distributed to regional boards at various levels, the ambition to struggle for central board seats will be reduced.