Political parties reluctant to make leadership changes

Political parties reluctant to make leadership changes

The following are excerpts of the interview with sociologist
Daniel Sparingga with The Jakarta Post's A. Asip Hasani on the
issue of political party leadership.

Question: Those calling for public officials, most notably,
President Megawati Soekarnoputri, to resign from their party
leadership posts, fear abuse of power given the strong position
in the executive. Your comment?

Answer: My response to this issue is ambivalent. I've observed
that it is difficult, on one hand, to promote the autonomy of
civil society vis-a-vis the state, while on the other hand, the
political reality in this country makes it hard to resolve the
problem. But the present period of transition doesn't seem to
provide the luxury of enabling both areas -- the state and civil
society -- to be strictly segregated.

The New Order has caused the emergence of a leadership crisis,
rendering such a dual function almost unavoidable. Political
parties themselves, due to our weak civil society, still rely on
their central figures to boost their authority. Political
parties, therefore, find it difficult to give up their leaders
when they have to join... the state, particularly the executive
branch of the government. The case of the Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and the United Development
Party (PPP) are the best example, because their leaders have
become president and vice president while the two political
parties continue to strive for greater authority and influence.
Moreover, the general elections of 2004 are approaching.

So the charisma of political party leaders remains very
significant to the relevant parties...

Not necessarily; charisma may apply in the case of Megawati
and her party but it's not so relevant in the case of Hamzah Haz
and PPP. Both leaders, however, are consolidating factors within
their parties as well as their mass base. Replacing their leaders
while the parties are expanding their influence will obviously
disturb their stability, while elections are only two-and-a-half
years away.

Q: Are you not worried about the possibility of power abuse stemming
from political party leaders maintaining top positions in the
executive?

A: In a more democratic system using the district system (in
elections) the problem can be eliminated and it may not even be
relevant to raise as an important political theme. In a
democratic political system, the role of political parties is
merely instrumental and very superficial, meaning that their
votes are not everything. But we can understand public anxiety
because in our present political framework a party leader and
also chair of its central board, has a major right to votes.

While the country's political system has started the process
of decentralization and power distribution, some political
parties remain unchanged and even still replicate the New Order
political system of centralization.

This is a peculiar phenomenon in a political system based on
democracy, as a party chairman is actually no more important than
a manager. Even in countries with a presidential or parliamentary
system, a party president is just a head of office or
administration in charge of conference or congress arrangements.

Q: You referred to the leadership crisis under the New Order. Can
you elaborate?

A: The New Order created a particular political system, in which
the entire force of civil society was integrated into the state
by means of cooptation or intervention. Its direct consequence
was that despite the presence of political parties other than
Golkar, the parties which came forth were able to do so with the
consent of the state. Anybody about to emerge as a political
party leader, national or local, had to secure such consent. As a
result, the party heads relied on the power of the state more
than on their own constituents in a bottom-up fashion.

So when the multiparty system was applied following the demise
of the New Order, the leadership crisis became a really crucial
issue. Today's political parties are in dire need of turning out
leaders who can consolidate both their parties and the masses.
That's why these parties are reluctant to give up their leaders
so easily. Separating them from their chiefs will be a great loss
to the parties themselves.

But this situation should be understood as transitional in
nature. When party leaders later only serve as office managers,
the separation will automatically be easier without causing
internal upheaval.

Q: The Golkar party seems better prepared. If Akbar Tandjung had to
abandon his chairmanship of the party, his successor might be
able to replace him without any significant upset. Do you agree?

A: Golkar's internal system is indeed the most well-organized in
comparison with other political parties. This has been the case
since the New Order's inception. Its structure is more inclusive
and its organizational experience is more evenly spread among its
leaders. In spite of problems with the grassroots and members, as
managers Golkar leaders have a lot of resources and no prominent
differences among each other.

Therefore, Golkar is indeed more ready for decentralization,
because the quality of the leadership below Akbar is of a similar
caliber and the number is fairly large. Golkar has a longer
experience and tradition, while political parties like PPP,
though long established, have never been organized as a modern
party.

Q: Fears of power abuse refer to interparty competition for economic
resources within the government and also abuse of public
facilities for the interests of the parties involved. What's your
opinion?

A: Though it's not easy to claim that both are directly
connected, we can theorize that before any majority exists in the
legislature, money politics would be a significant part of the
country's political arena, as money helps settle unsolved factors
due to the absence of a single majority. Vote transactions among
factions will be very important. I think all parties realize this
and it increases their need to accumulate resources not only for
financing costly election campaigns but also for buying votes in
legislative bargaining. And I don't see any prospect of achieving
a single majority in the next 15 years.

Q: So would it more difficult to have autonomous political parties
as one force of civil society while they are still very
centralistic with leaders wielding broad powers?

A: That's right. This is the price parties have to pay and though
undoubtedly figures like Megawati and Hamzah Haz will
rhetorically state that national interests should take priority
over party concerns, there will always be a conflict of
interests. Similarly, their attention will be divided and the
opposing interests will likely be hard to reconcile.

Q: So there's little we can do to promote a clean government while
we have party leaders also acting as the country's executive
leaders?

A: It will be disastrous if other political structures with
control functions fail to develop. This involves civil society as
well as public institutions like the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK),
ministries' inspectorates general, the legislature and other
agencies set up for power supervision.

Development of power control bodies both within the state and
in civil society becomes extremely important today, such as the
Indonesian Corruption Watch, Parliament Watch, Government Watch
and other nonpartisan organizations.

Q: What would happen to political parties, such as PDI Perjuangan,
PPP, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Crescent Star Party
(PBB) and the others, if their chairmen and top executives who
also hold government posts were told to resign from their
parties?

A: In a short period there would be jolts within the parties. The
worst consequence would that they could be thrown into disarray
and profound splits would occur as many would compete for vacant
positions. It is widely assumed -- and is indeed true -- that
central executive posts in parties, let alone chairmen, have
great authority and access to government power.

Q: What do you recommend facing this dilemma?

A: If the district system cannot be introduced yet in the next
general elections (2004), the parties themselves should carry out
power decentralization. Actually the spirit of decentralization
is already in their party statutes and internal rules, but their
central boards still retain extensive authority in, for instance,
making out the lists of legislative candidates for the elections'
proportional system.

The central boards should receive the nominees from regions
instead of sponsoring candidates, let alone determining their
order. If a lot more central authority is distributed to regional
boards at various levels, the ambition to struggle for central
board seats will be reduced.