Political groups resist government intervention
JAKARTA (JP): When Harmoko said recently that "Golkar and ABRI (the Armed Forces)" would unite to fight any attempt to destroy national unity, he wasn't just delivering one of his usual high- spirited speeches.
By mentioning Golkar in the same breath as ABRI, the chairman of the ruling political grouping hinted at the close relationship the party has with the military.
He also, inadvertently, allowed a glimpse of the domestic political landscape in the past year: a picture of an arena which has revolved around Golkar, its dependence on the bureaucracy and the military, and its campaign to retain its dominant position over the two other political organizations.
Early January, only months after he was elected chairman, Harmoko announced his intention to retain Golkar's "single majority" status. Shortly afterward, he toured the country extensively to launch a pervasive campaign, which smacked of electioneering.
He rejected accusations that his meeting thousands of supporters looked a lot like a campaign for the 1997 election. "Golkar will retain its status because the people want it that way," he asserted.
A clue about how Golkar maintains its dominant position came from former vice president Sudharmono. He said early this year that "a Golkar victory in the next general election should not depend on the condition of other political contestants... its achievements would depend on its popularity within the next four years (until 1997 election)."
"Other's weaknesses are our strength," he explained. This explains Harmoko's extensive trips as leader of Golkar, instead of as Minister of Information.
This intention, along with what some political observers call a system which greatly favors Golkar, shaped Indonesian political development in the past year.
The government's desire to maintain the status quo is the reason behind the growing public impression that the government has been tightening its grip over political and mass organizations.
The result was that the minority parties had to spend the better part of this year fighting government intervention in their internal problems. The government of course backed Golkar's single majority campaign.
Indonesian Democratic Party chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri protested this imbalance earlier in the year. She said the concept of "single majority" was not in line with the 1945 Constitution or the Guidelines of State Policy decreed by the People's Consultative Assembly last year.
The fact that the minority parties are plagued with internal squabbles only makes the situation worse. The bickering contributes to their inability to stand up to Golkar.
Indonesia has three sanctioned political organizations, the government-backed Golkar, the Moslem oriented United Development Party (PPP) and the nationalist-Christian alliance Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).
Golkar likes to be called a "functional grouping" although it functions like a political party. It has won an absolute majority in all the general elections since 1971.
Several major political agenda items showcased the government's and Golkar's resolution to maintain the status quo. These included the PPP's and the Moslem organization Nahdlatul Ulama's (NU) congresses, as well as problems that kept PDI too occupied to consolidate.
Megawati, the eldest daughter of late president Sukarno, was elected as chairperson of PDI late last year. It was the third congress in Jakarta that saw an absence of government intervention. This was in contrast to two earlier congresses that were marked by strong attempts by the government to influence the choice of leader.
However, the party was rocked by growing internal rifts for several months after the election. They came to a head with recent demands that Megawati resign.
Ardent critic of Megawati, and self-styled chapter leader Latif Pudjosakti was one of the major problems. He was installed by Megawati's opponents as chairman of PDI's East Java chapter in an unauthorized ceremony in November. She had appointed Sutjipto.
The crisis heightened when local authorities threw their support behind Latif and refused to recognize Sutjipto. When the crisis got out of hand, however, the government backtracked and said it supported neither Sutjipto nor Latif.
It was the government's ambiguous treatment that, as some observers charged, drew the conflict out. Speculation that the discord was actually kept alive to keep PDI from eclipsing Golkar certainly didn't help the situation.
When protests against her became too strong this month, Megawati recovered in the nick of time. She convened a limited national meeting in mid-December. The result was a declaration of support for her leadership.
Signs of government intervention appeared once again prior to and during the PPP congress in August. Already present internal conflicts aggravated the situation. Bickering and power struggles occurred among the leading members of the two dominant factions, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muslim Indonesia (MI), of the party.
Incumbent Ismail Hasan Metareum, who reportedly enjoyed government backing and had close ties with the military, fought tooth and nail against NU ulemas who tried to grab the chairmanship from him.
Despite the government's promise to stay out of the PPP election, congress participants, especially from the NU faction, felt that their effort to get Matori Abdul Djalil elected was blocked by external forces.
Quarrels continued even after the congress re-elected Ismail Hasan. This was seen by political observers as proof that the PPP is also being kept in check. The government does not want it to grow strong enough to threaten the establishment, but doesn't want it so weak that it upsets the present order of things.
The final major item in the 1994 political agenda was the NU leadership congress this month. This, too, was not entirely free from government intervention.
Months prior to the congress, incumbent chairman of its executive board (Tanfidzyah) Abdurrahman Wahid promised he wouldn't seek another term.
Abdurrahman, who is a staunch critic of the government, later decided to enter the race to protect the largest Moslem organization from being turned into potential power base by politicking NU leaders.
The five-day congress was a lesson in political maneuvering, and the members' resistance to external pressures and meddling.
In spite of speculation that the government was not pleased with him, as well as reports about government officials pressuring participants not to elect him, Abdurrahman refused to back down from his chairmanship bid.
He battled intimidation and slander before beating his competitor, businessman Abu Hasan, by a slim margin in tense and chaotic elections. Hasan was reportedly backed by the government.
Former home affairs minister Rudini described the extent of the power struggle between the government and the political and mass organizations when he recently said that "the government's meddling in political organizations is even more transparent today."
He noted that the current political system, which greatly favors Golkar over PDI and PPP, is not likely to bring about independent parties.
"We know that the government, which has become the political superstructure, is now much stronger than the parties that make up the political infrastructure," he said.
Interestingly, the Armed Forces kept its distance during all these power plays. Apart from some comments by top brass about the PPP and NU congresses, the Armed Forces looked like they were taking a back seat.
It is not clear, however, if this was done because ABRI wants to gradually lessen its role in government, as some have demanded, or for other reasons. How ABRI will deal with the growing demand that it also gradually lessen the support it lends to Golkar still remains to be seen. (swe)
Window: The government's desire to maintain the status quo is the reason behind the growing public impression that the government has been tightening its grip over political and mass organizations.