Political engagement or new containment policy

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): When President Bill Clinton was visiting Australia last week, his Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, was in China.

Clinton extended his trip to Manila to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting before visiting Bangkok. Clinton and Christopher's trips are, of course, interrelated.

Clinton's visit to the region constitutes his efforts to strengthen U.S. military ties with the three countries, in addition to Japan and South Korea. The U.S. security networks in East Asia mainly support U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Clinton also wishes to pave the way for economic liberalization in this region, to sow the seeds of democracy and human rights, especially in Indonesia and Myanmar.

Christopher's visit to Beijing was meant to prepare the fourth summit meeting between Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Xemin, which confirmed U.S. political "engagement" with China. In Clinton's opinion, it would be best to engage China economically -- such as providing it with Most Favored Nation status -- and engage it in dialogue about bilateral and multilateral securities through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Security Dialog Forum of Northeast Asia. These strategies are preferred over an isolation and containment policy.

By doing this, the U.S. hopes to influence China's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, and to reduce China's exports of nuclear weaponry to countries hostile to the U.S.

The U.S. engagement policy is parallel to those of East Asia toward China, which view it as a country of opportunity rather than a threat to the region in the 21st century.

Nevertheless, the possibility of a threat from China that could destabilize the region still lurks, especially in the China-Taiwan relationship, China's influence on North Korea and Myanmar, and the overlapping claims of the South China Sea islands of Spratley and Paracel.

It is in this context that Australia, in particular, still sees China as a potential threat to the security of the Asia- Pacific region and that of Australia itself. The issue of a threat has taken root for a long time, since the entry of cheap Chinese labor to Australia in the middle of the 19th century. These laborers toiled in the gold mines of Australia. The feeling of fear grew in the wake of the victory of the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Zedong in October 1949.

Since 1973, Canberra tried to soften its perception of the "yellow peril" by opening diplomatic relations with Beijing, and later boosted its economic ties with the communist country.

However, after the Cold War, which left China as the only communist stronghold in the Asia-Pacific region, old fears returned. This was also supported by the strength of the People's Liberation Army, the air force and the navy in particular, which can transform itself into a Blue Ocean fleet, capable of extending its forces beyond the borders of the South China Sea.

It is not surprising that Australia is trying to strengthen its military alliance with the U.S.. John Howard's government also developed a security network in the Asia-Pacific region, which saw, among other things, the signing of an Agreement on Maintaining Security between Australia and Indonesia on Dec. 18, 1995.

China appears to be in an early state of discrepancy, as it is asserting its military capabilities and economic growth. Its leaders believe that it is the only regional power in East Asia. The sheer size of its population, natural resources, geographical area and location fire its ambition to become a global power. To achieve this status, China is maintaining an independent foreign policy, especially in relations with the U.S. and Russia. It is also developing its military know-how, trying to insert its active roles in the ARF and APEC, and striving to become a member of the World Trade Organization in 1997. In the beginning of the Clinton administration, the U.S. was opposed to China's entry into the organization.

To China, a military build-up is not the same as upsetting the harmonic relationship of the Asia-Pacific powers. In its opinion, a military build-up is the result of an improved economy, which enables it to purchase arms to replace its outdated armor. It is in line with China's changing strategy, from a mere "Peoples War" to "modern warfare" and finally, to "immaterial squabbles".

The People's Liberation Army should also be kept small, effective, efficient and modern. These characteristics did alter its former function as coast guard into a force reaching beyond the South China Sea.

For the sake of the military build-up, China has made military purchases from Russia such as the Su-27 Flanker plane, MiG-31, Ilyushin Il-76, MiG-29, Su-35 Super flanker, Kamov-27 Helicopter, Kilo class submarines, and so on. China has also invited experts from Russia and signed an accord for the joint production of +Russian fighter planes. It also attempted to trade the province of Guizhou for the location of a MiG-31 assembly plant, but Russia was more interested in keeping the collective plane assembly line within its own territory, in order to support its economy and reduce unemployment.

However, the Chinese military build-up is perceived in several East Asian capitals as a future threat. If China was able to make military purchases in considerable numbers, what will happen if Hong Kong becomes part of it in 1997 and the country becomes one of the economic giants by the year 2020? It is not surprising that countries in the Asia-Pacific region are doing their utmost to keep the U.S. military presence in the vicinity, since they fear a rise of local dominant powers (Japan, China or India) which, as history has proven, could threatened regional stability.

Clinton's "total diplomacy" in the Asia-Pacific area is part of a vision he wishes to bestow upon America's future generations. The vision contains a powerful America, economically and militarily, and the champ of democracy and human rights at the end of this century and in the future.

As for China, the U.S. has settled for "political engagement" rather than a new containment policy. As a result, the U.S. rejected Australia's invitation to form an allied force, in place of a marine force north of Queensland.

The U.S. would rather place a force in Okinawa and on the South-North Korean borders than in Queensland, which is remotely located from East Asian flashpoints. American and Australian military cooperation appears in the setting up of communication stations on the Northwest Coast, Pine Gap and Nurrungar, and the launching of joint military exercises.

To Prime Minister Howard, Clinton's visit carries a significant political overture, confirming that the U.S. is a more important ally than Indonesia.

The writer is a research staff member at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.