Political engagement or new containment policy

Political engagement or new containment policy

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): When President Bill Clinton was visiting
Australia last week, his Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,
was in China.

Clinton extended his trip to Manila to attend the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting before visiting
Bangkok. Clinton and Christopher's trips are, of course,
interrelated.

Clinton's visit to the region constitutes his efforts to
strengthen U.S. military ties with the three countries, in
addition to Japan and South Korea. The U.S. security networks in
East Asia mainly support U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
Clinton also wishes to pave the way for economic liberalization
in this region, to sow the seeds of democracy and human rights,
especially in Indonesia and Myanmar.

Christopher's visit to Beijing was meant to prepare the fourth
summit meeting between Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Xemin,
which confirmed U.S. political "engagement" with China. In
Clinton's opinion, it would be best to engage China economically
-- such as providing it with Most Favored Nation status -- and
engage it in dialogue about bilateral and multilateral securities
through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Security Dialog
Forum of Northeast Asia. These strategies are preferred over an
isolation and containment policy.

By doing this, the U.S. hopes to influence China's foreign
policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, and to reduce China's
exports of nuclear weaponry to countries hostile to the U.S.

The U.S. engagement policy is parallel to those of East Asia
toward China, which view it as a country of opportunity rather
than a threat to the region in the 21st century.

Nevertheless, the possibility of a threat from China that
could destabilize the region still lurks, especially in the
China-Taiwan relationship, China's influence on North Korea and
Myanmar, and the overlapping claims of the South China Sea
islands of Spratley and Paracel.

It is in this context that Australia, in particular, still
sees China as a potential threat to the security of the Asia-
Pacific region and that of Australia itself. The issue of a
threat has taken root for a long time, since the entry of cheap
Chinese labor to Australia in the middle of the 19th century.
These laborers toiled in the gold mines of Australia. The feeling
of fear grew in the wake of the victory of the Chinese Communist
Party under the leadership of Mao Zedong in October 1949.

Since 1973, Canberra tried to soften its perception of the
"yellow peril" by opening diplomatic relations with Beijing, and
later boosted its economic ties with the communist country.

However, after the Cold War, which left China as the only
communist stronghold in the Asia-Pacific region, old fears
returned. This was also supported by the strength of the People's
Liberation Army, the air force and the navy in particular, which
can transform itself into a Blue Ocean fleet, capable of
extending its forces beyond the borders of the South China Sea.

It is not surprising that Australia is trying to strengthen
its military alliance with the U.S.. John Howard's government
also developed a security network in the Asia-Pacific region,
which saw, among other things, the signing of an Agreement on
Maintaining Security between Australia and Indonesia on Dec. 18,
1995.

China appears to be in an early state of discrepancy, as it is
asserting its military capabilities and economic growth. Its
leaders believe that it is the only regional power in East Asia.
The sheer size of its population, natural resources, geographical
area and location fire its ambition to become a global power. To
achieve this status, China is maintaining an independent foreign
policy, especially in relations with the U.S. and Russia. It is
also developing its military know-how, trying to insert its
active roles in the ARF and APEC, and striving to become a member
of the World Trade Organization in 1997. In the beginning of the
Clinton administration, the U.S. was opposed to China's entry
into the organization.

To China, a military build-up is not the same as upsetting the
harmonic relationship of the Asia-Pacific powers. In its opinion,
a military build-up is the result of an improved economy, which
enables it to purchase arms to replace its outdated armor. It is
in line with China's changing strategy, from a mere "Peoples War"
to "modern warfare" and finally, to "immaterial squabbles".

The People's Liberation Army should also be kept small,
effective, efficient and modern. These characteristics did alter
its former function as coast guard into a force reaching beyond
the South China Sea.

For the sake of the military build-up, China has made military
purchases from Russia such as the Su-27 Flanker plane, MiG-31,
Ilyushin Il-76, MiG-29, Su-35 Super flanker, Kamov-27 Helicopter,
Kilo class submarines, and so on. China has also invited experts
from Russia and signed an accord for the joint production of
+Russian fighter planes. It also attempted to trade the province
of Guizhou for the location of a MiG-31 assembly plant, but
Russia was more interested in keeping the collective plane
assembly line within its own territory, in order to support its
economy and reduce unemployment.

However, the Chinese military build-up is perceived in several
East Asian capitals as a future threat. If China was able to make
military purchases in considerable numbers, what will happen if
Hong Kong becomes part of it in 1997 and the country becomes one
of the economic giants by the year 2020? It is not surprising
that countries in the Asia-Pacific region are doing their utmost
to keep the U.S. military presence in the vicinity, since they
fear a rise of local dominant powers (Japan, China or India)
which, as history has proven, could threatened regional
stability.

Clinton's "total diplomacy" in the Asia-Pacific area is part
of a vision he wishes to bestow upon America's future
generations. The vision contains a powerful America, economically
and militarily, and the champ of democracy and human rights at
the end of this century and in the future.

As for China, the U.S. has settled for "political engagement"
rather than a new containment policy. As a result, the U.S.
rejected Australia's invitation to form an allied force, in place
of a marine force north of Queensland.

The U.S. would rather place a force in Okinawa and on the
South-North Korean borders than in Queensland, which is remotely
located from East Asian flashpoints. American and Australian
military cooperation appears in the setting up of communication
stations on the Northwest Coast, Pine Gap and Nurrungar, and the
launching of joint military exercises.

To Prime Minister Howard, Clinton's visit carries a
significant political overture, confirming that the U.S. is a
more important ally than Indonesia.

The writer is a research staff member at the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences.