Political courage needed to fight terrorism

Political courage needed to fight terrorism

Ridarson Galingging, Jakarta

The Indonesian government has welcomed the Australian
initiative to assist Indonesia in amending its Antiterror Law.

Why did the government feel an urgent need to welcome our
neighbor's help in reforming the country's antiterror
legislation?

The Oct. 1 bombing in Bali showed that the weakest point in
the fight against terrorism in Indonesia is the capability of the
police force and the intelligence bodies to anticipate and detect
the next terror attacks. We have done a great job when
prosecuting and punishing the terror suspects.

The planned Antiterror Law amendments seem to be focused on
giving the police more power to detain terror suspects much
longer that current law allows. Public statements from the
Ministry of Defense suggest clearly that the TNI intends to be
involved in the fight against terrorism.

If the weakest part of the fight is the ability to prevent
future terror attacks, how can this situation be fixed by
amending the existing antiterror law? What factors make
prevention our weakest point?

Assume that this extra power will be given to the police and
the intelligence bodies, can they really prevent another terror
attack in the future? Who actually will be the targets of this
extra power?

From the trials of the perpetrators of bombings in Jakarta and
Bali, it is very clear that the attackers are radical Muslims.
Former president Abdurrahman Wahid has said there are other
possible perpetrators such as the nation's police or military
officers. But thus far, we have no concrete evidence of this.

If future terror attacks are to be prevented, the police are
faced with no other choice but to make a lot of arrests and
detain radical Muslims, ban radical Islamic organizations, cut of
the sources of their financing, and cut their links to the
international networks.

Are the police willing to take these actions? And what of the
political repercussions for the incumbent administration?

We know that the terrorists that operate in Indonesia are
hiding behind the banner of Islam. They often claim that any
government effort to discredit them will discredit Islam. This
circumstance has made it difficult for the government to
aggressively arrest, detain the radicals and ban their
organizations for fear of being labeled as anti-Islamic.

The government's reluctance to ban the Jamaah Islamiyah group,
linked to all the major bomb attack in Indonesia, is a good
example of this dilemma.

Vice President Yusuf Kalla's recent statement that Indonesia
cannot ban Jamaah Islamiyah for it has never been recognized
under the law in Indonesia, despite the fact that this
organization has been on the UN list as a terrorist organization,
is evidence of this reluctance.

The real problems in the effort to prevent another future
terror attack seem to be more political than legal. Thus the
solution must be political, backed up by tough laws and strong
law enforcement agencies.

The government must convince the public that harsh legal
actions against the militants are not aimed at discrediting
Islam. The public must be made aware that the militants are not
struggling to enforce Islamic teachings by conducting terror and
violent acts, but instead damaging the image of Islam and the
Islamic community as a whole.

The public must also understand that addressing the terror
problem is in Indonesia's domestic interests and has nothing to
do with what the Americans or other Western powers want. The
Americans might agree with stronger efforts against terrorists.
But this is not an important reason for Indonesians to act.

Indonesians must act for Indonesia, and terrorist bombings
damage the Indonesian people and damage the interests of the
nation.

Giving excessive powers to the police and intelligence bodies
will not help much to prevent future terror attacks. The radicals
must be attacked politically by weakening their violent ideology
and legitimacy among moderate Islamic community.

More power to the National Police and the intelligence bodies
can be misused, who can use it to violate human rights and target
certain individuals disliked by the authorities.

Indonesia doesn't need an Internal Security Act (ISA) modeled
on those that we see in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. These
repressive acts allow for the detention without trial of anyone
considered by the authorities to be potential threat to national
security and public order. We know that within the current legal
environment prevailing in Indonesia, this kind of law has the
potential to be abused and it could block important legal reform
efforts.

Involving the military in the fight against terror is
acceptable only as long the main approach is law enforcement. The
military should be involved only when the law enforcement need
them. Clear guidelines on coordination mechanisms between the TNI
and the police to strengthen the fight against terrorism are
needed.

However, the main authority and responsibility to deal with
domestic security affairs must lie with the police. Such
authority is guaranteed by Article 30 of the Constitution and Law
No. 2/2002 on the National Police.

A special body with a strong mandate is urgently needed to
fight terrorism. This body must have political power to make
decisions to design a comprehensive plan to prevent and prosecute
terrorists. Such a body should be directly responsible to the
President.

Amendments to the law on terror should be focused on creating
this antiterror body with all its supporting infrastructure, not
to provide police and intelligence bodies more powers to arrest
and detain suspects indefinitely.

A special body that fully dedicates its entire time and
resources to fight terrorism will certainly have much more
success in preventing future terror attacks. The outside world
would not leave Indonesia to work alone and this empowered
antiterror body could be well-prepared to operate under what is
an existing difficult political environment.

Topping its agenda, the new body must conduct a widespread
campaign against the violent ideologies and perceived legitimacy
of the radical groups by involving the moderate Islamic
community, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Islamic boarding
schools, the biggest Islamic organizations, such Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU) and Muhammadiyah, as well as NGOs.

The writer (r-galingging2004@law.northwestern.edu) is a
lecturer in law at Yarsi University in Jakarta and a doctoral
candidate at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago.