Political courage needed to fight terrorism

Ridarson Galingging, Jakarta

The Indonesian government has welcomed the Australian initiative to assist Indonesia in amending its Antiterror Law.

Why did the government feel an urgent need to welcome our neighbor's help in reforming the country's antiterror legislation?

The Oct. 1 bombing in Bali showed that the weakest point in the fight against terrorism in Indonesia is the capability of the police force and the intelligence bodies to anticipate and detect the next terror attacks. We have done a great job when prosecuting and punishing the terror suspects.

The planned Antiterror Law amendments seem to be focused on giving the police more power to detain terror suspects much longer that current law allows. Public statements from the Ministry of Defense suggest clearly that the TNI intends to be involved in the fight against terrorism.

If the weakest part of the fight is the ability to prevent future terror attacks, how can this situation be fixed by amending the existing antiterror law? What factors make prevention our weakest point?

Assume that this extra power will be given to the police and the intelligence bodies, can they really prevent another terror attack in the future? Who actually will be the targets of this extra power?

From the trials of the perpetrators of bombings in Jakarta and Bali, it is very clear that the attackers are radical Muslims. Former president Abdurrahman Wahid has said there are other possible perpetrators such as the nation's police or military officers. But thus far, we have no concrete evidence of this.

If future terror attacks are to be prevented, the police are faced with no other choice but to make a lot of arrests and detain radical Muslims, ban radical Islamic organizations, cut of the sources of their financing, and cut their links to the international networks.

Are the police willing to take these actions? And what of the political repercussions for the incumbent administration?

We know that the terrorists that operate in Indonesia are hiding behind the banner of Islam. They often claim that any government effort to discredit them will discredit Islam. This circumstance has made it difficult for the government to aggressively arrest, detain the radicals and ban their organizations for fear of being labeled as anti-Islamic.

The government's reluctance to ban the Jamaah Islamiyah group, linked to all the major bomb attack in Indonesia, is a good example of this dilemma.

Vice President Yusuf Kalla's recent statement that Indonesia cannot ban Jamaah Islamiyah for it has never been recognized under the law in Indonesia, despite the fact that this organization has been on the UN list as a terrorist organization, is evidence of this reluctance.

The real problems in the effort to prevent another future terror attack seem to be more political than legal. Thus the solution must be political, backed up by tough laws and strong law enforcement agencies.

The government must convince the public that harsh legal actions against the militants are not aimed at discrediting Islam. The public must be made aware that the militants are not struggling to enforce Islamic teachings by conducting terror and violent acts, but instead damaging the image of Islam and the Islamic community as a whole.

The public must also understand that addressing the terror problem is in Indonesia's domestic interests and has nothing to do with what the Americans or other Western powers want. The Americans might agree with stronger efforts against terrorists. But this is not an important reason for Indonesians to act.

Indonesians must act for Indonesia, and terrorist bombings damage the Indonesian people and damage the interests of the nation.

Giving excessive powers to the police and intelligence bodies will not help much to prevent future terror attacks. The radicals must be attacked politically by weakening their violent ideology and legitimacy among moderate Islamic community.

More power to the National Police and the intelligence bodies can be misused, who can use it to violate human rights and target certain individuals disliked by the authorities.

Indonesia doesn't need an Internal Security Act (ISA) modeled on those that we see in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. These repressive acts allow for the detention without trial of anyone considered by the authorities to be potential threat to national security and public order. We know that within the current legal environment prevailing in Indonesia, this kind of law has the potential to be abused and it could block important legal reform efforts.

Involving the military in the fight against terror is acceptable only as long the main approach is law enforcement. The military should be involved only when the law enforcement need them. Clear guidelines on coordination mechanisms between the TNI and the police to strengthen the fight against terrorism are needed.

However, the main authority and responsibility to deal with domestic security affairs must lie with the police. Such authority is guaranteed by Article 30 of the Constitution and Law No. 2/2002 on the National Police.

A special body with a strong mandate is urgently needed to fight terrorism. This body must have political power to make decisions to design a comprehensive plan to prevent and prosecute terrorists. Such a body should be directly responsible to the President.

Amendments to the law on terror should be focused on creating this antiterror body with all its supporting infrastructure, not to provide police and intelligence bodies more powers to arrest and detain suspects indefinitely.

A special body that fully dedicates its entire time and resources to fight terrorism will certainly have much more success in preventing future terror attacks. The outside world would not leave Indonesia to work alone and this empowered antiterror body could be well-prepared to operate under what is an existing difficult political environment.

Topping its agenda, the new body must conduct a widespread campaign against the violent ideologies and perceived legitimacy of the radical groups by involving the moderate Islamic community, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Islamic boarding schools, the biggest Islamic organizations, such Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, as well as NGOs.

The writer (r-galingging2004@law.northwestern.edu) is a lecturer in law at Yarsi University in Jakarta and a doctoral candidate at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago.