Wed, 13 Nov 2002

Police need professionalism in dealing with militias

Sri Wahyuni, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The Indonesian Police need to improve professionalism, assure neutrality and build people's trust if they want to deal with paramilitary groups, a scholar said here Tuesday.

Speaking to The Jakarta Post, political and defense observer Pratikno of Gadjah Mada University said the government actually had a legal basis to disband paramilitary groups.

The law on national defense, he said, clearly stipulated that only the state had the right to the use of violence and force, thus its monopoly on the armed forces, including soldiers and police officers.

"But applying the legal instrument needs a guarantee," he said, adding that in this case only the police, who are responsible for maintaining security, can guarantee that the law is enforced.

Pratikno was commenting on a recent call by Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto for all military- style groups, including those affiliated to political parties and religious organizations, to disband.

Pratikno also said that the presence of militia groups was common in most post-colonial societies, including Indonesia. Even the Indonesian Military, he said, originated from local militias, including preman (street gangsters) or centeng (thugs), who fought for Indonesia's independence.

"Later they developed into the official military and members were provided with official military ranks," he said.

In the context of modern Indonesia, according to Pratikno, all the militias should have been incorporated into the Indonesian Military. Efforts had been made to integrate local militia groups with the official military, especially during the 1940s and 1950s. Yet, their presence is still widespread, even up to the present time, with some of them possessing the potential to incite widespread violence and hinder the process of democratization.

Pratikno, however, asserted that the disbandment of militia groups would need more than just words. A fair enforcement of the law on the disbandment of the groups that applies to every paramilitary group in country is all that is needed.

"However, it is also vital that police guarantee that they are capable of performing the tasks that the militia groups have been handling," he said.

Many military-style groups affiliated with political parties or religious organizations were formed to serve their organizations' needs, such as providing security during party gatherings. Pratikno said, however, it would be difficult for the police to take over those tasks, given their limited personnel.

A senior police officer at the National Police Headquarters told the Post that on average throughout the country, an Indonesian policeman was responsible for providing security for some 1,000 people. Ideally, according to UN standards, a policeman should be responsible for between 350 and 400 people.

"We plan to make it a 1:750 ratio by 2004, but I'm not sure we will be able to meet that target given the state's current financial conditions as well as the existing number of police academies," said a police officer, who requested anonymity.

Existing academies, according to the officer, could only produce around 20,000 new graduates a year, comprising officers and low-ranking policemen and women.

Another reason why disbanding paramilitary groups would be difficult is the fact that their presence is considered advantageous to their political or organizational groups, especially for mass mobilization purposes.

"Not to mention that such groups also have effectively become political apprenticeships for militia commanders. By being a leading preman, you can become an elite politician or legislator. There are many examples of that. You name it," said Pratikno.

Under the circumstances, according to Pratikno, another thing that the government could do would be to clearly ban the use of violence and to uphold all laws and regulations. This means that once members of a paramilitary group commit violence, necessary legal actions must be taken, including putting them on trial.

Pratikno cited public doubts on the police's ability to take over certain tasks from paramilitary groups as another constraint in efforts to disband the militias.

A lack of public trust in the military and security forces, especially during the New Order, due to their failure to remain neutral, is another big constraint. In the past, people saw the military and police as siding with particular groups in the community.

"This has forced the community to form their own forces to protect their interests regardless of the fact that it is against the law," he said.

Unfortunately, he said, both the authorities and the community accepted the presence of militia groups for their own interests. The police, for example, consider them more as a help rather than a possible source of violence.

"But, both have apparently forgotten that their presence at the same time can also create difficulties to both the authorities and the community," he said.

Citing an example, Pratikno said that most of the riots that occurred ahead of the 1999 general election were incited by clashes between rival party militias or between certain militia groups and the police.

Pratikno therefore, strongly supported efforts to minimize the impact of the presence of militia groups among the community, while acknowledging that to hope for their immediate disbandment was impossible, given the various factors surrounding the issue.

"It's quite a big concern, watching members of a particular satgas (task force), laskar (militia group), or other military- style group stopping cars on the streets as they wish. It's completely wrong and dangerous. It leads to a process of state delegitimization," he said.