Police and autonomy: Security schizophrenia?

Sri Pamoedjo Rahardjo, Former Advisor, National Defense and Security Council, Jakarta

The increasing number of reported conflicts between the National Police and the Indonesian Military is often attributed to a competition for influence. The police or Polri is being perceived as capitalizing on the declining image of the military (TNI) due to alleged past atrocities.

The separation of Polri from TNI at best seems only physical, because it is not complemented with clear terms of reference relevant to on-going changes in the political system.

In other words, the current political elites seem to overly simplify their views on Polri as being merely the government's apparatus to handle peace and order, whereas in the past, these tasks were discharged by the military as the main initiator.

The political elites have even drafted a law on the National Police without taking into account possible future confusion arising from the untested Law No. 22/99 on regional autonomy.

Confusion regarding security and order emerged as the new scheme on autonomy reflected a bigger role for the regencies. It has indirectly reduced the role of the provincial government to simply a coordinating role. Unless the turf of each player is carefully planned, the new paradigms could very well lead Polri, as the national apparatus, to become an odd agency in exercising its authority.

With almost absolute power devolved to municipal and city governments, the local governments may be encouraged to revive the dormant municipal police force (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja) rather than depend on the ambiguous roles of the national police force. The tendency is increasingly evident in metropolitan Jakarta where the municipal police force and deputized security guards are becoming more visible in securing and protecting municipal assets, property and other public areas falling under the local ordinances.

If this tendency of the delegation of power is not properly checked, the momentum to take over completely will become unstoppable and could result in open conflict. The role of Polri may and will overlap with local municipality police institutions. Autonomy itself will encourage the municipal police to demand a bigger share in overseeing the local government's interest but not necessarily for the entire nation's interest. After all, during the early stages of Indonesia's birth as a nation, Polri had its roots in the municipal police officers.

Polri is struggling for its existence on the political map. The move has trapped officers in a web of intrigues. Polri is increasingly felt to have become populist. Evidence shows that Polri, as an institution, has been partial in handling cases particularly when they implicate the powers that be. At the height of the administration under former president Abdurrahman Wahid, politicians almost successfully manipulated and intervened in Polri's leadership.

The decision to remove law enforcement from defense and security tends to relinquish calculated considerations. The police officers have been socialized for more than three decades to believe that they are part of the political machinery to maintain security and order. Without any exposure to civil roles and functions, police officers now are made to execute law enforcement in the newly acquired roles to maintain peace and order during peacetime.

Polri has thus become overburdened with maintaining law and order ranging from petty thefts to narcotics, kidnappings, counterfeiting and rebellion. Yet many petty cases remain unsolved and have been ignored by the officers.

Despite the repositioning of Polri, with three decades of military doctrine of Saptamarga combined with the police doctrine of Tribrata, the institution has apparently been molded to become an inflexible institution that is difficult to reorganize.

Polri could have been retained as a national security agency, under the Ministry of Defense with special civil tasks. The agency can be reassigned to carry out the government's mandate and impose civil order under the defined national laws. Its officers are authorized to arrest individuals who break the laws. The functions of local crime prevention can gradually be turned over to municipal police forces.

Therefore, there are two feasible roles for Polri in the future. First, Polri can be reassigned as a national body for investigation. The well-trained Polri officers can be positioned to handle nation-wide serious crimes where the municipal police are not authorized or trained to do so.

Under this scheme, the agency can be assigned to support the provincial government in law enforcement, secure and protect the government's public property, protect national interest from possible threats and maintain public order, which requires crossing between regional and provincial boundaries.

The municipal police can be assigned to manage local civil disturbances, protect local properties and protect members of the community from crime within administrative boundaries.

The second role is as armed national guards. Highly trained officers in military and paramilitary functions of the national police are well positioned to become the National Guard.

The paramilitary functions carried out by the mobile brigade or Brimob will be a compatible force to overcome civil disturbances. Retaining the paramilitary functions of Polri under the armed forces can reduce recent altercations over power status in connection with the postponed new draft security bill. A haphazardly implemented reorganization of Polri can create an abrupt change in the officers' career paths. This could result in dissatisfaction and indisciplinary action among the officers.

With these two possible roles of Polri, the government can ensure its power within the national boundaries. When the local governments reactivate the municipal police force, the central government should allow its trained officers to either remain with the national or local police force. Flexibility to choose will reduce tension and anxiety over an already rigid career path.

To understand the effect of autonomy on the national police system, Indonesia should learn from the Philippines. This country has experienced institutional and loyalty changes. Former president Ferdinand Marcos changed the police system by merging local police apparatus, graduates of the Police Academy, with the Philippines Constabulary, mostly graduates of the Philippines Military Academy (PMA).

The by-product of the integration was the Integrated National Police (INP). The constabulary officers were given the choice to join the Armed Forces of the Philippines or remain with the police.

Next president Corazon Aquino removed traces of Marcos and changed INP to become the Philippines National Police (PNP). While the police began to understand their new terms of reference, her successor Fidel Ramos introduced decentralization in the country. The police then became politically inclined and compartmentalized. Evidence of loyalty to the rulers became apparent under former president Joseph Estrada where PNP was headed by the president's own man; who had been implicated in the famous 1995 indictment of a number of senior police officers.

In conclusion, should autonomy continue, the best solution for Polri as an institution is to remain as a national police force to maintain civil order and guarding the government's interests.

Action plans to modify Polri should not be exercised like the turning of one's palm. There should be a commitment from the government and lawmakers to learn from other neighboring countries in having a national police system and in the local autonomy scheme.