PKB and the dangers of patronism

By Donna Woodward

MEDAN (JP): In countries which have or are developing stronger interest in women's issues and more respect for individual rights and dignity in general, concepts like "paternalism" and "paternalistic" are no longer considered neutral descriptions of social hierarchies.

Paternalism is recognized for what it really is. It is a demeaning attitude that leads not to respect for or protection of women, but to repression of the talents and rights of half the world's population.

A related phenomenon is the patronage system. Patronage, the practice by authority figures of favor granting that breeds blind tolerance of abuse of authority, is also discredited now, though in the recent past it might have been considered a valid form of quasi-official benevolence.

There is a third phenomenon that still seems to hold a place of honor in Indonesian mores: patronism. Patronism refers to the practice of appointing someone to serve as an organization's special protector. This custom is still much in evidence in Indonesian organizations.

The election of President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, as chief patron of the National Awakening Party (PKB) is one of many examples we might cite of organizations with one or more patrons in addition to the usual officials. Is patronism an innocent relic of a national tradition? Or is patronism, rather, a toxic remnant of paternalism and feudalism?

The role of a patron is usually given to someone perceived to have influence with and channels to a power structure. While a patron may be chosen for his/her ability to give financial support, the ability to run interference with officials is more significant.

Or the position may be offered to someone an organization feels bound to honor for the sake of favors past or anticipated. This is not to suggest that patrons are without professional qualifications; these, however, are not usually what the patron is expected to contribute.

Relationships and status, not qualifications, guide the selection of patrons. Patronism is just a step removed from cronyism. Before the economic crisis, successful Asian businesses were lauded in the West for their adroitness in capitalizing on personal relationships to further business interests.

After the fall analysts took another look at this way of doing business. Relationships for mutual advantage -- cronyism -- had replaced relationships built on mutual integrity as the basis for business and banking deals, to the detriment of the whole region. Cronyism is more blatantly self-serving than patronism.

But patronism and cronyism are both rooted in the notion that it is acceptable to use one's position to benefit those with whom one has some personal relationship or indebtedness. It is acceptable to intervene personally in public institutions via private channels. These are notions that controvert the democracy-building principles of transparency, accountability and equal opportunity.

In the case of PKB, the party has given the President the right as chief patron to approve the candidates for the party's highest office. On its face this is innocuous enough. The party is a voluntary association. Whatever decisions the party takes affect its own members, not the operations of government.

Nevertheless, there are several dangers latent in patronism. The obvious one is that the patron who also holds a position within government might give (or be perceived as giving) special consideration to his party. An official can avoid this danger by scrupulously refusing to show any preferential official treatment to party members.

Another consequence of patronism within political, social, and religious organizations is more insidious. If the predominant institutional experience that people have is within organizations whose leaders rely on private interventions and circumvention of stated procedures to achieve results, members will expect nothing different from their government institutions.

A private organization has no legal requirement to operate democratically. But one would expect the new political parties to be among Indonesia's innovators in internalizing democratic principles.

Patronism, the reliance on "Mr. Fixits" whose institutional authority and accountability tend to be vague, is an obsolete tool for democratic organizations to be using to achieve their objectives. If this patron-seeking mentality continues to flourish unquestioned, it is hard to see how democracy can take root and grow strong within younger generations of citizens and future political leaders.

While the appointment of patrons might seem like a way of achieving a separation of powers and checks and balances, it is not. It has achieved only the multiplication of high status positions in organizations.

We see corporations with boards of commissioners, boards of directors, and sometimes boards of management; and foundations with founders' boards, boards of directors and patrons. We still do not see governance reform.

Persons who serve as patrons in foundations may have only the best interests of the organization at heart. But this is not the point. Regardless of the intention, the perpetuation of patronism (with its echoes of paternalism, colonialism and feudalism) cannot be healthy for Indonesia as it struggles toward democracy.

The writer, an attorney and former American diplomat at the U.S. Consulate General in Medan, is president director of the management consultancy firm PT Far Horizons.